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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the broadest terms, this dissertation is an investigation into what it 
would mean for practical reason to provide normative categories of 
intersubjective action in the service of universal freedom. Thematically, my 
strategy in pursuing this question will be first to examine the notion of practical 
reason itself and then to see whether practical reason as it is conceived of by 
Kant can be genuinely intersubjective. The concept of intersubjective action, 
understood as one agent’s reason being a motivating reason for another agent, 
gives rise to two related questions: the first concerns whether it is possible at all 
and the second concerns how the possibility of intersubjectivity is related to 
justice.  
Historically, my strategy will be to pursue these questions in the works of 
broadly Kantian writers, Kant, Rawls, Korsgaard and, lastly, Hegel. By working in 
this tradition I would like to argue that the internal pressures of the failure of 
Kant’s original argument linking freedom and reason forces Kantian writers like 
Rawls and Korsgaard to move closer to the position advocated by Hegel and 
develop a more immanent understanding of the relation between world and 
subject. From a historical point of view, we can see this rapprochement also as 
the overcoming of the widely diagnosed metaphysical residue which plagued 
Kant’s writing: the radical distinction between the free will of the subject and the 
deterministic world of physics.  
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I further believe that arguing for the continuity of the problematic of 
practical reason and immanent reflection on both the ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ 
sides of the debate means that this once hard and fast distinction is becoming of 
less and less value. Convergence of the two sides can be see in the fact that 
both Bernard Williams’ and Hegel’s critique of the Kantian position overlap in 
many aspects. But more important than that, I wish to emphasize that these two 
criticisms lead to a reshaping of the debate which in no way turns away from 
Kant’s original commitments to freedom and intersubjectivity. I thus see Hegel’s 
role in this dissertation not as adversarial but rather as completing a project 
which has recently been articulated more clearly by writers like Rawls and 
Korsgaard.  
The aims of this dissertation can also be stated in slightly different terms, 
namely those of the now 200 year old debate between Kant and Hegel. As 
indicated, I see general agreement between Kant and Hegel in terms of the 
scope and ways of grounding a theory of practical reason. However, this should 
not blind us to the still significant differences between the Kantian and the 
Hegelian perspectives. These differences will be examined here from the agent-
centered perspective. I will argue that the Hegelian perspective is that of the 
agent acting within history while the Kantian perspective is essentially ahistorical 
and as such fails to account for the position of the real existing individual’s 
position.  
This difference lies at the heart of the familiar claim that Kant’s moral 
theory is empty. But to say only that is to miss the fact that Kant’s notion of 
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freedom does not commit us to an ahistorical perspective. What I would like to 
draw out in this dissertation is the extent to which the perspective of individual 
agency might be retained within the Kantian account if this account is modified to 
emphasize the position of the individual striving for, but not necessarily 
achieving, universal justice. The decisive shift in the philosophical transition from 
a Kantian theory to a Hegelian one is accordingly to be found in rejecting the idea 
that a complete system of duties can be articulated from an impersonal 
perspective and in the embrace of the idea that the duties we do have are only 
ever the result of concrete and historically situated rational reflection.1  
This shift is decisive since it is only from the latter perspective that the 
contingencies of the world can be both accounted for and made less arbitrary 
with regard to justice. A merely ideal theory will fail to connect to concrete 
decisions and so be insufficient to orient an agent’s thinking in the world. This 
point is powerfully made by both Hegel and Bernard Williams. Williams insists on 
the non-ideality of the present world and argues vehemently that in order to make 
sense of actions, we must take their origin in this non-ideal world into 
consideration. Universal prescriptions will not help us here.  
Indeed, reason is able to abstract from its historical conditions by 
universalizing its aims but this does not mean that my current reflections are 
universal in the sense of being unchanging. In drawing up the parameters of my 
                                            
1 I do not want to claim that Kant himself held such a rigoristic theory. My discussion here does 
not concern itself with seeing whether the categorical imperative can be gotten to ‘work’ in some 
  
 7 
reflections, I might be inattentive to certain features of my environment that future 
generations will consider of central importance— my carbon footprint for 
example. The agent centered perspective universalizes but does not consider its 
results universal because it does not believe that reason can completely outstrip 
contingent conditions. It if could, what good would its judgments on current 
situations be?  
The key to a theory of justice, I will argue, involves the idea that one can 
and must continually revise ethical norms and political laws with an eye toward 
making them more and more universal though also with the recognition that no 
law or norm can last. Reflection is only ever for the short to medium term.  
 
The issue which shadows and, I will argue, is deeply connected to, the 
question of the perspective of the agent and the justice of her actions is the issue 
of metaphysics. For the division between freedom and nature which Kant seeks 
to overcome is fundamentally an question of overcoming the idea that there is a 
physically determined order to the universe which humans cannot help but follow. 
To put it more pointedly, the question of justice is whether humans themselves 
can make sense of their suffering and thus whether they can do anything to 
alleviate it. The idea that there is or is not anything humans can do about their 
situation is essentially ‘metaphysical’ in the sense that it is a question that must 
go beyond physical nature. The idea of agency is thus in a strong sense itself 
                                                                                                                                  
casuistic way. What is at stake here is the claim to universality of certain maxims deemed 
impermissible or enjoined.  
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metaphysical. And this means that the metaphysics of agency is the central topic 
of (meta-) ethics. Metaphysics thus asks after the sense of suffering and with 
that, it asks about the justice of some people suffering and not others.  
With this claim I mean to draw attention to the fact that the problem of 
agency is constitutively tied to the problem of the meaning or sense of suffering 
for each individual. When I thus say that there is a change is perspective 
between the ahistorical Kantian position of rational reflection which assumes that 
all are capable of justice and the temporal Hegelian position that justice is 
something to be achieved both in terms of concrete social organization and 
philosophical reflection itself, I am pointing to a fundamental disagreement about 
the nature of metaphysics and how it can be overcome or discharged.  
Thus the tendency in Kantian constructivism to sidestep the question of 
metaphysics by seeking to establish the possibility of agency misses precisely 
what gave rise to the question of metaphysics itself, namely actual suffering. 
Actual suffering, I will argue, can only be accounted for from the perspective of 
actual agents reflecting on their actual situation.  
 
 
The Structure of the Dissertation  
In the first chapter we will examine Kant’s own attempt to show that 
human are capable of autonomous moral action. This involves a deduction which 
takes the form of the argument that since we can think of ourselves as free, we 
must be free. Kant abandoned this attempt because he recognized that it relied 
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on metaphysically inadmissible notions of the ontological priority of the noumenal 
realm. In order to develop the problematic of self-grounding further, I will follow 
the analysis of Kant’s deduction with two additional interpretation of Kant’s 
practical philosophy, both of which suggest a way of overcoming Kant’s 
difficulties. One will be the interpretation of Gerald Prauss who argues that Kant’s 
failure to ground pure practical reason deductively stems from being forced to 
separate nature from the self. Prauss suggests that Kant might have found a way 
out of his difficulty if he had developed a more inclusive notion of autonomy. 
Heinz Kaulbach, by contrast, argues that history can play a decisive role in 
Kant’s conception of practical philosophy. History can be seen as the gradual 
reorientation of the subject away from appetitive nature toward a commitment 
toward autonomy. Both of these approaches, I conclude, put pressure on Kant’s 
strict division between the autonomous self and the causal world, requiring a 
more inclusive treatment of human desire in moral philosophy.  
In chapter two, I consider Rawls’ attempt to base a Kantian moral theory 
on the coherentist principle of the reflective equilibrium. Rawls’ avowed intention 
to remain metaphysically neutral, however, presents a problem for the theory of 
intersubjectivity and therefore normativity since without the guarantee that the 
agents in Rawls’ reflective equilibrium do share the same fundamental rational 
structure of acting on practical reason, there is no way of knowing what sort of a 
consensus one is building in negotiation. One might be building genuine 
consensus or one might just be talking at cross purposes while believing that 
genuine consensus is being built.  
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Chapter three examines two critiques of the Kantian enterprise of 
grounding the principle of pure practical reason. The purpose of this chapter is to 
give a basic outline of what the Hegelian critique of the notion of the categorical 
imperative as a test for the permissibility of action amounts to in Hegel and also 
to give the slightly different critique Bernard Williams makes of the possibility of 
having a ‘rigoristic’ morality system. In this chapter I argue that the critique of the 
Kantian enterprise voiced by Williams and Hegel comes down to a critique of the 
categorical imperative as a transcendental or reified rule for acting. That is, 
because the categorical imperative test is external to what it is testing, it cannot 
be a reliable guide to action. And, as such, to add Williams’ other point, it 
burdens us with unreasonable demands which ask us to give up the fundamental 
commitments which make us who we are.  
Against this, I present Korsgaard’s theory of reflection in chapter four. 
Here I argue that because Korsgaard interprets the categorical imperative as the 
process of reflective endorsement of incentives back on themselves, there is no 
problem of a mismatch between the practical problem facing the agent and what 
the agent proposes as a solution. Showing this involves some discussion of 
Korsgaard’s moral psychology. Ultimately I will argue that Korsgaard is an 
internalist about reason, though in a different way from Williams. I also show that 
the disagreement between Korsgaard and Williams about where fundamental 
values come from is a result of Williams’ Humean internalism. But Korsgaard’s 
argument that reflective endorsement provides the agent with reasons for action 
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does not yet mean that it provides others with reasons for action. This is what I 
call the egoism objection, already made against Rawls in chapter two.  
In chapter five I follow up the on the problem of egoism by giving an 
account of Korsgaard’s theory of the publicity of reason. Here she argues that 
since desires are in some way prior to their reflective endorsement, anyone’s 
reasons can become candidates for endorsement. There is thus no strong 
distinction between my desires and other peoples’ desires. I take this to have 
established the possibility of intersubjectivity or communal deliberation.  
In chapter six, I turn to Hegel in order to give more depth to the notion of 
intersubjectivity by trying to see how a theory of intersubjectivity might be able to 
give us more concrete guidance for action than the idea of mere possibility of 
justice does. In this chapter, again using Williams, I argue that moving toward 
justice requires us always to already have certain standards of justice which are 
then displaced by the newly arrived at standards. I thus reinterpret Williams’ 
challenge to the Kantian position as a deep concern about the unjust political 
organization that would force one to choose between fulfilling one’s vocation, 
say, of becoming a great painter and staying with one’s family. I thus argue that 
standards of justice are inherently historical.  
In chapter seven, I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic with a view to understanding Hegel’s moral psychology. Here it is my 
aim to show that Hegel construes the development of society as a series of 
struggles in which the reasons of those previously unheard by the dominant class 
enter into the consciousness of those who hold power. I interpret Hegel as 
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insisting that justice is a matter of the historical revision of the standards for 
action.  
I conclude the dissertation with some remarks about the connection 
between the process of philosophical reflection and the perspective of the agent 
within history.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
AUTONOMY AND KANTʼS (FAILED) DEDUCTION OF FREEDOM 
 
Kant’s moral philosophy, as we saw in the introduction, is based on finding 
a positive employment for pure reason. For Kant this means determining a way in 
which pure reason can guide our actions. This means showing not only that 
rational beings would conform to the law, but also that humans are rational 
beings. This double problem might be stated as the problem of bridging the gap 
between the weak autonomy thesis and the strong autonomy thesis, where the 
former thesis is simply the (analytic) notion that rational beings determine 
themselves according to reason and the latter thesis holds that humans are such 
rational beings. The transcendental deduction of morality in Kant’s Groundwork 
chapter 3 is supposed to bridge this gap and thus show that human beings act 
under the law of pure practical reason.  
Kant’s problem, formulated in different terms, is the problem of whether 
reason can motivate us to action by itself or whether all action stems in some 
sense from ‘natural’ inclinations. To put it yet another way, the question is 
whether rational reflection can bring the results of the understanding’s own 
synthesis of intuition under categories into accord with the regulative principles 
coming from reason itself. In this sense, the transcendental deduction of morality 
is really supposed to be an extension of the anti-metaphysical project carried out 
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in the Critique of Pure Reason, since the deduction of morality (just like the 
transcendental deduction of the categories) insists that morality (and knowledge 
of the external world) is independent of external givens, like god or society. 
Reason is here shown to be self-grounding. The problem is that the analogy 
between the deduction of the categories of the understanding in terms of the 
apperception thesis breaks down when it is applied to the realm of pure practical 
reason. The deduction of a principle of pure reason in the noumenal realm 
cannot then be translated back into a principle which has normative force in the 
matters of the sensible realm.  
The deduction of the moral law was a failure as Kant himself came to 
realize in the Critique of Practical Reason. There Kant recognized that he had 
failed to show that reason is self-grounding in the way he wanted to. He failed to 
show that thinking of ourselves as moral is a sufficient (though necessary) 
condition for being moral. The problem, I will argue, is that in setting up the 
deduction, Kant’s distinction between the sensible and the noumenal world 
comes back to haunt him. Once this division is invoked, there is simply no way of 
overcoming it. Showing this to be so will set the ground of a reworking of the 
notion of  moral reflection in subsequent authors, all of whom seek to avoid 
Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal distinction.  
After a discussion of the failed deduction, I will turn to two influential 
interpretations of Kant’s theory of morality, which point in directions not taken by 
Kant, but ones that will find their analogue in my discussion of Hegel. The first is 
Gerald Prauss’ interpretation, which lays the foundation for an understanding of 
  
 15 
Kant’s moral theory as a post-metaphysical theory centering on the concept of 
autonomy rather than morality, much as Hegel’s speculative theory does. Prauss 
claims that by running together morality and autonomy Kant reduces nature to a 
necessary evil while upholding an extra-worldly notion of morality. Second, I will 
examine Friedrich Kaulbach’s attempt to establish a Kantian notion of autonomy 
by providing a historical structure to ethical reasoning in which autonomy is the 
site of a struggle between our inclinations and reason, and in which reason 
ultimately can win out and reorient the self toward reason. The claim, then, is that 
Kant’s theory of action, if historically mediated, could provide a way of 
overcoming the problematic dichotomy of the noumenal and the sensible.  
 
Practical Reason, Autonomy and Moral Insight 
Before getting to the deduction of freedom and morality in Groundwork III 
it will be helpful to make some general remarks about what we are looking for in 
such a deduction. Let us recall again that the deduction of morality has two parts. 
The first shows that rational beings are moral (thus obeying the categorical 
imperative), and the second shows that humans are such rational beings. The 
first step thus has to do with autonomy but not yet with morality. It is only in the 
second step that moral is ‘established’ with recourse to an argument according to 
which humans have  noumenal natures and are thus rational.  
Another important element is the practical nature of reason. For Kant 
reason is practical when there are sufficient reasons for the will to realize a 
particular purpose. Reason, in other words, is practical when it is employed as 
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the answer to the question ‘what should I do’? Practical reason is pure when it 
causes or motivates an action without reference to (natural) inclination. Acting 
from pure practical reason is thus acting autonomously. If practical reason is to 
be pure, it must satisfy the following two conditions of motivation and normativity: 
(1) reason must contain principles which explain what the will wants, since the 
will is only autonomous if it recognizes the right thing to do without reference to 
the world outside it; and (2) the will must also be binding. The self, and not 
nature, must be able to cause action.2 Practical reason is thus the general 
capacity to realize those ends which the self sets for itself. In realizing its ends, 
the self must thus constantly negotiate with its natural part, its set of inclinations 
and the influences around it. But while action is always the result of some nexus 
of inclinations and deliberation, it is axiomatic for Kant’s account of morality that 
only those actions are moral which are motivated without consideration for 
inclinations or external circumstances.   
Understanding this type of autonomous self-relation is fundamental to 
understand the notion of practical reasons since it is not obvious that it can even 
be shown that the self has such a capacity for self-direction. German Idealism is 
based on the tenet that the self and its consciousness of itself are irreducible 
terms. This means that theoretical knowledge is knowledge of the self’s 
knowledge. I know that I know. To show that practical reason is real, however, it 
must then be shown that this self-relation, this relation of the subject to itself can 
                                            
2 See Dieter Henrich. “Ethik der Autonomie”. Selbstverhältnisse. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982. pp. 6-
56. 12-14.  
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also be understood in a practical way. This would mean that the practical self has 
to will itself in the same way it knows itself. But this would fundamentally involve 
the idea that theoretical knowledge is already practical, that knowing is already 
acting.3 As we shall see, the precise nature of the parallel between practical 
reason and theoretical reason will be an interpretative question. This is the role of 
the categorical imperative which seeks to unite knowledge with normative 
reasons for acting, but the difficulties in getting there are great. Nonetheless, this 
is what Kant tries to show in the deduction.  
To show reason’s practical nature, its ability to determine itself freely, Kant 
limits the proof of freedom by linking it to morality. But morality is only a particular 
type of autonomy, only a particular employment of the use of practical reason.4 
Nonetheless, since Kant treats morality and autonomy as the same for much of 
the Groundwork, it is worth briefly examining the particularities of moral insight. 
Moral insight, as Dieter Henrich characterizes it, is knowledge of the good. But 
this knowledge is not simple theoretical knowledge, since it is unmediated. The 
good is always evidently good and needs no external justification. But the good is 
                                            
3 Gerold Prauss. Kant über Freiheit und Autonomie. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983. 12-15.  
4 What, exactly, this means, is in a sense the purpose of the dissertation in its entirety. For what 
is at stake in the uncoupling of ethical relations from universality makes up the story of much of 
the critique of Kant’s rigorism. In short, the later authors to be considered below have held that 
reflection need not be taken to be universal so much as universalizing. This means that reflection 
reflects from its particular position in history with an eye toward universality by not necessarily 
thinking that it has (or ever can) achieved true moral certainty of the type Kant’s moral theory 
seems to imply.  
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also normative. Knowing the good is to feel bound by it. Thus all immoral action 
involves turning one’s back on the good, at least in the moment of action.  
It is this immediacy of the good in moral action linked to the fact that while 
knowledge may be true or false, action never is. That causes the apparent 
difficulty in linking theoretical knowledge with practical knowledge. Evidently, 
practical and theoretical knowledge, even if fundamentally the same, constitute 
quite different ways of comportment in the world. In the deduction, Kant tries to 
show how we can get from theoretical knowledge to practical action through the 
notion of autonomous reflection.  
 
I see the fundamental task to be accomplished by Kant’s ethics as the 
‘proof’ (through deduction or otherwise) that there is such a thing as practical 
reason or autonomy. I will be looking at three attempts to show this.  
 
Kantʼs Deduction 
Kant’s deduction proceeds in three basic steps. The first is to show that 
rational beings have autonomy, the second is to show that we are rational beings 
and thus autonomous, and the third step is to show that this autonomy requires 
us to be moral. In this chapter, we will be concerned mainly with steps two and 
three. The problem here is that once Kant goes beyond autonomy to morality, he 
must disregard nature as a determining factor in human will and create the 
heteronomy/autonomy distinction which does not hold. Kant is wrong to deny 
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nature in his moral theory. This is a defect that he tries to make up for in his 
political philosophy.  
A word about the reconstruction: I will be basing my account chiefly on 
Allison’s interpretation in his Kant’s Theory of Freedom as this account provides 
the most convincing version of Kant’s argument (including its limitation). I will be 
adding the interpretations of others as I go. Initially my interest will be to provide 
a clear account of this most difficult of sections. Criticisms and the reason why 
Kant abandoned the deduction, will be dealt with after the argument has been 
reconstructed.  
 
The Analycity Thesis and Reciprocity Thesis 
Kant begins Section 1, entitled “The concept of freedom is the key to the 
explanation of the autonomy of the will”5, with the distinction between two types 
of freedom. Negative freedom, as has been established in the third antinomy of 
Critique of Pure Reason, is limited to the ordering of apperception under 
concepts which arise outside the subject and merely affect it. In this case, the 
subject might be purely determined by nature or god and still be able to order 
concepts. The positive concept of freedom involves the will giving itself causal 
laws.  
Kant wants to show that the positive notion of freedom follows from the 
negative notion, that reflection occurs under principles. Kant views the 
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connection between these two terms as analytic: “If, therefore, freedom of the will 
is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by mere 
analysis of its concept.”6 This is followed by the claim: “But the principle of 
morality— that an absolutely good will is that whose maxim can always contain 
itself regarded as a universal law— is nevertheless always a synthetic 
proposition; for, by analysis of the concept of an absolutely good will that 
property of its maxim cannot be discovered.”7  
These two sentences prefigure the argument almost in its entirety. The 
argument must thus proceed as follows: The Analycity Thesis states that a fully 
rational will always acts autonomously, i. e. under its own laws. Freedom 
requires rationality, self-determination. Then it must be shown, in Section Two of 
Groundwork III, that rational wills act under the idea of freedom. Section Three 
shows that humans are rational beings, from which it follows that we are free. 
Section Four shows that rationality implies the notion of the categorical 
imperative, that is, that the moral law has validity for us. Morality, however, is a 
synthetic proposition and thus requires a deduction. Allison argues that what is 
being deduced in GMS III is not freedom itself, but morality (the synthetic 
                                                                                                                                  
5 “Der Begriff der Freiheit ist der Schlüssel zur Erklärung der Autonomie des Willens” GMS 446-
47 
6 “Wenn also Freiheit des Willens vorausgesetzt wird, so folgt die Sittlichkeit samt ihrem Prinzip 
daraus durch bloße Zergliederung ihres Begriffs.“ GMS 447.  
7 “Indessen ist das letztere [Sittlichkeit] doch immer ein synthetischer Satz: ein schlechterdings 
guter Wille ist derjenige, dessen Maxime jederzeit sich selbst, als allgemeines Gesetz betrachtet, 
in sich enthalten kann, denn durch Zergliederung des Begriffs von einem schlechthin guten Willen 
Kann jene Eigenschaft der Maxime nicht gefunden werden.“ GMS 447 
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proposition). Once morality is established, freedom can be derived from it. It is 
only in this circuitous way that Kant can move from negative freedom to positive 
freedom. In a way, it might be said that morality is only a stepping stone on the 
way there.  
 
The Reciprocity Thesis 
What Allison calls the Reciprocity Thesis is an interpretation of the 
Analycity Thesis. Positive freedom or self-determination can be interpreted in two 
ways; as practical freedom or as transcendental freedom. Practical freedom, the 
weaker thesis, implies only that a rational agent would be able to determine the 
means to an end. This is simply the ability to reflect on a task and choose one 
means to achieving it over another. Such reflection implies nothing about the 
ultimate source of the principle according to which we seek to accomplish the 
given end. This type of freedom is compatible with strong determinism since we 
might be motivated by genetic determinations all the way down. Allison argues 
that Kant rejects this weaker thesis.  
To prove positive freedom, freedom must be taken in the strong, 
transcendental sense. A transcendentally free agent adopts her principles 
because they are rational rather than because they are expedient (and thus 
informed by some inclination). Since they are adopted by the agent freely, it must 
be possible to give reasons for their adoption. Since there is no source higher 
than transcendental freedom from which the reasons could derive and which 
could guarantee their adequacy, this type of reason giving is exclusively 
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autonomous. Only conformity to an unconditional practical law could provide the 
required ultimate justification and autonomy.  
We must now show that conformity to the practical law is both a sufficient 
and necessary condition of the justification of maxims. Allison argues that it is 
easy enough to show that transcendental freedom/self-determination is a 
sufficient condition for ultimate reason giving: something that is justified (that is, a 
sufficient reason) to all others surely is justified (a sufficient reason) to me.  
But we must also show that transcendental freedom is necessary. For if 
we cannot show this, it might still mean that some other, universal but 
heteronomous source (like god), could be determining us to give the type of 
universal reasons we give. The problem is that the maxim only seems justified if 
it already takes the form of morality, i. e. is done from duty. But it cannot be that 
only that which is done from duty is self-determined. Allison thinks we can 
overcome this difficulty by means of the distinction between permissible and 
obligatory. We could thus say that the maxim must be justified only as at least 
permissible, i. e. at least not contradicting the self-determination of all others 
around me.  
Since we are not concerned with appetitive beings here, we are not 
dealing with restrictions on desires and inclinations. We are dealing with what is 
permissible as such, i. e. rationally justifiable under any circumstances. But this is 
precisely what Kant understands by the unconditional practical law.  
Having avoided pegging self-determination to duty alone, we still have a 
neutral conception of practical reason as self-determination or autonomy. We 
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merely have a universally valid justification which is empty of content. There are 
no moral laws which can regulate our conduct other than reflection itself. 
Autonomy is to act under practical reason. Transcendental freedom means 
acting under the practical law.  
Allison thinks that Kant has thus shown that practical freedom will not 
suffice to give a general justification for a maxim, but transcendental freedom will. 
This is because practical freedom is ends oriented while transcendental freedom 
is not. The key difference is retained in the idea of permissibility which, in this 
context, is not a moral conception (though duty or obligation would have been). 
So far we have shown that rational agents must be thought of as 
transcendentally free. We have not determined this freedom with regard to any 
required types of action. Thus far we also do not know why transcendentally free 
agents conform to the pure practical law.  
The next step must tell us something about the unconditionally practical 
law’s connection to the moral law, for it is through morality that Kant wants to 
show that freedom exists. The key move will involve some notion of intentionality 
which will reveal our connection to the moral law. In other words, Kant will have 
to show that conforming to the practical law is the same thing as conforming to 
the practical law because it is the practical law. We must thus connect what 
appears to be a ‘fact’ about rational free agents (their conformity to the practical 
law) with the intentional structure behind this ‘fact’ (why they do so). Allison 
argues that to say that “conformity to universal law must be the reason for 
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adopting a maxim is just to say that [the law’s] merely legislative form must 
provide the reason […], the ‘determining ground’ of the will.”8  
Transcendental freedom is the missing link since transcendental freedom 
as self-determination means that one’s reasons are normative for oneself in an 
unconditional way. This, and here comes the problematic step in the argument, is 
because transcendental freedom is not connected to any desires or physical 
impediments. For transcendentally free agents, actions and reasons for actions 
are one and the same. Practical freedom, by contrast, does not have 
unconditional norms because it is (at least at times) externally determined.9  
But this now only establishes the categorical imperative for 
rational/transcendentally free beings (if, at this level, we can even speak of 
imperatives), but not yet for humans. Allison has thus established that Kant starts 
from a thick notion of transcendental freedom rather than the thin one of rational 
agency. Self-determination, in other words, is a normative act. We can now look 
back and see why Kant thinks that, for transcendentally free rational agents at 
least, it is analytic that morality follows from the analysis of freedom. It follows 
because, for purely rational agents, to be self-determining, to have reasons for 
actions, just means acting on these reasons. And this means simply taking one’s 
reason’s to be motivating, which Kant believes to be an analytic claim.   
 
                                            
8 Allison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom.  
9 In a sense, this is a precursor to the internalism argument we will see in chapter 3. To have a 
reason for an action is thus to act. Nothing is a reason unless it can motivate an agent.  
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The second part of the ‘proof’ of freedom concerns the question of 
whether humans have a rational will. Accordingly the next section, Section Two, 
will argue that rational wills cannot help but act under the idea of freedom, and 
that all rational beings with a will must be free.  
 
The Preparatory Argument and the Argument against Fatalism 
Allison argues that since the moral law is supposed to apply to us qua 
rational beings, and since (by the Reciprocity Thesis) it is supposed to be derived 
solely from the property of freedom, freedom must itself be presupposed as a 
universal property of rational beings with a will. But since, per the Critique of Pure 
Reason, freedom cannot be proven theoretically, the next best strategy is to 
argue from the weaker thesis that freedom must necessarily be presupposed, 
and this is just what Kant seems to do. The so called preparatory argument 
makes the point in two steps:  
(1) “I say now: every being that cannot act otherwise than under the 
idea of freedom is just because of that really free in a practical respect […].”10  
(2) “Now I assert that to every rational being having a will we must 
necessarily lend the idea of freedom also, under which alone he acts.”11  
 
                                            
10 “Ich sage nun: Ein jedes Wesen, das nicht anders als unter der Idee der Freiheit handeln kann, 
ist eben darum in praktischer Rücksicht wirklich frei.” GMS 448.  
11 “Nun behaupte ich: dass wir jedem vernünftigen Wesen, das einen Willen hat, notwendig auch 
die Idee der Freiheit leihen müssen, unter der es allein handelt.” GMS 448 
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The cash value of being free ‘from a practical point of view’ is that one is 
subject to whatever laws one would be subject to if, per impossibile, it could be 
proven (theoretically) that one is free. As Ameriks remarks, this means that a 
proof of our freedom ‘in a theoretical respect’ would add nothing about the truth 
of our freedom or its relevant practical consequences.12 
One would expect Kant to go on arguing as follows (Allison calls this the 
extended argument):  
“(3) All laws ‘inseparably bound up with freedom’ are valid for every being 
with reason and will.  
(4) But the Reciprocity Thesis establishes that the moral law is 
‘inseparably bound up with freedom’.  
(5) Therefore, the moral law is valid for every being with reason and will.  
(6) Since beings such as ourselves have reason and will, the moral law is 
valid for us.  
(7) Since we do not necessarily follow the dictates of the law (these 
dictates being ‘objective necessity’ but ‘subjective contingency’), the law for us 
takes the form of a categorical imperative, that is, we are rationally constrained, 
although not necessarily causally necessitated, to obey it.”13  
The problem with this line of argument is that, as Henrich points out, Kant 
has not yet established that humans have a will, i.e. that they have a practical 
                                            
12 Karl Ameriks. “Kant’s Deduction of Morality and Freedom”. 170.  
13 Alllison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. 216.  
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capacity at all.14 Here Kant identifies practical reason with will. This invalidates 
points (6) and thus the entire argument.  
Another perspective on the argument is given by Allan Wood who argues 
that the preparatory argument presents us with a sort of analogy of between 
rational norms and morality. He claims that Kant needs to argue that the capacity 
we ascribe to ourselves in regarding ourselves as subjects of moral obligation is 
of exactly the same kind as the one we ascribe to ourselves in thinking of 
ourselves as judging according to rational norms, therefore if we cannot 
intelligibly doubt that we have such a capacity in one case, we have no good 
ground for doubting that we have it in the other. That this claim is legitimate can 
be seen in the fact that we do not accept logical rules only temporarily. We follow 
logical rules because it is unconditionally necessary to do so in order to preserve 
the truth of our judgments. All those who think of themselves as making rational 
judgments already presuppose something that commits them to morality.  
The point of the preparatory argument, as these commentators point out, 
is that thinking of yourself as free is, in a practical sense, already to be free. This 
is why a theoretical proof cannot make us more free, nor can a proof that we are 
in some sense determined take away from our freedom. Freedom is a first 
personal experience and thus thoroughly practical.15  
 
                                            
14 Dieter Henrich. “Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes”. 64-70.  
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The Hidden Circle 
Next Kant raises the problem of a circle in his argument.16 This problem is 
neatly formulated by Ameriks:  
If we define a rational will as a will of its own in the sense that it is to obey only 
self-legislated principles, principles which according to Kant can be only of a 
universalizable type, then subjection to morality can follow from freedom of will. 
But the entailment involves a kind of circle, for the free rational will that is the 
premise leads to morality only because its freedom is understood not as merely 
(negative) transcendental freedom, but as autonomy.17  
The problem, as stated by Ameriks, is that Kant simply has not yet 
established the positive concept of freedom needed for morality. He has 
established only that rational agents must take themselves to be free.   
The circle has been much debated in the literature, but Allison’s 
deflationary approach to the problem seems a good one. According to Allison, 
the problem of the circle is only apparently a problem for Kant since Kant has not 
actually made the argument that would trap him in the circle. At this point, the 
argument is only hypothetical: “If one regards oneself as a rational agent, then 
one must also regard oneself as free and therefore as standing under the moral 
                                                                                                                                  
15 We should note, however, that putting things in this way already foreshadows the central 
problem for Kant, which is that freedom might turn out to be too ‘first personal’, that is, it might 
only apply to me.  
16 GMS 450.  
17 Ameriks. “Kant’s Deduction of Freedom and Morality”. 172.  
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law.”18 But Kant has not yet made the extended argument (points 3-7 above). If 
he had done so, however, without having established our rational nature (as he 
has not), he would have been guilty of a circular argument, i.e. assuming the idea 
of freedom only because of the moral law (rational will) in order subsequently to 
infer the moral law in its turn from freedom.19  
This point serves again to emphasize the care Kant is taking in making the 
argument for freedom. It also helps to set up the problem of the actual deduction 
of morality and its implication of freedom.  
 
The Two Standpoints Argument 
The circle can only be resolved if Kant can show that we are rational 
agents with wills. Kant does this with the help of the two standpoints argument. 
Again we follow Allison. The two standpoints argument claims that our 
membership in the intelligible world provides the needed nonmoral premise from 
which our freedom and (by the Reciprocity Thesis) our subjection to the moral 
law can be derived in a manner which is neither question-begging nor circular 
manner. The argument must show that, qua members of the intelligible world, we 
are warranted in assuming that we really are rational agents and, as such, really 
subject to the moral law. This is also meant to show, then, that we have practical 
reason, i.e. the ability to determine ourselves through the practical law. This is 
                                            
18 Allison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. 221.  
19 GMS 453.  
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the most controversial step in the deduction and the one that ultimately drove 
Kant to abandon the deduction.  
The key is now to show that we humans are members of the intelligible 
world. We thus need two more arguments: (1) an argument that, without 
appealing to either the moral law or presupposing freedom, establishes our 
entitlement to regard ourselves as member of the intelligible world, even if only 
from a ‘point of view’ or ‘standpoint’; and (2) an argument showing that, qua 
members of the intelligible world, we are justified in regarding ourselves as 
rational agents, that is, as rational beings with wills. Given this, Allison argues, 
the validity of the moral law for us would follow by Reciprocity Thesis.20 That is to 
say, Kant must show both that we are free and that this freedom is able actually 
to influence our empirical nature through our will.  
The argument proceeds from the analytic claim earlier that we act on 
reasons. Then Kant adds that as cognitive beings we are conscious of capacities 
in virtue of which we cannot conceive ourselves merely as sensibly conditioned. 
That is, we are conscious of having reasons for our actions. So, knowing that we 
have a will must now be linked with membership in the noumenal world in which 
reasons are always acted upon. The problem is that mere consciousness of 
having a will is not enough to establish that we actually have a will. (If it were, 
there would be no problem of the circle and no recourse to the intelligible world 
would be needed.)  
                                            
20 Allison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom.  
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The crux of the argument is that if consciousness of the will is also an 
activity of the will (in the intelligible world), this evades the danger that the will is 
merely illusory or determined from some outside source, (since transcendental 
idealism rules out any empirical effects on the intelligible world). From the two 
different perspectives, the will is thus real both in the intelligible and the sensible 
sense. It is both passive with regard to the object’s nature and active in changing 
this nature.  
This point comes down to the notion that self-consciousness, which might 
be deceived, cannot be deceived in its practical employment because practical 
employment is already an action within the world. There is thus a crucial 
difference between thinking oneself free and acting on such a thought. You might 
think you are free and be deceived, but if you think you are free and act as if you 
are free, you have just acted freely. And if you have just acted freely from your 
standpoint, no one can say that you have not acted freely from an ‘objective’ 
standpoint.  
 
The Categorical Imperative 
Thus far Kant has established that we (humans) may think of ourselves as 
both possessing a will and as being able to use it freely (in an incompatibilist and 
transcendental sense). He has not yet established that we have any reason to do 
so, or, to put it differently, that pure practical reason can actually motivate us and 
is therefore normative for us. What, in other words, is the relation between the ‘is’ 
of our self-determination, and the ‘ought’ of morality? This further step must be 
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accomplished in the section entitled “How is the categorical imperative 
possible?”21 Again we turn to Allison. This step presupposes that the moral law is 
the law according to which intelligible beings act, and that it is also the distinction 
between governance in intelligible and sensible worlds. Kant first notes that if we 
were purely intelligible beings, all of our actions would be autonomous; if we 
were solely part of the sensible world, however, all our actions would be 
governed by desires and inclinations.  
The deduction itself comes at Groundwork 453-4. The nerve of this 
argument lies in the complex claim that since the intelligible world is (in general) 
the ground of the sensible world and its laws, and since the will as a member of 
the intelligible world is subject to its laws, the will must also be conceived of as 
grounded in the intelligible world and its laws. From this it supposedly follows that 
sensibly affected and therefore phenomenal beings such as ourselves, who are 
likewise conscious of possessing a will, experience the law stemming from this 
noumenal will as an unconditional command, that is, a categorical imperative 
addressed to them in their phenomenal nature.22  
It is worth pausing here to remark that this argument is really the crux of 
Kant’s theory of normativity. What makes a reason powerful enough to motivate 
us, that is, to beat out competing inclinations, is that its source stems from our 
noumenal or rational nature. What makes rational reflection motivating, in other 
words, is its purity, its separateness from the world in which the human agent 
                                            
21 “Wie ist ein kategorischer Imperativ möglich? GMS 453-56 
22 Allison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. 225.  
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must act. The problem with this argument is that sensible creatures must be 
addressed by the moral law in the right way, i.e. they must be affected but cannot 
be necessitated. The separateness from nature which gives reason its authority 
also threatens to keep reason from affecting the natural world of inclination. 
Normativity must retain its motivational character and must thus appear in the 
form of a command. But it is not clear how this might occur.23  
Kant tries to confront this problem by arguing that the moral law is 
synthetic. Thus the synthetic a priori proposition (“an absolutely good will is that 
whose maxim can always contain itself regarded as a universal law”24) has 
already been established in the deduction of the moral law, not merely at the 
introduction of the categorical imperative. The derivation of this synthetic a priori 
is only possible on the basis of the positive concept of freedom, which furnishes 
the third term enabling the link between the concept of the absolutely good will 
and the moral requirement. The will cannot be considered moral unless it is free 
in a transcendental sense. If freedom were of a lesser degree, we could not rule 
                                            
23 Allison argues that, with the benefit of hindsight, what Kant seems to need is his later 
distinction between Wille and Willkür, where pure Wille (or pure practical reason) confronts the 
sensibly affected (yet free) Willkür as an unconditional demand, one to which our needs as 
sensible beings must be subordinate. Allison’s argument is a version of the argument Kaulbach 
will make on a broader scale, namely that in order to unify ‘wild’ nature and reason, we really 
need a third term, the nature in the true self. But while Allison bases his argument on a reading of 
Religion, Kaulbach believes the point can be made more generally.  
24 “Ein schlechterdings guter Wille ist derjenige, dessen Maxime jederzeit sich selbst, als 
allgemeines Gesetz betrachtet, in sich enthalten kann.” GMS 447 
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out being influenced by an external force. Morality requires transcendental or 
incompatibilist freedom.  
Finally, once one has established the status of the moral law as the 
principle of autonomy on which rational agents would necessarily act if reason 
were fully in control, there is no further difficulty in claiming that it is also the 
principle on which rational agents ought to act should they be tempted to do 
otherwise. This point is a consequence of the two stand point argument under 
which the is/ought distinction is a distinction merely of perspective and not of fact 
or ontology. So, by reducing the distinction between our phenomenal and 
intelligible nature to a matter of perspective, Kant tries to show that we can be 
affected by both. Our noumenal nature’s superior authority, however, means that 
when it raises its voice in command, we ought to heed it and not our natural 
inclinations.  
This point, however, needs further clarification. We can now turn to Dieter 
Schönecker and Allen Wood’s analysis of this issue of transition from 
autonomy/freedom to morality. In doing so, we should keep in mind that what is 
being sought is an answer to how, in fact, we are to understand Kant’s claim that 
the categorical imperative is merely the concept of the moral law under the 
conditions of a finite will, as Otfried Höffe has nicely put it.25 To put it differently, 
how can the two standpoint argument maintain the ontological equality of both 
perspectives while maintaining the motivational (and therefore affective) 
superiority of the intelligible?  
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We saw earlier, in Allison’s defense of the Reciprocity Thesis, that Kant 
was able to show that for a rational being (existing in the noumenal realm) there 
was strictly speaking no distinction between being free and being moral. To act 
autonomously simply is to act according to the categorical imperative, i.e. to treat 
people as ends and never as means only. Of course, for purely rational 
creatures, there can be no imperative properly speaking since what they want to 
do and what they should do are the same. This is not so for humans. Humans 
are impeded in their rational willing by desires and habits. What Kant must thus 
show is that the moral law has a motivating effect on rational human beings.  
 According to Schönecker and Wood the answer to this question is that I 
should act morally because I can act morally. But this answer is only possible if it 
can be shown that being-able-to-act-morally is fundamentally a wanting-to-act-
morally. It is Schönecker and Wood’s hypothesis that Kant grounds the wanting-
to-act-morally on the claim that the intelligible world has a superior ontological 
status. Schönecker and Wood thus conclude that, in a fundamental sense, for 
Kant the ‘true self’ is really conceived of as wanting what it ought to want rather 
than what it wants to want.26 The true self, in other words, is the noumenal self. 
But to say that is, again, to have separated the noumenal self from the sensible 
self to such an extent that they seem to have no contact at all.  
                                                                                                                                  
25 See Otfried Höffe. Immanuel Kant. 181-85.  
26 Schönecker and Wood Kants ‘Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitte’; Ein einführender 
Kommentar. 200-202.  
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For Schönecker and Wood the superiority of moral autonomy and what 
makes it appear as an imperative in the sensible world, is moral autonomy’s  
ontologically superior status. For it is only in the difference between the 
intelligible and the sensible world that such a thing as morality can even appear; 
it is only beings who are intelligible and sensible at once who must be motivated 
to act on one of their parts rather than on the other.  
Stressing the point made above about ontological separateness, 
Schönecker and Wood conclude that this argument is illegitimate because Kant 
uses the distinction between the sensible and intelligible worlds in an ontological 
sense, but seeks an epistemological conclusion about motivation from it. It 
remains unclear how the ontological distinction between the sensible and 
intelligible world can be bridged such that the sensible world could be affected (in 
the appropriate way) by the intelligible world.27 What is ultimately required here is 
an explanation of how there can be such a thing as a non-necessary 
necessitation. How can we be divided and yet unified in the way Kant describes?   
As noted earlier, Kant’s answer seems to reside in the difficult two 
standpoint argument according to which we are free in a practical sense if we 
think we are: “every being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of 
freedom is just because of that really free in a practical respect”.28 Much depends 
on what Kant means by ‘idea’ here. ‘Idea’ here cannot be anything other than 
                                            
27 Schönecker and Wood Kants ‘Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitte’; Ein einführender 
Kommentar. 206. See also Allison’s criticism of the same issue above.  
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that which powers the normative force of the categorical imperative. Since we are 
not purely rational, we can only have an idea of the noumenal law while living 
under the influence of nature. So, in a certain way, the two standpoint argument 
boils down to the question of our relation to nature both in ourselves and outside 
of ourselves. And this question becomes the question of whether we can, in fact, 
act autonomously at all, i.e. whether we have pure reason.  
To put the question another way, the issue at stake is whether the idea of 
the moral law is a representation (of knowledge) or whether it is a practical rule of 
motivation. It must certainly be the latter since the idea must bring with it stronger 
authority than does epistemic knowledge, which is limited by our inability to 
represent the thing in itself. The authority of pure reason in its practical 
employment, however, must be completely self-authorizing and this means being 
motivating, a reason for action.  
Annemarie Pieper presents an argument which might help us see the two 
standpoint argument in a new light. She argues that the Categorical Imperative, 
as based on Kant’s distinction between the intelligible and the sensible worlds, 
does not constitute the naturalistic fallacy (as Karl-Heinz Itling maintains29) in that 
it illicitly connects an ‘is’ with an ‘ought’ (where this distinction is taken as 
pertaining to different ontological statuses of motivations and facts). Rather, she 
argues, the distinction must be seen from the correct point of view and since the 
                                                                                                                                  
28 “Ein jedes Wesen, dass nicht anders als unter der Idee der Freiheit handeln kann, ist eben 
darum in praktischer Rücksicht wirklich frei.” GMS 448 
29 Karl-Heinz Itling. “Der naturalistische Fehlschluß bei Kant”.  
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empirical will cannot be the recipient of the categorical imperative, and the 
intelligible world cannot be seen as motivating the sensible world directly, Kant 
seeks to resolve the issue by placing it in the context of the theoretical and 
practical standpoints. She writes:  
The categorical imperative does not exist; it has no way of being 
and exists just as little as the world of the understanding does. […] 
The categorical imperative only comes into view from the 
perspective of practical reason: as a practical law, that is, as the 
normativity of norm generating laws whose ground is itself the 
highest normative principle, the principle of freedom.30   
 
The point is then that the categorical imperative is a purely practical law, 
unintelligible from the theoretical (empirical) perspective. Its basis, freedom, is 
equally unintelligible from the theoretical knowledge. This much we already know 
from the Critique of Pure Reason. But this still does not directly address the 
problem of the seeming ontological superiority of the noumenal realm over the 
phenomenal realm.  
 
The interpretation of Kant’s deduction I have given over the past sections 
concludes that Kant is unable to provide a justification for the normativity of the 
moral law for humans because it relies on an unjustified distinction between the 
phenomenal and noumenal natures of humans.  The two standpoint argument 
                                            
30 “Der kategorische Imperativ ist nicht; er hat keine Seinsweise und existiert ebenso wenig wie 
die reine Verstandeswelt. [...]Der kategorische Imperativ kommt nur aus der Perspektive der 
praktischen Vernunft in den Blick: als praktisches Gesetz, d.h. als die Verbindlichkeit von Normen 
begründende Norm, deren Verbindlichkeit wiederum ihren Grund im höchsten normativen Prinzip, 
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Kant uses to justify this distinction states that because we can think of ourselves 
as free we are free, where thinking here means reflection in the practical sense 
of setting means to an end. Such means-ends thinking, however, is difficult to 
bring together with purity of motivation required by Kant’s notion of moral 
autonomy. Kant thus seems unable to bridge the gap between our noumenal 
nature which thinks of itself as free and our sensible nature which sets ends and 
pursues them. Kant, in other words, is unable to show that our end is freedom 
itself because he has not shown that pure practical reason itself motivates our 
end setting practices.  
 
The two interpretations of Kant that follow seek to construct alternate 
readings of Kant’s phenomenal/noumenal distinction. Prauss pursues what I 
think will turn out to be a rather Hegelian approach in which the process of 
reflection itself takes center stage. Kaulbach pursues the question of reason and 
nature from the perspective of historical development. He thinks that inclinations 
can be made more autonomous through a sort of cultivation of the ‘true self’, 
which is autonomous.  
 
Prauss: Pure Practical Reason and Morality 
We now move to the second approach to Kant’s notion of pure practical 
reason. Prauss contends that Kant gives up his initial insight into the necessary 
                                                                                                                                  
im Freiheitsprinzip hat.” Annemarie Pieper. “Wie ist ein kategorischer Imperative möglich?”. 279. 
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opposition between nature and freedom by developing his concept of autonomy 
exclusively through morality. The concept of morality forces Kant to value the 
noumenal realm as good and the sensible realm as evil. This means that action 
and theoretical self-relation must remain external to one another. If Kant starts 
from the perspective that this theoretical self-relation is on the side of inclination, 
it will be impossible to prove that autonomy exists. But if Kant starts from this 
theoretical self-relation as rational, then it is not at all clear how reason can ever 
be practical.  
As we saw at the outset of Groundwork III, Kant develops the concept of 
freedom out of our theoretical understanding of spontaneity of the mind. He 
argued that freedom is expressed in our ability to order the sensory impressions 
of the world. As Prauss glosses it, this means that subjectivity determines merely 
the “’projection’ of objectivity for its knowledge and but not yet anything 
corresponding for its actions”.31 Thus, Prauss argues, negative freedom cannot 
lead to positive freedom. This means, however, also that Kant cannot bridge the 
gap between theoretical reason and practical reason. The problem, Prauss 
contends, lies in the way Kant conceives of the ‘eigentliche Selbst’, ‘the true self’. 
The problem with Kant’s construction of practical reason is that Kant does not 
have a concept of the practical at all and merely tries to explain practical reason 
by way of the natural, that is, desires and habits. But, as previously defined, the 
                                                                                                                                  
(my translation)  
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practical is for Kant “everything that is made possible through freedom” which 
excludes precisely this kind of heteronomy.32  
It is this problem which forces Kant to determine practical reason or will as 
a type of self-relation of the understanding or reason to its desires. This relation 
of desires is called a will precisely because of its relation to reason. But Kant still 
has difficulties distinguishing this type of self-relation from theoretical reason. As 
the example of the technical-practical imperative makes clear, theoretical reason 
is still of central importance in this conception. That is to say, the hypothetical 
imperative is still a theoretical means-ends setting capacity determined by the 
relations of empirical objects to the subject and is not in itself practical. Even here 
it is not clear what determines the will to act at all. Only the intentional structure is 
clear, given by theoretical reason, but practical reason seems not to have a 
place.  
Since it must exclude the natural (inclinations and desires), the self-
relation Kant has constructed appears to be based on theoretical reason. What I 
have explained in this kind of reasoning is merely a type of rational construction 
of interaction with the world based on our epistemological relations. Kant has 
simply remade self-consciousness as self-determination. The problem, Prauss 
contends, is that Kant has to claim that this type of self-consciousness of objects 
                                                                                                                                  
31 Gerold Prauss. Kant über Freiheit und Autonomie.120. “‘Entwurf’ von Objektivität für ihr 
Erkennen und damit offenbar noch nicht auch schon etwas Entsprechendes für ihr Handeln”. (my 
translation) 
32 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. “alles, was durch Freiheit möglich ist” A800/B828 
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outside the subject is also a practical relation. The true self would thus be both 
theoretical and practical at the same time.  
But this leads Kant to the paradox discussed earlier: either the self is 
determined by the natural world, in which case autonomy cannot be 
distinguished from heteronomy, or the self is reason, in which case it becomes 
hard to see what is practical about it at all (given the exclusion of the 
natural/practical world).  
 
Practical Reason and Autonomy 
According to Prauss, however, Kant makes one further attempt at 
grasping the nature of the practical by defining the practical as a self-relation of 
will and getting at autonomy in this way. Autonomy is legislation which is 
particular to oneself— ‘eigen’. In this sense, having a will means having a will of 
one’s own, a particular relation to oneself. Animals, accordingly, do not have a 
will. Prauss writes: “That humans possess something like a will at all […] stems 
from the fact that they originally possess the will as a type of practical self-
relation, a ‘will for oneself’ or a ‘willing of oneself”.33  
It is only through this self-relation that the will can even be conceived as 
wanting anything for itself or others. And it is only this way of seeing the question 
                                            
33 Prauss. Kant über Freiheit und Autonomie. “Dass der Mensch überhaupt dergleichen wie einen 
Willen hat, liegt […] ausschließlich daran, dass er ihn ursprünglich als ein praktisches 
Selbstverhältnis besitzt, als einen ‘Willen zu sich selbst’, oder ein ‘Wollen seiner selbst’.” 132. (my 
translation) 
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of autonomy that can make intelligible the possessive meaning of the  ‘own’ in 
‘own will’, or ‘own act’. One’s desires, however, remain external and can never 
be one’s own in the reflective and possessive sense. Desires may be mine in a 
reflective sense, but they are also always causalities of nature and therefore not 
really ‘mine’ all the way down.  
Kant equates this ‘ownness’ of will with autonomy and hence with being 
an end in oneself. The essential self-related act of willing is thus a reaction of the 
self to itself in which the self is its own end. In this way Kant can separate what 
has a relative value from that which has absolute value. If ‘means’ are to have 
any value at all they can only have value relative to something which has 
absolute value, namely an end in itself. Having a will of one’s own is like being an 
end in oneself in the sense that both are self-directed. Having a will means willing 
oneself and being an end in oneself means being one’s own end. “Whatever else 
he might want, man is this willing only because in willing whatever else he wills, 
he always fundamentally wills himself”.34  
We might take Prauss’ argument about willing oneself as the missing 
analogue of the apperception thesis in which we know ourselves knowing 
ourselves. This is the fundamental self-relation of German Idealism. The idea 
that the self wills itself in everything it wills means that we have reversed the 
direction of the dependency between the understanding and reason. Practical 
                                            
34 Prauss. Kant über Freiheit und Autonomie. “Was auch immer er wollen mag, so ist der Mensch 
doch eben dieses Wollen jeweils nur dadurch, dass er in allem, was er will, grundsätzlich einmal 
sich selber will.” 135-36. (my translation)  
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and theoretical reason are now coeval in the sense that both are required for 
human action to be intelligible.  
Thus we can see that, initially at least, Kant’s practical philosophy defines 
the human not merely as theoretical self-understanding but also in a practical but 
morally neutral way. Humans have inner absolute worth because they are will 
themselves and so are ‘of value to themselves’. Thus Prauss concludes:  
In order to have a fundamental consciousness of and a will toward 
himself in a neutral sense, which would then also be both a 
theoretical as well as a practical self-relation, the agent would also 
have to be autonomous in a neutral sense; and it would be from 
this autonomy that Kant could then derive moral autonomy.35  
 
Thus only humans as ends in themselves can form the basis for the 
principle of morality, and not morality itself.36  
In a sense, Prauss’ two arguments make two opposing points which flank 
Kant’s argument. While the first argument we saw contends that Kant’s view of 
morality is illegitimate because it amounts to a division of the intelligible will into 
                                            
35 Prauss. Kant über Freiheit und Autonomie. “Und dem neutralen Sinn gemäß, in dem der 
Mensch danach ursprünglich ein Bewusstsein von und Wille zu sich selbst und damit Freiheit 
eines theoretischen wie praktischen Selbstverhältnisses wäre, müsste er zunächst auch in 
neutralem Sinn schon Autonomie sein, aus welcher Kant so etwas wie moralische Autonomie 
dann überhaupt erst abzuleiten hätte.” 137-38. (my translation) 
36 Schönecker and Wood make a similar criticism. They argue that even if one accepts Kant’s 
distinction between things in themselves and appearances, it is far from clear how the fact that 
humans are part of both realms allows us to infer that desires must be subject to reason (given 
the invalidity of the ontological thesis). Kant’s ultimate answer, they contend, is that humans are 
ends in themselves and thus valuable. But rather than explain what this might mean (as Prauss 
attempts to do) Kant gives only an implausible ontological answer to this question. Schönecker 
and Wood Kants ‘Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitte’; Ein einführender Kommentar. 204-205.  
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good and the sensible realm into evil, the second argument about the self-
relation of willing, states that the notion of an autonomous self-willing subject 
does not even amount to an explanation of the moral law because being an end 
in oneself and being a means to an end are not stable categories. Both of these 
arguments suggest that Kant has not been able to overcome the ambiguity in his 
notions of heteronomy and autonomy.  
Prauss’ criticism is thus fundamentally concerned with Kant’s distinction 
between intelligible and sensible. The best way of developing a satisfactory 
interpretation of this issue is to develop a concept of autonomy, which Prauss 
believes can be found in the notion of a self-relation of willing. But this too does 
not provide for a satisfactory answer to the ethical imperative which Kant claims 
stems from the noumenal realm.  
Because the question of this equal relation between nature and morality 
seems to involve the metaphysics of the noumenal realm, Anglo-American 
commentators have tended to shy away from this part of Kant’s ethics, preferring 
to ground their interpretations on the notion of humans as ends in themselves.37 
Prauss’ critique of Kant, however, hinges on taking seriously the sensible-
intelligible distinction since it also takes seriously the apparent exclusion of the 
sensible realm from Kant’s moral theory.  
 
                                            
37 Allison, of course, is a notable exception.  
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Kaulbach: The Historical Perspective on Autonomy 
Friedrich Kaulbach’s interpretation of Kant takes up the problem of 
autonomy by seeking a historical rather than theoretical resolution to the problem 
of moral judgment. It takes up the problem of the noumenal realm by providing a 
‘dialectical’ interpretation of Kant’s ethics. The central claim, which echoes the 
point at which we left off our discussion of Prauss, is that the subject can effect a 
reorientation of the emotions through reason on the basis of autonomy. This 
reorientation is meant to explain how reason (or the noumenal) is able to affect 
our finite nature. Kaulbach also raises the speculative point that it is inadmissible 
to cut off nature from our practical deliberation. Nature, through history, must be 
given a place if the employment of practical reason is to be normative for us.  
The reorientation of the self assumes not two but three parties involved. 
Kaulbach believes that humans have a fundamental nature, something like a 
substratum affected by our ‘wild’ nature and our reason. Thus the true self 
(Kant’s ‘eigentliches Selbst’) is able to create a type of consensus between our 
emotions and our reason which means that our egoistic feelings can be brought 
into unity with a furthering of general human life. Kaulbach writes:  
The practical identity which arises in this manner is that of a self in 
accord with itself to the extent that its free reason (Vernunft) also 
permeates the reason of initially foreign beings. […] Insofar as I 
become myself through the history of my actions and to the extent 
that my own ‘nature’ is permeated by the said ‘change of 
disposition’ (Um-stimmung), I have the right to call myself free.38  
                                            
38 Friedrich Kaulbach. Das Prinzip Handlung in der Philosophie Kants. 168. „Die praktische 
Identität, die so entsteht, ist Übereinstimmung des Selbst mit sich, sofern seine freie 
Vernünftigkeit auch die der Vernunft zunächst fremden Natur durchdringt. [...] Sofern ich durch 
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We become this true or rational self through a historical process: “The 
categorical imperative asks agents to constitute their consciousness through 
practical thinking in such a way that it becomes possible to recognize what our 
duty is and then to decide to act on what duty demands.”39 The maxim itself is 
thus the measure or indication of the reasoning subject’s degree of rationality.   
This reorientation allows me to test the universality of my impulses against 
the prescription of the categorical imperative. The maxim brings together 
theoretical and practical reason because anything it seeks to implement will be 
both empirically determined and practically implemented. The subject must 
determine whether the maxim, which arises out of interest (and is thus normative 
in a broad sense) is in accord with the principles of living which the true self 
endorses (and is thus normative in the more specific rational sense of just). The 
maxim is a product of autonomous thinking if it meets the criterion of reason 
coinciding with itself and therefore autonomy. But this is only part of the question 
about how the categorical imperative can be normative for us.40  
                                                                                                                                  
die Geschichte meines Handelns Ich selbst werde, sofern auch meine ‚Natur’ durch die 
beschriebene Um-stimmung meiner Triebsphäre mit Vernunft durchdrungen ist, vermag ich mich 
für Freiheit zu beanspruchen.“ (my translation) 
39 Friedrich Kaulbach. Das Prinzip Handlung in der Philosophie Kants. 171. „Der kategorische 
Imperativ fordert den Handelnden auf, in sich auf dem Wege praktischen Denkens eine 
Verfassung seines Bewusstseins herzustellen, in der es ihm möglich ist, die ihm angemessene 
Pflicht (Maxime) zu erkennen und sich zugleich zu ihrer Verwirklichung zu entscheiden.“ (my 
translation).  
40 This is also as far as more recent approaches to the maxim problem have gotten. See Rüdiger 
Bittner. „Maximen“. (Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Mainz 6-10 April 1974. Teil 
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The more fundamental question to be answered is how theoretical and 
practical reason combine to move us to action. How is it, in other words, that we 
can be both subject to the laws of nature and at the same time makers of the 
‘laws of nature’? How are we to understand the dialectic of freedom and nature, 
of autonomy and heteronomy, of autonomy and influence? The reorientation 
Kaulbach introduced earlier relied on what I called the substratum of the ‘true 
self’. But how can the objective domination of the self by nature be made to 
coincide with the subjective idea of freedom which we have through reason?  
Kant’s answer to this problem, according to Kaulbach, is that there is in 
effect no difference between the interest of reason and the interest of nature, but 
that both are simply interests. The difference is that the interest of reason is true 
to itself (and therefore autonomous) while the interest of ‘wild’ nature is 
pathological (and therefore heteronomous). But both work on the same subject. 
The interest of reason is superior to the interest of ‘wild’ nature because reason 
is at once both a source of practical argument (reason in the logical sense) and a 
cause of action (reason in its practical sense) while ‘wild nature’ is only the latter.  
This distinction calls for a clarification since it seems that it might be 
begging the question to assert that reason is both practical and theoretical at 
                                                                                                                                  
II.2 Hg. Gerhard Funke. pp. 485-98.), Höffe. „Kants kategorischer Imperativ als Kriterium der 
Sittlichkeit“.  (Ethik und Politik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979. pp. 84-119.), even Barbara Herman’s 
seminal essay „The Practice of Moral Judgment“ (The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1993. pp. 73-93.) seems not to inquire into the conditions under which maxims might 
be normative.  
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once and that practical reason is thus its own cause. In answering the question, 
Kaulbach argues that the two perspectives of theoretical and practical reason 
permit us to say that freedom is both self-verifying and self-actualizing.41 In 
reorienting itself to become more true to itself, the good will is seen as creating a 
‘second nature’, a practical being of a second order which is not determined by 
natural inclinations but by freedom. Under the category of causation, this 
‘intelligible’ order is a cause because it is self-determined. Respect for the law 
now appears as the limiting and quashing of the wild forces of nature in us. 
Practical reason thus transforms the meaning of egoistic self-love into a rational 
will which issues in ‘rational self-love’. Again it must be emphasized that we are 
not speaking of limiting our nature itself, but of limiting the egoistic interests in our 
self. These two senses of nature must be kept separate.  
What drives this reorientation and how can reason dominate nature in us? 
Kant conceives of theoretical knowledge not in terms of pure truth but in terms of 
a critique of the notion of truth as truth for us. Kaulbach argues that theoretical 
reason projects its practical application into the world in the form of the 
categorical imperative. This practical constellation is the perspective of freedom 
under which we see the world:  
The practical constellation is produced by the subject in ‘thinking-
action’. Here the agent assumes the role of the practical being 
determined by reason, sets the meaning of good and evil and 
assigns the appropriate moral value to ends and means. These 
                                            
41 That both verification and actualization are essential parts of any post-metaphysical or 
speculative philosophy will be a central concern of not only Hegel, but also Korsgaard. See 
chapters 4 and 5.  
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categories make it possible to think and speak about the purpose 
[Gegenstand] of action. This constellation has the character of 
freedom to the extent to which it is produced by the self-
determining practical subject.42  
 
The practical constellation provides a perspective from which the 
epistemic understanding of the world (the ‘is’) already has a causal character (the 
‘ought’) which means that not only is the moral law determined through 
knowledge of the world, but the moral law is also determining or normative for the 
subject. In this sense it can be said that freedom is both causality and cause.  
This unity is forged by the resolution of the two standpoint argument in 
favor of reason in the dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant’s aim in 
the dialectic is to go beyond the question of moral ‘knowledge’ to the question of 
meaning (Sinn). According to Kaulbach, the discussion of meaning is also meant 
to show the how the elements in the series of (historical) maxims which testify to 
the reorientation of reason are related. This is the purpose of the argument about 
hope in Critique of Practical Reason and also in the historical writings. Hope is 
the (metaphysical) belief that reason will eventually be able to rule over ‘wild’ 
nature and that freedom will reign in the kingdom of ends. The notion of hope is 
                                            
42 Kaulbach. Das Prinzip Handlung in der Philosophie Kants. „Praktische Konstellation [...] wird 
vom Subjekt in einer Denk-handlung hergestellt, in welcher ich mir die Rolle des praktischen, von 
der Vernunft bestimmten Seins gebe, in der ich auch die Sprachregelung über Gut und Böse 
festsetze und Zwecken und Mitteln den ihnen gebührenden moralischen Wert erteile. Auf der 
Basis dieser Kategorien ist Denken und Sprechen über die Gegenstände des Handelns möglich. 
Dieser Konstellation eignet der Charakter der Freiheit, sofern sie von dem sich selbst 
bestimmenden praktischen Subjekt hergestellt wird.“ 290. (my translation) This perspective 
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thus designed to hand the victory of the struggle between nature and reason to 
reason, for it is only reason which is capable of ultimately resolving the antinomy 
in favor of the idea of the kingdom of ends.  
The metaphysics of hope is thus well suited to help us parse the world in 
terms of rational and non-rational objects, and this will further the goal of a final 
resolution to the struggle. As orientation or reorientation, the notion of freedom 
thus has concrete ’epistemic’ ramifications for our actions, specifically in the 
sense that it permits us to think of freedom as causal in a more powerful way.  
By conceiving of himself as a free subject in the practical 
constellation and thus making himself the true origin of his action, 
the agent allows the category of substance necessary for action to 
become a unifying principle, a principle through which the multitude 
of instances and moments which constitute the history of action 
become a unity of ‘my’ actions. Actions makes causality into a real 
concept.43   
 
From this Kaulbach concludes that, from the practical perspective, 
spontaneous action is not restricted to merely understanding (begreifend) reason 
but also to actualizing (entwerfend) reason.44 Thus actions produce results which 
exhibit the mark of real freedom. “History appearing as the succession of action 
                                                                                                                                  
seems also to be suggested by Kant’s question “Was darf ich hoffen?” in the “Canon of Pure 
Reason” discussed in the introduction.  
43 Kaulbach. Das Prinzip Handlung in der Philosophie Kants. 298. „Indem sich der Handelnde als 
freie Substanz in der praktischen Konstellation prädiziert und sich dadurch die Wirklichkeit einer 
Ursache für Handeln gibt, lässt er die dabei einfließende Kategorie der Substanz zugleich auch 
als ein einigendes Prinzip wirken, durch welches die Vielheit der Augenblicke und Momente, aus 
denen die Geschichte der Handlung besteht, zur Einheit eines einzigen Vollzuges jeweils ‚meiner’ 
Handlung zusammengefasst wird. Kausalität wird durch Handeln zum realen Begriff.“ (my 
translation) 
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is thus not only a causal process but the ‘externalization’ of the free internal 
movement of the acting will”.45 This means that actions can actually be 
determined by the noumenal realm and hence that practical reason exists.  
 
Kaulbach’s interpretation both justifies Prauss’ criticism of Kant’s ethics 
and also tries to defend Kant. Kaulbach’s argument can be taken to emphasize 
the necessity of developing a notion of autonomy in Kant which will then be the 
ground for a theory of morality. The division of human nature into ‘wild’ nature 
and ‘reason’ creates a three part structure rather than a dualistic structure usually 
associated with Kant, and thus suggests that the struggle between reason and 
nature can be carried out on the field of this third term. This substratum, as I 
have been calling it, assumes autonomy and conceives of the struggle taking 
place as not between heteronomy and autonomy but between heteronomy and 
morality.46  
The deduction in Groundwork III shows that autonomy is necessary if 
morality is to be possible. But the failure of the deduction also makes clear that 
                                                                                                                                  
44 In support, Kaulbach cites Kant. XVIII, Refl. 5612.  
45 Kaulbach. Das Prinzip Handlung in der Philosophie Kants. 318. „Die sich als erscheinende 
Geschichte vollziehende Handlung ist demnach nicht nur ein kausal beschriebener Prozess, 
sondern ‚Äußerung’ einer freien inneren Bewegung des handelnden Willens.“ (my translation) 
46 In this sense, Kaulbach’s interpretation, especially of this interpretative nexus has a certain 
affinity with Heidegger’s notion of care as autonomy (see Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
1993. 196-97). Heidegger assumes care as an existential modality thus avoiding the whole 
autonomy/heteronomy debate. This allows him to interpret ‘heteronomy’ in the form of ‘das Man’ 
  
 53 
autonomy is not the same as morality. Morality is rather an instance of autonomy 
which Kant uses to argue that autonomy is real. Thus the failure of the deduction 
leaves not only morality in question but also its foundation, autonomy. This shifts 
the burden of proof for Kant’s ethics away from showing the existence of morality 
to showing the existence of autonomy.  
Since, from the Critique of Pure Reason, we know that freedom or 
autonomy cannot be proven as such, the task of giving an explanation of 
autonomy must be accomplished in a different way. Kaulbach’s defense of Kant’s 
ethics thus seeks a different  path. Kaulbach interprets the question of autonomy 
in a historical and materialist vein. The key interpretative move here is to 
distinguish between the theoretical understanding of the world as instantaneous 
and the practical understanding of morality as historical. The historical dimension 
is meant to provide room for the reorientation of the self’s autonomy toward 
reason.  
This historical interpretation of ethical decision-making can be faulted on 
two fronts. It takes autonomy for granted at the outset and does not succeed in 
providing a justification of it by the end of the argument. The argument thus 
replicates the structure of the Groundwork III deduction. Kaulbach substitutes a 
historical/ phenomenological explanation of morality for a deduction. He seeks to 
ground autonomy on morality in much the same way Kant did. But he fails 
because he, too, is unable to overcome the division between the sensible and 
                                                                                                                                  
as a deficient mode of being rather than as a fundamental alternative, as Kant seems to have to. 
See also Prauss. Kant über Freiheit und Autonomie. 145.  
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the intelligible realms. As Hans Lenk has pointed out, Kaulbach tends to over-
psychologize what Kaulbach calls the ‘inner actions’ motivated by freedom.47 I 
add that the idea of freedom ultimately can only be turned into a causal power if 
we attribute psychological force to the intelligible realm. But this cannot be for 
two reasons: firstly, because Kaulbach does not succeed in truly collapsing the 
distinction between the intelligible and sensible realms and, secondly, because, 
to do so, would take away the forward thrust of the whole project of reason in 
Kant’s philosophy, undermining the crucial historical premise. To actually unify 
reason and nature, if only psychologically, would impede any notion of hope 
which is designed to hold out a possible resolution but not to provide one.  
 
Conclusion 
Kant’s failure to prove the existence of autonomy and morality comes 
down, I believe, to the failure of the two standpoint argument to be satisfactorily 
resolved. It is, at bottom, unclear how (even in Kaulbach’s resourceful 
interpretation) the intelligible realm can affect the sensible one. But I believe that 
the reasons that drove Kant to postulate this distinction cannot very well be 
rejected either. For, as we have seen, the problem of autonomy and of practical 
reason is a question about the relation of the self and nature. To reject this 
distinction would be to fall back into the Aristotelian problem  of having to equate 
interest and desire purely with nature and thus of having to reduce the concept of 
                                            
47 Hans Lenk. “Freies Handeln als Interpretationskonstrukt”. in Kant in der Diskussion der 
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freedom to natural causes as well, or as Kant has it, to freedom on the turnspit. If 
we are to make sense of freedom we can only do so by opposing it to nature in 
some substantive way. This is a point of which both Allison and Prauss are 
keenly aware and is the reason why both insist on an incompatibilist notion of 
freedom in Kant. For to endorse a compatibilist idea of freedom, as many current 
commentators do, is to invalidate what Kant means by moral inquiry.  
The two interpretations of Kant’s moral philosophy I have offered have 
tried to go beyond the letter of Kant’s text in order to reconstruct a position from 
within Kant which seeks to overcome the metaphysical residue of the 
intelligible/sensible division. I take these two interpretations to be paradigmatic of 
what such an overcoming of metaphysics in Kant would involve. On the one side, 
overcoming Kant’s division of the world into intelligible and sensible would 
involve a stronger  notion of autonomy, one that is more analogous to the 
apperception thesis which serves to justify Kant’s deduction of the categories. As 
Prauss argues, what the apperception thesis has that the deduction of freedom 
lacks, is a strong notion of self-relatedness. For reason to be able to truly justify 
itself, reason would have to show that it does not rely on the exclusion of a 
central realm of human life.  
I take Kaulbach’s interpretation as complementary to Prauss’ in the sense 
that Kaulbach argues that if autonomy is really to be understood as self-
grounding and thus as self-related, such a self-relation will not only have to be a 
                                                                                                                                  
Moderne. ed. Gerhard Schönrich and Yasushi Kato. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996. pp. 256-67.  
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mediation of intellect and nature, but a temporal mediation in which we pay close 
attention to the future-directed character of practical reason.   
Both commentators, I want to argue, take it as an unacceptable 
consequence of Kant’s critique of metaphysics that he eliminates altogether from 
his philosophy the interaction between world and subject in order to rein in the 
excesses of reason.48  
                                            
48 I have not discussed Kant’s other justification of reason, the fact of reason doctrine, which 
argues that the existence of freedom cannot be proven but must be assumed simply from the 
idea that we can imagine ourselves as free. There are two reasons for this. The first is that 
believing ourselves to be free rather than proving that we are so, while it alters the proof structure 
of Kant’s moral theory, does not change what I have concentrated on as Kant’s central thesis, 
namely the idea that in order to have a moral theory, the world must be divided into intelligible 
and sensible realms.  
The second reason for not discussing the ‘fact of reason’ doctrine here is that I believe that what 
contribution it can make to our understanding of the self-grounding of reason, will better come 
into focus after we have dealt with the other option on the table for a grounding of morality: to 
learn from Kant’s metaphysical faltering and thus to provide a moral theory based solely on a 
form of coherentism, as in the case of John Rawls, to whom I now turn.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
RAWLS AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
The metaphysical problems that plagued Kant’s deduction of morality in 
the Groundwork have seemed, to many twentieth century philosophers who 
wanted to retain much of Kant’s moral philosophy, so great that these 
contemporary thinkers have abandoned the attempt to ground pure practical 
reason altogether. The question I mean to pursue in this chapter is whether a 
certain type of Kantian moral philosophy can get by without such a grounding. In 
Rawls one finds a writer who believes that much of Kant’s ethical theory can be 
salvaged if one sidesteps the question of a metaphysical justification for morality 
and concentrates on the proceduralism necessary for universal justice.  
Rawlsian constructivism is, as I hope to show, a worthy successor to Kant 
in the sense that it seeks to avoid the problems that have plagued generations of 
Kant interpreters— to find some way of making the categorical imperative ‘work’. 
Rawls’ strategy, by contrast, is to concentrate on the categorical imperative as a 
way of thinking about moral laws immanently, that is, as constantly articulated 
and enacted by the individual agent. For Rawls, the categorical imperative is just 
the mental process we engage in when we think about how to be just to other 
human beings. Rawls thus emphasizes respect for persons over moral 
psychology. Respect for persons entails that we treat others just as we want to 
  
 58 
be treated by others and this simply means, not seeking special treatment for 
oneself. Respect, Rawls argues, should (and generally does) enters into every 
thought about others. This type of thinking is modeled in both of Rawls’ 
justifications for the liberal political society: the original position and the reflective 
equilibrium. The categorical imperative is a way of thinking which enables such 
respect for others.  
I will argue, however, that, compelling though Rawls’ interpretation of 
Kant’s ethical theory is, its aim of presenting a non-metaphysical interpretation is 
only partially successful. Rawls is successful in giving a non-metaphysical 
account of reflection through the reflective equilibrium— a process in which each 
agent reflects on her considered beliefs and also takes into account the beliefs of 
others. Absent a universal (and therefore ‘metaphysical’) notion of practical 
reason which underlies such reflection, however, there is no way of showing that 
the conclusions of individual reflection cohere in any socially meaningful way. 
Indeed, this absence of cohesion is the result of Rawls’ failure to take concrete 
suffering into account. By building his theory on the possibility of coherence 
between individuals, Rawls has, I will argue, sidestepped the problem of the 
perspective of justice altogether.  
 
In reconstructing Rawls’ thought, I will present the argument regressively, 
starting from Rawls’ conception of autonomy and working backwards, always 
asking for a justification for the previous level of argument, until at last we arrive 
at the reflective equilibrium which is supposed to underwrite the whole 
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conception of justice. The regressive reconstruction follows the argument Rawls 
gives in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, if not in A Theory of Justice, 
and underlines the acknowledged debt Rawls owes to Kant. The regressive 
argument also affirms that, after all, Rawls wishes to give a Kantian style 
grounding to his project.  
 
The Original Position and the Categorical Imperative 
Rawls writes:  
The original position may be viewed […] as a procedural interpretation of Kant’s 
conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative within the framework of 
an empirical theory. The principles regulative of the kingdom of ends are those 
that would be chosen in this position, and the description of this situation enables 
us to explain the sense in which acting from these principles expresses our 
nature as free and equal rational persons.49  
For Rawls, the original position is a regulative principle and thus a way of 
adjudicating between conflicting desires and inclinations.50 The agent in the 
original position must be both autonomous and motivated by her reflection. That 
is to say, the original position must yield universally acceptable principles (as in 
the categorical imperative) and it must ensure that these principles are 
                                            
49 John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 226. Henceforth TJ when cited in the text.  
50 Rawls himself does not believe that Kant’s categorical imperative actually provides a 
particularly good way of determining a content of the moral law. This is what his own theory of 
justice is supposed to provide. Rawls. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. 163.  
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acceptable to all. The former condition is modeled in the original position by 
bargaining and the latter is modeled by the veil of ignorance.  
Let us look at autonomy first. Rawls introduces the veil of ignorance to 
hide the parties’ particular social and natural circumstances. The parties are 
asked to design a society without the knowledge about where they will be placed 
in the society, or which beliefs, moral, political or religious they will have.51 All 
participants understand the basics of political affairs and economics and possess 
general knowledge. Thus they choose principles under which they are prepared 
to live, wherever they end up in society. The general social structure is just but 
blind to the particular inclinations of the agents. (TJ 118-19) Under the veil of 
ignorance, just as in Kantian autonomy, we have no personal or particular sense 
of the good. We seek only justice, the ability to enjoy our particular notion of the 
good once we determine what that is.  
Rawls also argues that there is a parallel between rational choice theory 
and the categorical imperative. Rawls says that the original position is in the 
tradition of social contract theory. Like the categorical imperative, it provides a 
way of responding to a practical problem: what ought I do? Rawls’ two principles 
of justice are simply the moral law under the conditions of a modern liberal 
                                            
51 There has been considerable objection to the supposed neutrality made possible through the 
veil of ignorance. Onora O’Neill, for instance, notes that Rawls does not assume disinterest at all 
times during the original position process, but permits it with reference to the fate of future 
generations. “The Method of A Theory of Justice”. These objections point to problems with the 
basic assumption of rational action. It is not clear whether we can ever be made neutral. See also 
the discussion of Sandel below.  
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society, yielding more specific versions of the universal prescriptive of respect as 
stated in the categorical imperative.  
The parallel is this: the original position models the reflection of the 
individual on her goals with reference to the moral law as taking place between 
individuals under the veil of ignorance. What can be agreed on by all parties 
involved as the best way for each person to secure her ends in view of the 
alternatives available is, by definition, just and what is just, is what should be 
done. But rather than rely on what he believes is a dubious notion of the purity of 
practical reason, Rawls casts reflection as public deliberation between people 
under the veil of ignorance. (The reasons for the switch in perspective will be an 
issue below.)  
This parallel, however, masks a point of divergence between rational 
deliberation as Rawls conceives of it and rational deliberation as Kant conceives 
of it. The difference concerns an ambiguity in Rawls’ account of deliberation. For, 
as we saw in the last chapter, Kant’s argument was that it was analytically true 
that the rational being would do what was rationally demanded of her by the 
categorical imperative. This was the weak autonomy thesis. The problem was 
showing that humans are rational beings— this was the strong autonomy thesis. 
The question to be examined here is to what extent Rawls’ rejection of Kant’s 
metaphysical division between sensible and intelligible worlds affects the 
justification of morality. Since we cannot yet give an answer to the question of 
whether Rawls has anything to say about the move from weak autonomy to 
strong autonomy, I suggest that we flag this problem by employing a distinction 
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Christine Korsgaard makes in her Sources of Normativity— the distinction 
between the categorical imperative and the moral law. The categorical imperative 
or CI-procedure is meant to denote rational deliberation itself, while the moral law 
is supposed to tell us what the range of such deliberation is. That is, all laws are 
universal, the question is whether the law ranges over my own life (in which case 
I might be an egoist) or over everyone, as Kant supposes.52 The question we 
must keep an eye on, in other words, is this: what sort of principle is involved in 
Rawls’ notion of deliberation in both the original position and in the subsequent 
deliberation of the reflective equilibrium. Is it an agent internal rationality or an 
overarching intersubjectively rational law?  
 
Let us return now to Rawls’ reinterpretation of the categorical imperative 
as rational deliberation, the CI-procedure. The two principles of justice, as 
expressions of the moral law, are an equilibrium point. Rawls writes: “Equilibrium 
is the result of agreements freely struck between willing traders. For each person 
it is the best situation that he can reach by free exchange consistent with the 
right and the freedom of others to further their interests in the same way.” (TJ 
103) Elsewhere Rawls characterizes his theory of justice as partially a theory of 
rational choice.53 We can thus say that the original position is supposed to 
provide a situation in which the participants can determine what they can expect 
to attain in terms of the advancement of their own ends given the ends of others. 
                                            
52 Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. 99.  
53 TJ 15.  
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To put it another way, we could say that in the original position agents become 
clear about what they are maximally entitled to without invoking exceptions for 
themselves. No one, Rawls says, will take less than they think they can get.  
Autonomy and the categorical imperative procedure are, of course, 
equivalents. Thus Rawls can say that the rational process of deliberation ensures 
that the particular conception of justice chosen is equivalent to saying that 
rational and disinterested deliberation had taken place (TJ 120). “The veil of 
ignorance makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of 
justice.” (TJ 121)54  
We should note two points before we go on. Rawls has moved moral 
reflection from the first person perspective to public deliberation; from the ‘I’ to 
the ‘we’. At least prima facie, the original position is not supposed to be all in the 
mind of one individual. The second point follows from the first. By changing the 
perspective of reflection from the first person to the third person, Rawls has also 
changed the moral psychology involved in accepting the outcome of deliberation. 
                                            
54 Many have argued that a hypothetical agreement does not constitute a justification for the two 
principles chosen in the original position. See Thomas Nagel. “Rawls on Justice”. p. 6. Habermas. 
“Diskursethik— Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm”. p. 89. Along similar lines, R. M. Hare 
argues that agreement between the people in the original position merely gives us agreement on 
peoples’ opinions. These are thus merely a form of intuitionism, albeit cross examined. “Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice”. pp. 83-84. See also Michael Sandel. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 109.  
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It is not clear that accepting the outcome of public deliberation has the same 
normative force as accepting the outcome of my own deliberation.55  
  
The Moral Character of the Ideal Agent 
Underlying the original position and the application of the categorical 
imperative, however, is a conception of the moral character of the actors who 
reflect and thus abide by the moral law. In “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” 
Rawls interprets these agents as both ‘reasonable and rational’. Rawls uses 
these terms as a translation for Kant’s vernünftig, which includes both senses. 
The two terms mark the distinction Kant makes between the two types of 
practical reason, pure and empirical practical reason. The former is found in the 
categorical imperative while the latter is exemplified in the hypothetical 
imperative. Rawls notes that Kant’s conception of a person also marks the fact 
that, for him, the hypothetical imperative (empirical practical reason) is absolutely 
subjugated by the categorical imperative (pure practical reason).56 This is to say 
that the person who engages in moral reflection subjugates his rationally 
conceived maxims to the moral law.  
The same goes for Rawls’ agents in the original position. The original 
position too requires a certain conception of the person if it is to yield agreement 
                                            
55 In a way, this is the problem Rawls will have to address in Political Liberalism where he will 
have to show that we accept the results of the original position for reasons that are in a sense 
pure or moral rather than prudential.  
56 Rawls. “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. 503-504.  
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at all; the people negotiating must not only be rational but they must also have a 
sense of justice, i. e. recognize that they are all equal. This, again, is the question 
of respect for persons. Thus “a society satisfying the principles of justice as 
fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it 
meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under 
circumstances that are fair”.57 This point presupposes that people must be free 
and equal in order even to engage in rational deliberation.  They must be free in 
order to negotiate but they must also be equal in the sense of not believing that 
anyone deserves more than any other. I think Rawls believes that this captures 
the notion of ‘reasonable and rational’ in Kant, though this parallel is not made 
explicit until “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”.  
However, in A Theory of Justice Rawls already states that “the intuitive 
idea [of the two principles of justice] is that since everyone’s well-being depends 
upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory 
life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing 
cooperation of everyone taking part in it […]”.58 Though Rawls has not yet 
explicitly made the argument for it, the claim is that the (instrumental) rationality, 
which is supposed to generate agreement through maximization in the original 
position, already includes some form of autonomy in which the reasonable 
frames the rational. Though we cannot look at it at this point, the ground has 
                                            
57 TJ 12.  
58 TJ 13 
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already been prepared for the much larger argument, which is that rational 
choice can provide a foundation for the moral law.  
I think it is also of some interest that Rawls interprets the second 
formulation of the categorical imperative in this way: that is, as the notion that we 
must heed and respect humanity in ourselves and others because in doing so we 
respect our character as reasonable and rational beings. Thus our free nature, 
interpreted as rational, is always in some sense subjugated by our equal nature, 
interpreted as reasonable. This is the meaning of the second formulation of the 
categorical imperative as respect for persons.59   
We should note at this point that in the original position we are still dealing 
with a hypothetical ‘person’. Rawls no less than Kant believes that the agents 
who perform the bargaining or the reflection about the categorical imperative are 
ideal.60 Thus the reality of the two principles of justice is still in doubt, just as is 
the reality of the rational agent who employs the categorical imperative in Kant. 
All Rawls is saying at this point is that, in order for rational deliberation to take 
plac,e we must presuppose a free and equal agent.  
 
 
The Reasonable and the Rational 
Rawls characterizes his project in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral 
Theory” as the attempt to: “establish a suitable connection between a particular 
                                            
59 Rawls. “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. 505.  
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conception of the person and the first principle of justice, by means of the 
procedure of construction”.61 This means that Rawls attempts to construct a 
philosophically coherent story about how the idealized conception of the person 
as reasonable and rational, can lead to a set of public institutions of justice we all 
can endorse. Before we examine what Rawls means by constructivism, we must 
understand what he means more exactly by the reasonable and the rational.  
In political terms this means:  
[W]henever a sufficient basis for agreement among citizens is not 
presently known, or recognized, the task to justify a conception of 
justice becomes: how can people settle on a conception of justice, 
to serve this social role [of admissible social institutions], that is 
(most) reasonable for them in virtue of how they conceive of their 
persons and construe the general features of social cooperation 
among persons so regarded? (KC 305) 
 
Rawls has in mind here that people reflecting on the issue of justice will 
see themselves as free and rational and see others in this way as well. Their 
reflection will be something like the model of reason employed in game theory 
(where each player tries to maximize his or her advantage but realizes that this is 
only possible when the other players are treated fairly). In order for such rational 
deliberation to be effective at developing rules all can agree to, the rational actors 
will be forced to abandon their personal preferences and incorporate only those 
rules which apply to all equally. This will make the system morally neutral, though 
not amoral.  
                                                                                                                                  
60 Kant. GMS 407. O’Neill. “The Method of A Theory of Justice”. 33-34.  
61 Rawls. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”. 304. Henceforth KC, when cited in the text or 
“Kantian Constructivism” when cited in footnotes.  
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To put the issue slightly differently, we could say that the hypothetical 
imperatives each person at the bargaining table wishes to realize are limited by 
the recognition that each of the bargainers is equal and that it is thus 
unreasonable for one member to insist that the group agree to make an 
exception for that member. Thus the reasonable which models the demands of 
universality in the categorical imperative frames the debate about which 
particular hypothetical imperatives can be realized. The notion of universality, 
which Rawls interprets as equality, frames and restricts the particular rational 
plan of any actor. This turns classical liberal ‘negative’ freedom into a more 
communal ‘positive’ freedom. Thus when Rawls says that the original position is 
morally neutral, he means that there is no conception of the good involved in 
decision making itself. Morality, however, is in play in the sense that freedom and 
equality have a particular moral perspective, which is that the reasonable frames 
the rational.  
But Rawls has not, as yet, given an argument for this overlaying of the 
rational by the reasonable. In a sense we are asking how equality can come to 
dominate freedom, that is, to anticipate a bit, what makes up Rawls’ argument to 
the effect that Kant’s doctrine of respect for persons will trump a libertarian notion 
of freedom even in the seemingly libertarian theory of rational choice. This is a 
problem for Rawls since, taken on its own, as Rawls readily admits, rational 
choice might, depending on the moral character of its actors, yield a Hobbesian 
state as readily as the Kantian Kingdom of Ends. There is nothing keeping the 
rational actors from agreeing to the rules only for prudential reasons and 
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upholding them only until the relations of power shift in their favor. Rational 
choice is a method of coordinating people, but it cannot guarantee that people 
will forever be happy with the position they have been given, even if they initially 
agreed to it.62   
In order to provide stability for the rules agreed to in the original position, 
Rawls must now reintroduce something like Kant’s belief that rationality includes 
respect for persons and not just the maximization of one’s advantage (material or 
otherwise). While Kant believes rationality and social responsibility to be of a 
piece, Rawls has here, in the interest of overcoming some of Kant’s metaphysical 
presuppositions, divided them. Rawls has based the laws of his society on issue 
of rational self-interested coordination among its members. Now he must show 
that rational self-interest is also in the interest of others and is, in fact, worth 
agreeing to for ‘the right reasons’ as he will say in Political Liberalism.  
Agreement for the ‘right reasons’ is central to Rawls’ overall project since 
it is meant to show that there actually is real or, one might say, metaphysically 
true, agreement between different points of view. Of course, Rawls wants to do 
without the language of truth and is thus forced to explain ‘right reasons’ through 
the model of conversation. The problem remains a real one, however, since for 
there to be agreement, there must be a fundamental intersubjectivity which 
Rawls just assumes throughout.  
                                            
62 This is a concern not adequately dealt with in A Theory of Justice. Other issues, like holding 
out for a larger share of the pot, have already been addressed. See chapter 3 in A Theory of 
Justice.  
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In order for this rationality to yield more than prudential agreement or a 
modus vivendi, Rawls must show that having a thin theory of the good allows 
each agent to move to a thick theory of the good. This is the point of introducing 
the distinction between the rational and the reasonable.63 Rawls wants to show 
that instrumental reason as employed in the original position can be seen as an 
ethical capacity from a different perspective. This leads to a reinterpretation of 
the original position in “Kantian Constructivism”, which relies more heavily on the 
notion of equality than its predecessor in A Theory of Justice did.  
The movement occurs in three stages. It starts from rational autonomy 
(bargaining proper), moving to full autonomy (bargaining with reasonable or 
moral constraints) and finally ending up with the readers of Rawls’ theory 
themselves (which finds its justification in the reflective equilibrium). What Rawls 
calls the rational or rational autonomy is modeled in pure procedural justice. At 
the second stage, of full autonomy, Rawls adds to the conception of the person 
as free and equal two moral powers and two higher-order interests. The first 
power is that of having an effective sense of justice, the second is the power to 
form and revise and rationally purse a conception of the good. Corresponding to 
these are the higher-order interests of realizing and exercising these powers. (KC 
312)  
The move to full autonomy and the reasonable, Rawls writes, is 
“expressed by the framework of constraints within which the deliberations of the 
                                            
63 See Rawls “Themes in Kantian Moral Philosophy”. 503-504, and “Kantian Constructivism” 316. 
Also Baynes. The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism. 57.  
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parties (as rationally autonomous agents of construction) takes place”. (KC 317) 
This framework is the reasonable ideal of fair cooperation. The framework, by 
which Rawls means the addition of the two moral conceptions of the person, 
reciprocity and mutuality, ensure that the plan of the good each person 
articulates for him or herself also includes the good of others. This is the doctrine 
of respect for persons as it is expressed in Kant’s second formulation of the 
categorical imperative, the formula of humanity as an end in itself. Thus the two 
moral powers overlay the process of rational deliberation, transforming the 
instrumental deliberative process in the original position into a process of mutual 
recognition and fair cooperation. Rawls elaborates: “In justice as fairness, the 
Reasonable frames the Rational and is derived from a conception of moral 
persons as free and equal. Once this is understood, the constraints of the original 
position are no longer external.” (KC 319) I take this to mean that only the device 
of the original position (which models instrumental reason) imposes the 
constraint of fair cooperation on the people. For the people in the original 
position, social cooperation is not intuitive. But it is so for fully autonomous 
people who live in the institutions which the two principles of justice have helped 
to create. For they see themselves as possessing the two moral powers and thus 
restrict their pursuit of the good in the name of something more than the 
maximization of their material gain.  
The movement of the two stages so far trades on the distinction between 
different perspectives. If we move back a little, we might recall that the purpose 
of the original position is to develop principles of justice out of our 
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presuppositions about moral character. That is, what kind of laws would free and 
equal people come up with if left to their own devices? What Rawls does is to 
draw out first what free or rational individuals would do and then to overlay this 
with what people who are both free and reasonable would do. Rational people 
seek to maximize their benefit while reasonable people seek to maximize their 
benefit with the concerns of others in mind. This parallels exactly the structure 
that Kant argues for as well: we are rational beings insofar as we try to realize 
our ends by adopting the means to do so, but we are moral insofar as we adopt 
only those ends which we can will others to adopt as well.  
Thus Rawls can say: “The unity of practical reason is expressed by 
defining the Reasonable to frame the Rational and to subordinate it absolutely; 
that is, the principles of justice that are agreed to are lexically prior to their 
application in a well-ordered society to claims of the good.” (KC 319) 
The lexical ordering of the reasonable over the rational also parallels Kant’s 
division of practical reason into empirical practical reason and pure practical 
reason. While empirical practical reason— the hypothetical imperative— means 
acting according to any practical principle, pure practical reason— the categorical 
imperative— means acting according to the principle of the moral law.  
This parallel notwithstanding, it is still unclear whether our wills can 
actually act according to the moral law. That is, while it may be agreed that it is 
analytic that we are rational, it has not yet been shown that we are reasonable. 
Furthermore, we now face the problem, rightly noted by Rawls, of whether what 
appears to us as descriptively reasonable (i.e. apparent respect for persons) is 
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actually respect for persons or merely arises for prudential reasons. (KC 321) For 
Kant the answer to the lexical ordering of the reasonable over the rational comes 
from the argument about the priority of autonomy over heteronomy. And the 
same goes for Rawls. Autonomy simply means following your own reason and 
this is what we do when we reason from laws which we ourselves have given 
ourselves.  
This point also brings out a little bit of the ambiguity in ‘rational choice’ 
which requires it to be subjugated under the ‘reasonable’. Just as a maxim or 
plan of action might or might not originate from pure practical reason, so too the 
results arrived at in the original position might or might not be expressions of a 
universally applicable law. They might just be agreed to because it is easiest for 
all. What concerns Kant and Rawls clearly is that the practical principle that is 
adopted be adopted because it is universal and thus for the sake of reason itself, 
rather than for expedient reasons. Thus, in order for us to be sure reasons are 
adopted for the sake of reason, we must put constraints on our adoption of 
maxims. We should adopt only those principles which are free of contingent 
concerns.  
Before moving on, let us recap the argument so far. We started with the 
notion of the original position as an interpretation of the categorical imperative. 
This was meant to show that the bargaining in the original position together with 
the veil of ignorance models Kant’s twin notions of the moral law and autonomy. 
These arguments were essentially meant to show that if we are autonomous, we 
will choose ends that are universally acceptable.  
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The second step was for Rawls to draw out the presuppositions behind 
the notion of the vernünftig person in Kant who is able to reflect and act in 
accordance with the categorical imperative. This meant seeing the double 
structure of the agent’s practical reason, which revealed itself to be both pure 
and empirical. Rawls characterized the agent as ‘reasonable and rational’, where 
the reasonable (modeling the categorical imperative) absolutely subjugates the 
rational (modeling the hypothetical imperative). This conception of personhood 
was then linked to Rawls’ conception of the person as free and equal.  
There are still two elements missing from this argument. The first, to which 
we will now turn, is the question of how we get from the presupposed character 
of the agent as reasonable and rational to the content of the principle of justice, 
which so far has been described only formally. The second question, which we 
will come to after that, is what justifies the assumption of people as ‘reasonable 
and rational’ in the sense of being free to set their own goals.   
 
Constructivism 
Constructivism is meant to be the way to get from a certain conception of 
the person (here, free and equal) to the appropriate principles of action for such a 
person. This means that constructivism seeks to draw out the content of the 
conception of the agent and to formalize it. That is, if the CI-procedure is the 
appropriate form of a rational principle, what is the appropriate material? The 
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answer is the free and equal agent.64 It is the answer to the question: what 
should we do when we act under the moral law or use our pure practical reason 
(which amounts to the same thing)?  
In Kantian terms this means that: “the totality of particular categorical 
imperatives […] that pass the test of the CI-procedure are seen as constructed 
by a procedure of construction worked through by rational agents subject to 
various reasonable constraints.”65 Each time we reflect and determine a law for 
ourselves we construct an element in a universal set of rules which can then be 
abstracted and turned into a general duty. Rawls’ two principles of justice are a 
version of what might be arrived at in such an abstraction. The point, though, is 
that the maxims of conduct permitted or enjoined by rational reflection are not 
theoretical speculations; they are responses to actual needs for clarification of 
the permissibility of intended action.  
O’Neill notes that the constructivist position is anti-realist because it 
denies that moral facts are discoverable in theoretical terms.66 Constructivists 
believe that ethical principles are constructed by human agents, that these 
principles are practical and that they are objective. To this effect O’Neill quotes 
Rawls as saying in “Kantian Constructivism” that: “Kantian constructivism holds 
that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructing social 
                                            
64 For this way of putting the problem see Christine Korsgaard. “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”. 
107.  
65 Rawls. “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. 513-14.  
66 O’Neill. “Construction in Rawls and Kant”. See also Christine Korsgaard. “Reasons We Can 
Share”.  
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point of view that all can accept. Apart from the process of constructing the 
principles of justice, there are no moral facts”. (KC 307) This is because moral 
objectivity stems from moral reflection by individuals. If the maxim is in accord 
with the moral law then it is permissible or enjoined. But since the moral law 
legislates universally, the results are valid for all and thus objectively true for all 
rational and reasonable agents. The only way objectivity can be understood is by 
referring to the set of agents who fall under it. There are no independent moral 
facts because they have no way of reaching us, just like the thing in itself.  
This contrasts notably with the moral realist position in which principles 
are regarded as discoverable and the truth of a subjective moral claim rests on 
the claim  of being in accordance with an objectively true moral value. Rawls thus 
claims that Kant regarded rational intuitionism, for example Leibniz, as 
heteronomous because it held that principles of morality are true in an objective 
sense. This is heteronomy because, if this were true, we would have to subject 
ourselves to a law which is external. Thus Rawls claims that:  
in Kant’s moral constructivism it suffices for heteronomy that first 
principles obtain in virtue of relations among objects the nature of 
which is not affected or determined by our conception of ourselves 
as reasonable and rational persons (as possessors of the power of 
practical reason), and of the public role of moral principles in a 
society of such persons. […] Kant’s idea of autonomy requires that 
there exists no moral order prior to and independent of those 
conceptions that is to determine the form of the procedure that 
specifies the content of first principles of right and justice among 
free and equal persons.  
 
And a little later:  
“[This thesis] simply means that the form and structure of this procedure express 
the requirements of practical reason. These requirements are embedded in our 
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conception of persons as reasonable and rational, and as the basic units of 
agency and responsibility.”67 
To recap then, we can say that constructivism is the idea that the content 
of our highest moral principles stems from the rational and reasonable reflection 
upon our concepts as free and equal agents. Constructivism models autonomy in 
the sense that it constitutes the moral law or principle of justice from within its 
own rational and reasonable reflection. Nothing can count as a law for me 
without my having determined it for myself. This strongly echoes Kant’s claim 
that there is nothing good in itself except the good will.  
Now, as before, there is here an emphasis on the first person perspective. 
That is, constructivism is just the CI-procedure insofar as it pertains to 
determining the content of the moral law. The content of the moral law has the 
content it has because I have (rationally) reflected upon it and have determined 
that it has this content. We must, however, keep open the possibility that when 
this first person perspective is switched to a third person perspective, as it is in 
rational choice, we loose normativity altogether. We will return to this issue.  
An important consequence of the constructivist method is that the terms of 
justice are procedural, that is, no contentful definition of justice can ever be 
given. There are two types of procedural justice: perfect procedural justice where 
a good is in sight and we work toward achieving or actualizing it, and pure 
procedural justice. Rawls writes of the latter: “The essential feature of pure 
procedural justice, as opposed to perfect procedural justice, is that there exists 
                                            
67 Rawls. “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. 512. Henceforth ‘Themes’ when cited in the text.  
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no independent criterion of justice; what is just is defined by the outcome of the 
process itself.” (KC 311)68 The point Rawls wishes to emphasize here is that: 
“there exists no standpoint external to the parties’ own perspective from which 
they are constrained by prior and independent principles in questions of justice 
that arise among them as members of one society”. (KC 311)  
The contrast again is with the realist or rational intuitionist position, in 
which knowledge of the good is applied to a certain situation to bring the good 
about. Pure proceduralism, by contrast, is practical and constitutes the good as it 
develops. Or, as Rawls writes in A Theory of Justice, “A procedure translates its 
fairness to the outcome only when it is actually carried out.”69 This is a uniquely 
practical conception of justice which has no theoretical analogue.  
In a sense, one would be hard pressed to say why something is just other 
than that it has been rationally and reasonably agreed to. The constructivist 
procedure is thus completely immanent. Moral objectivity is reached by a process 
of internal reflection in which the maxim is referred to an internal concept for 
adjudication and is implemented on the authority of the process of deliberation 
alone. Objectivity is not sought in external metaphysical truths but arrived at 
through thinking itself. So for constructivism, truth is constructed in rational 
engagement with the world rather than found by poking around in the world.  
                                            
68 See also A Theory of Justice where Rawls writes: “[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there 
is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such 
that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been 
properly followed.” (TJ 75) 
69 Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 75.  
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Construction thus has two elements. First, it is a process internal to the 
agent and as such it is from a first person perspective. No one can reflect for me. 
Second, it is practical. Since reflection on the permissibility of performing an 
action stems from an incentive for action, the result of my reflection can only ever 
be manifested in my action itself. The result of my reflection can only ever be 
what I actually do, that is, what motivates me. If I say I ought to give $100 to 
charity and do not, I have actually decided to keep the $100. A practical 
constructivism thus relies on a notion of pure practical reason, that is, the idea 
that we are capable of reflecting on our ends by the use of the moral law or the 
two principles of justice.   
 
Let us take a step back again and see where the argument has gotten us 
so far. Constructivism and proceduralism were introduced to provide a link 
between the conception of persons as free and equal, or as reasonable and 
rational and the content of the principles of justice. Rawls’ contention was that 
through the process of construction, or through autonomous reflection, these 
ideal agents would determine a set of principles which are able to govern the 
agents who have developed them in fair cooperation. Construction was then the 
way to bring out the content of the basic idea of the reasonable and rational 
agent without introducing any alien conceptions of how the world is or ought to 
be. The only tool available to the reasonable and rational agent in determining 
what the principles of justice are is reason. We also found that this constructivism 
proceeds from a practical point of view, which cannot be justified in theoretical 
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terms. Justice is immanently constituted as doing that to which all involved have 
agreed.  
Thus three of the four elements of Rawls’ argument are in place. The 
original position has been established as yielding a universal principle. The 
presuppositions about the moral character (freedom and equality, reasonable 
and rational) of the agents who participate in the original position have been 
examined. And lastly, constructivism has presented a way for us to move from 
these presuppositions of moral character to the actual content of the formal 
characteristics of the moral law: the principles of justice.  
The only element that is still missing is the justification of why we should 
think that we are actually those people in the original position who frame the 
rational by the reasonable.  
 
Excursus: Rawls and Kant, parallel arguments 
I have argued that Rawls has roughly followed the structure of the 
Groundwork. He has developed the categorical imperative in terms of the 
universality of the two principles of justice, corresponding to the first formulation 
of the categorical imperative. Then Rawls has switched perspectives and has 
argued that the presupposition for such a law is that people respect their 
humanity and, finally, Rawls has contended that in order to act under the moral 
law, we must imagine ourselves as instantiating the two principles of justice. For 
Rawls this is the kingdom of ends. Let us examine these parallels in a little more 
detail.  
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Rawls writes: “In the first formulation [of the categorical imperative], which 
is the strict method, we look at our maxim from our point of view. […] We are to 
regard ourselves as subject to the moral law and we want to know what it 
requires of us.” (Themes 505) This, I want to argue, is similar to the original 
position in which we want to know the formal structure a principle of justice would 
have.  
In the second formulation, however, we are to consider our maxim from the point 
of view of our humanity as the fundamental element in our person demanding our 
respect, or from the point of view of other persons who will be affected by our 
actions. Humanity both in ourselves and in others is regarded as passive: as that 
which will be affected by what we do. (Themes 505) 
As I have already indicated above, I take this to be the perspective of 
drawing out the presuppositions about agents in the original position. To frame 
the rational by the reasonable means to see ourselves as passive in the face of 
the hypothetical imperative and to try to avoid damage to our humanity by 
restricting its scope. Our humanity is the material for the application of the CI-
procedure in the sense that this is the purpose for that procedure. Rawls adds: 
“The point is simply that all persons affected [by my will] must apply [the CI-
procedure] in the same way both to accept and to reject the same maxims. This 
ensures a universal agreement which prepares the way for the third formulation.” 
(Themes 505)  
“In [the third] formulation we come back again to the agent’s point of view, 
but this time we no longer regard ourselves as someone who is subject to the 
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moral law but as someone who makes the law. The CI-procedure is seen as the 
procedure adherence to which, with a full grasp of its meaning, enables us to 
regard ourselves as legislators— as those who make universal public law for a 
possible moral community.” (Themes 506) This last formulation is clearly 
analogous to constructivism in the sense that in constructivism we develop 
positive law out of our conception of ourselves as free and equal.  
I provide this juxtaposition of the structure of Rawls’ and Kant’s arguments 
not only to support Rawls’ claim that A Theory of Justice is largely Kantian in 
orientation but to show that A Theory of Justice brings out central features of 
constructivism which must be seen as not just incidental but substantive 
contributions to Kant scholarship.70 I further wish to argue that by tying his theory 
to Kant so closely, Rawls’ theory is subject to many of the same difficulties as 
Kant’s work. These difficulties have mainly to do with the problem of justification. 
For instance, the failure of Kant’s deduction of morality has left Kant without a 
footing from which to say that humans are indeed able to interact respectfully 
with one another. The two commentaries on Kant which we looked at in the 
previous chapter attempted to push Kant toward a more historical and thus 
immanent view of the interaction between agents and nature. Because Rawls 
avoids this push toward immanence and stays at what might be called the 
‘common sense’ level, he also lacks a philosophically rigorous conception of 
intersubjectivity. Rawls’ rejection of metaphysics, as I have said before, leaves 
                                            
70 See Rawls. A Theory of Justice. §40.  
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him without an answer to the question of how people can actually be relied upon 
to treat each other with respect.  
 
Justification and the Reflective Equilibrium 
If the theory of construction is the justification for the two principles of 
justice, then what justifies construction? Rawls’ answer, like Kant’s answer to the 
problem of why humans should consider themselves free, is quite simply that 
constructivism is not justified in a theoretical way, but is given its authentication 
through cohesion into the perspective of existing humans who find that they 
agree with it. Justification is given through action. This notion of coherence is the 
final step in the three part development of authentication presented in “Kantian 
Constructivism”.  
We have already seen the first two steps. The first was that of the actors 
in the original position. They were rationally autonomous in the sense that their 
understanding of their life and the good was hidden behind the veil of ignorance. 
Then came the second perspective, that of full autonomy in which the 
perspective was that of the agents stepping back from rational autonomy in order 
to implement the second level of insight, reasonableness or the sense of justice. 
This introduced the categorical imperative to frame the hypothetical imperative, 
but the agents who employed it were still only ideal. What is needed, as I have 
said, is to determine whether the ideal agents of full autonomy bear any 
resemblance to us.  
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Finally, Rawls comes to consider the last perspective, “that of ourselves— 
you and me— who are examining justice as fairness as a basis for a conception 
of justice that may yield a suitable understanding of freedom and equality” (for 
our own practical use). (KC 320-21) Rawls continues:  
Here [in the third perspective] the test is that of general and wide reflective 
equilibrium, that is, how well the view as a whole meshes with and articulates our 
more firm considered convictions. […] A doctrine that meets this criterion is the 
doctrine that, so far as we can now ascertain, is the most reasonable for us. (KC 
321)  
At this third perspective then, we have arrived at the criterion for a final 
justification of Rawls’ theory. The problem for Rawls, as for Kant, is that we 
cannot prove that people believe themselves to be those ideal agents. Rawls is 
quite convinced that the failure of Kant’s deduction of the moral law is sufficient 
to show that such an idealized theory approach makes no sense. So, according 
to the third perspective, the justification or authentication comes down to what 
Rawls calls the reflective equilibrium.  
Let us now examine what the reflective equilibrium is in more detail. As 
Kenneth Baynes puts it: “reflective equilibrium refers to a condition in which an 
individual’s concrete moral judgments have been brought into harmony with her 
higher-order moral principles”.71 This harmonization occurs first through a narrow 
process of reflective equilibrium in which one moves back and forth between 
concrete judgments (in, say, the manner of the categorical imperative in which 
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the subject decides on a maxim and, using the categorical imperative procedure, 
determines whether it can be acted upon— if not, a new maxim must be created 
and tested) and then through the wide process of reflective equilibrium in which 
one’s own judgments are bought into harmony with general social norms, shared 
by most readers of A Theory of Justice.72   
Let us now turn to Rawls’ own characterization of the process before 
turning to criticisms and defenses of this method. Rawls holds that his theory of 
justice describes our own sense of justice. (TJ 41) The justifications of his theory 
of justice, modeled by the original position and background conditions, are all 
reflections of our own considered judgments. The need to write A Theory of 
Justice in the first place, however, must have been generated by the knowledge 
that, on the face of it, not everyone currently does in fact share Rawls’ 
conception of justice. The task of justifying the theory of justice thus must occur 
though a process of fleshing out those beliefs we actually all hold.73   
The process of achieving reflective equilibrium systematizes our beliefs.74 
What we do in the narrow reflective equilibrium is thus similar to what we do in 
                                                                                                                                  
71 Baynes. The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism. 69.  
72 Rawls already characterizes the discussion about Justice as Fairness as taking place within a 
bounded society, one that endorses liberal democracy. Readers coming from outside this realm, 
may not agree with him.  
73 Who exactly the ‘we’ is, has been the subject of much debate. See, for instance, Susan Moller 
Okin. “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender”.  
74 See Rawls’ formulation about the original position: “The conditions embodied in the description 
of the original position are ones that we do in fact accept. Or, if we do not, then perhaps we can 
be persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection.” (TJ 19)  
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the CI-procedure. We take a practical problem which, admittedly, is more 
abstract than our everyday practical concerns, and reflect on it. For what is 
systematizing but bringing disparate concepts under a general principle of 
practical reason.  
Rawls is thus arguing that through the reflective equilibrium we might see 
our own principles of reason to be the same ones that Rawls, however, has 
advocated in A Theory of Justice. This will only produce coherence and not more 
because it cannot be argued (made explicit theoretically) that we must share the 
same principle of pure reason. A Theory of Justice is thus an invitation to reflect 
on a deeper problem of our time and to take Rawls’ theory as an occasion for 
reflection.  
There is thus a positive and a normative side to the reflective equilibrium, 
or, as Scanlon put it, a descriptive and a deliberative side. As a method of 
arriving at an accurate portrait of justice, we must dig within ourselves to find 
normative notions we endorse.75 Both sides seem to be included in the following 
statement by Rawls: “we do not understand our sense of justice until we know in 
some systematic way covering a wide range of cases what these principles are.” 
(TJ 41) Indeed, in this statement of the purpose of the reflective equilibrium it is 
not possible to separate the two senses. Since, however, the process of the 
reflective equilibrium is a theoretical undertaking to which we subject our 
considered judgments, it seems appropriate to call it a method of deliberation.  
                                            
75 Scanlon. “Rawls on Justification”. 145.  
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The method itself is not explained in great detail in A Theory of Justice.76 I 
will thus cite only the two main passages from this work in which Rawls describes 
the reflective equilibrium process as it pertains to original position:  
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the condition of the 
contractual circumstances [in the original position], at others 
withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principles, I 
assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial 
situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields 
principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and 
adjusted. (TJ 18) 
 
A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or 
conditions on principle; instead, its justification is a method of the mutual support 
of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view. (TJ 
19) 
The reflective equilibrium begins with our considered opinions which must be 
made “under conditions favorable to deliberation and judgment in general”. (TJ 
40) According to Scanlon considered moral judgments are of three types: (1) 
Those that have to do with how the judgment is made (knowledge of the issues, 
the person neither gains nor loses by the outcome), (2) those that have to do with 
                                            
76 Rawls’ idea of the reflective equilibrium has been taken up in the fields of moral philosophy and 
the philosophy of science. See, for instance, the more rigorous formulation James Blanchowicz 
gives (which is not based strictly on Rawls’ account). Likening the reflective equilibrium process 
to repairing a ship at sea, Blanchowicz writes: “It is not just the fact that one is resting on a dry 
part of the ship in one’s efforts to repair a leaking part and that one may later rest on the repaired 
(formerly leaking) part to repair a new leaking (formerly dry) part that establishes genuine 
reflective equilibrium, but rather the fact that the way in which one rests on these respective parts 
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how the judgment is held (the level of confidence in the judgment and how stable 
the judgment is over time), and (3) those which should be intuitive with respect to 
ethical principles.77 A central feature of these conditions, and one which will be 
relevant to criticism of the reflective equilibrium discussed below, is that the 
process of the reflective equilibrium is always subject-dependent. That is, it is 
always my judgment that comes in for consideration. In this sense, judgments 
are judgments only when they come with my reasons for the judgments 
attached.78 They are thus not comparable to observational data.79  
As a coherentist strategy, convergence in reflective equilibrium is only 
evidence of how much agreement we already have. It is not normative, in the 
sense that it might convince one who does not hold what I hold to change his or 
her mind. It is purely introspective. This is because, as Norman Daniels argues, 
coherentism in the form of the reflective equilibrium remains agnostic about 
whether there is any truth which it might approximate. This agrees with the point 
about anti-realism raised earlier according to which constructivism develops all 
‘truths’ through reflection itself.  
                                                                                                                                  
is different in each case[…].” Blanchowicz. “Reciprocal Justification in Science and Moral 
Theory”. 460.  
77 Scanlon. “Rawls on Justification”. 143.  
78 This is perhaps the place to note that Rawls never develops an adequate justification of the 
reflective equilibrium from the first person perspective, and thus ultimately leaves himself open to 
criticism from Kantians and others who regard the subject as the primary unity of ethical 
coherence. See the discussion of Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill below. Both seek to 
remedy this deficiency in Rawls’ account through their respective theories of practical reason.  
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Problems with the Reflective Equilibrium  
As we saw above, the method of the reflective equilibrium is a way of 
becoming clear about one’s own ethical convictions. We examine our thoughts 
and our principles are measured against what we might have read or discussed 
with others. The important point to keep in mind is that we are now ourselves, 
comprehensive subjects with commitments to notions of the good. This means 
that each of us reflects from a different perspective.80   
At this point we must, however, make a distinction which I mentioned 
earlier, namely the distinction between the content of the theory and its very 
possibility. For there is an ambiguity in the charge that we reflect from different 
perspectives as real existing agents. The charge might mean that, since we are 
different, we are not sure whether we will come to the same conclusions as 
Rawls does. But it might also mean that we would have completely different 
conceptions of morality or that morality might be denied altogether. The former 
                                                                                                                                  
79 See Norman Daniels. “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics”. pp. 169-
72. See also Brandt. “Wide Reflective Equilibrium”.  
80 This is what Sandel has in mind when he argues that the Rawlsian deontological subject is 
incapable of normative commitments because he or she has been cleansed of all contingency 
which would necessitate normativity in the form of judgment. In order to make the Rawlsian 
subject capable of normativity, normativity must be introduced at a later stage but this is 
impossible given the thinness of the subject as it is conceived in the original position. Sandel. 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.  
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point is addressed by the bulk of Rawls’ argument while the latter point refers to 
a problem Rawls does not have much to say about.81  
The problem of different starting points for reflection  brings with it a host 
of problems for Rawls. For instance, there is no longer any compelling 
connection between the perspectives of the different subjects being asked to 
endorse Justice as Fairness. The point is put nicely by Baynes who argues that 
there seems to be no reason for me to accept the results of the reflective 
equilibrium unless I am the one who has undergone the process myself. This, 
presumably, is what Rawls means when he writes that “each person has in 
himself the whole form of a moral conception”. (TJ 44) Here, whole must mean 
complete for me and not, as in Kant, universal. Thus, there does not seem to be 
any reason why I should be swayed by a subjective process of reasoning not my 
own.82 We are thus back at the question of who the ‘we’ who endorses the 
considered moral judgments is and whether there is any connection among the 
individuals which make up the ‘we’. In A Theory of Justice and in “Kantian 
Constructivism”, this ‘we’ seems not to have been theorized at all where possible 
justification is concerned.  
Scanlon, similar to Baynes, argues that the reflective equilibrium process 
is normatively underdetermined. This charge states simply that no conclusive 
evidence for or against Rawls’ theory can be gotten from a coherentist 
                                            
81 Rawls addresses this issue in Political Liberalism where he talks about commitment to the 
liberal state as opposed to the modus vivendi, a temporary commitment which, in certain extreme 
cases, might seeks to overthrow the whole system.  
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justification.83 Since the reflective equilibrium does not offer a determinate 
process by which one might arrive at ethical conclusions, it is quite possible for 
two people to start from the same premises and, using the reflective equilibrium 
method, still arrive at different conclusions. Rawls acknowledges this point when 
he says that his theory of justice is just ‘a’ theory of justice.84 (TJ 43-44) But as a 
theory of justice it must include the claim that something is normative for us even 
if we cannot agree entirely on what it is. The problem is thus that a coherentist 
theory which seeks its justification in the reflective equilibrium is too weak to bind 
people of differing perspectives together because it cannot on its own overcome 
the differences that people with previous normative commitments bring to bear 
on their reflections. Coherentism, in other words, seems not to be able to provide 
consensus where there is none to begin with.  
There is another, deeper objection here, however. Scanlon has argued 
that someone’s employment of the reflective equilibrium commits the evaluator of 
                                                                                                                                  
82 See Baynes. The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism. 74.  
83 Brandt argues, for instance, that Rawls’ argument comes to a conclusion no more forceful than 
that: “A coherent set of beliefs can be made more convincing than another set even if there is 
nothing which can confirm or refute it.” “The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium”. 
272-73.  
84 Concerning the intersubjectivity of the reflective equilibrium process, Rawls writes that the 
question must remain open: “I shall not even ask whether the principles that characterize one 
person’s considered judgments are the same as those that characterize another’s. I shall take for 
granted that these principles are either approximately the same for persons whose judgments are 
in reflective equilibrium, or if not, that their judgments divide a few main lines represented by the 
family of traditional [moral] doctrines […]”.  (TJ 44) Rawls adds, referring to himself, that: “if we 
  
 92 
the argument who undertakes it to nothing at all.85 This question delves deeper 
since it asks the more fundamental question of whether morality exists at all and 
thus lays bare the assumption Rawls has so far been making about the reflective 
equilibrium, namely that it is the pure employment of practical reason. If the 
reflective equilibrium is, in fact, the pure employment of practical reason, there 
will be no problem with coherence beyond the merely technical problem of the 
correct assessment of the facts. We thus need some further argument about why 
the reflective equilibrium is, in fact, the employment of pure practical reason and 
not some other principle. This goes to the more fundamental question of the 
possibility of morality and thus relates quite clearly to Kant’s own failed attempt at 
proving intersubjectivity.  
The problem I am here insisting on is that that the answer to the problem 
of the justification of the two principles of justice in the reflective equilibrium 
cannot be gotten through an analysis of the coherence of the two principles of 
justice with our own perspective as readers of political theory through the 
reflective equilibrium. The deeper problem suggested here turns on the question 
about the possibility of morality in general, which cannot be answered by 
coherentism precisely because it is a question of first principles or metaphysics, if 
you will. Indeed, coherentism can only give an evaluation of the rightness or 
                                                                                                                                  
can characterize one (educated) person’s sense of justice, we might have a good beginning 
toward a theory of justice”. (TJ 44) 
85 See Scanlon. “Rawls on Justification”. 152 and O’Neill. “Constructivism in Ethics”. 206-207.  
  
 93 
justice of two principles of justice if it is assumed that coherence is really an 
expression of morality or practical reason.  
Before taking up this final issue, we must look a little more closely at what 
the role of pure practical reason is in Rawls’ theory. And this crucially depends on 
the perspective employed in the philosophical reasoning of A Theory of Justice.  
 
Pure Practical Reason and the First Person Perspective  
We have now seen all four elements of Rawls’ theory so I now want to 
take stock of the argument as a whole and make good on the promises for 
elaboration I made during the reconstruction of the argument. I will thus discuss 
what I see as the real problem in Rawls’ ultimate justification of his theory, by 
which I mean the position of pure practical reason. In both the original position 
and the reflective equilibrium Rawls presents us with a conception of normativity, 
through bargaining and the interpretation of social norms, which seems to want 
to sidestep the question of the need for a justification of his claim for our ability to 
employ pure practical reason. I will argue, however, that a notion of pure practical 
reason must underlie both conceptions. I will then return to the issue of whether 
pure practical reason receives a foundation in Rawls’ work.  
The first problem I mentioned was the problem of what I argued was the 
substitution of the original position for the categorical imperative in A Theory of 
Justice. I noted that in this move Rawls replaced a first person perspective with a 
third person perspective. He seemed to be arguing that the process of 
deliberation under the veil of ignorance was just as good at leading to the two 
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principles of justice as solitary reflection. Indeed, the substitution rather suggests 
that Rawls thinks rational choice is a better model for ethical thought than solitary 
reflection.  
From a Kantian perspective, however, this move seems highly suspect. 
For what gives rise to normativity in Kant is that I make the law for myself, that I 
am an autonomous actor. As is clear from the reading I gave above, Rawls also 
considers this to be the case with the agents in the original position behind the 
veil of ignorance. But rational reflection, as Kant sees it, operates only from the 
first person perspective. That is, something is normative for me because I choose 
to adopt it as a principle. No one else can make me adopt as my end something I 
do not freely choose as an end. You may force me to do it, but it will not be my 
end.  
This is just the familiar point that practical reason cannot be given a 
theoretical explanation. No one can convince me by argument that I should adopt 
their reasons. I must convince myself. So, if deliberation in the original position is 
really a ‘compromise’ as Rawls states, then the agreement reached in it is not 
normative for anyone since it does not represent a principle anyone actually 
endorses. The principle that has arisen through the compromise might, of course, 
still be adopted, but Rawls has not given us any argument for why those in the 
original position should adopt the principles they have reached in negotiation.86  
There is a way out of this argument, of course. It is essentially that the 
original position with its multiple parties is just a way of representing what goes 
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on in rational reflection in the CI-procedure. The move from the CI-procedure to 
the original position is just heuristic.87 That this is so becomes quite clear, I think, 
when one examines the notion of constructivism, which is meant to connect the 
two principles of justice to the original position. Constructivism seeks to draw out 
the consequences of our presuppositions about the agents negotiating in the 
original position. But in order for us to be able to draw out anything about them, 
we must assume that they have something in common, namely the concepts of 
freedom and equality. This is why Rawls refers to these agents as idealized. In 
order for the process of construction to yield anything at all, ‘idealized’ must 
mean that they are at least generally the same. If this is so, then the move from 
free and equal individuals through construction to the two principles of justice 
merely mirrors Kant’s movement from the vernünftig individual though rational 
reflection to the moral law.  
As such, it is no mystery that the agents in the original position can come 
to a ‘compromise’ which is normative for all. The compromise is no compromise, 
it is really the presupposition of the moral theory underlying the make up of the 
agents— justice as fairness. There has thus been no shift from the first person 
perspective which admits of the use of practical reason to the third person 
                                                                                                                                  
86 Rawls. A theory of Justice. 104-105.  
87 See Ronald Dworkin. “The Original Position”. Dworkin essentially argues that the original 
position is just a way of testing our intuitions about justice against a general theory. As such, of 
course, it bears close resemblance to what Kant had in mind with the CI-procedure. Rawls admits 
as much himself when he states that collective bargaining is really just a representation of the 
process of reflection employed by the noumenal self. A Theory of Justice. 226.  
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perspective. There is also thus no issue of convincing anyone of the rightness of 
the two principles of justice.  
So, as I think I have shown, the problem of normativity of the two 
principles of justice does not arise at the level of the original position since, 
fundamentally, the original position models the use of pure practical reason by an 
autonomous self. This does not mean, however, that the problem of normativity 
has been laid to rest. The normativity of the two principles of justice is simply 
moved back to the reflective equilibrium and to the question of the acceptance of 
it by comprehensive subjects. It also does not mean that the problem of the first 
person to third person switch and the problems this entails has gone away.  
 
We saw above that the reflective equilibrium was designed to bring our 
own considered opinions into accord with those of others. But the reflective 
equilibrium is meant not only to help us clarify our own views to ourselves, but 
also to bring these views into harmony with those of others. Rawls, as has been 
noted, calls these the narrow and wide reflective equilibrium respectively. But 
while the narrow reflective equilibrium is a process of internal reflection which 
seeks to help us get clear about our own principles, the wide reflective 
equilibrium is constructed as a dialogue between different members of society, 
perhaps modeled on Kant’s notion of public reason. There is no problem with this 
picture unless one regards the two processes of the reflective equilibrium as 
substantially different.  
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For, while it is fairly clear, given the possibility of introspection Rawls 
allows for, that we would become more clear about our principles in the narrow 
reflective equilibrium, it is more difficult to see how the process of the wide 
reflective equilibrium would help us to clarify our ideas about morality if we think 
this process is significantly different from the process of narrow reflective 
equilibrium. Indeed, on the reading of practical reason which I have been giving, 
and which I have argued Rawls’ reading of Kant endorses, there can be no 
distinction between these two types of reflection since social norms and reasons 
could only ever function as candidate reasons which we would then have to 
endorse ourselves anyway. The entire weight of social convention must still be 
rationally examined by us if we are to act on its directive while maintaining our 
autonomy.  
According to the arguments I have just given, we must conclude that 
Rawls’ attempt to build greater stability for his system, through both the notion of 
bargaining in the original position and through the idea of wide reflective 
equilibrium which ultimately rely on a notion of public reason, is really reducible 
to the employment of pure practical reason by each individual.  
 
The Problem of Normativity and the Necessity of its Justification 
The fact that I have agued that the social anchoring that Rawls wants to 
give his theory by embedding it in broad social views is inconsistent does not 
mean, however, that the theory must be rejected or even that its steps are 
incoherent. I have merely shown that Rawls actually sticks far closer to Kant’s 
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general argumentation than is usually supposed. Two theoretical moves have 
been rejected but as long as we interpret these moves as merely heuristic, the 
general theory remains intact. It is thus time to come to the question of the final 
justification of the reflective equilibrium, in other words, whether there is an 
account of pure practical reason in Rawls’ theory.  
And here we come to the central problem of Rawls’ justification. Kant saw 
his theory as hinging on the proof or authentication of the necessity of freedom 
and morality both in the deduction and in the fact of reason doctrine. Rawls does 
not think his theory requires such a grounding.  
This brings us again to the problem of the first person and third person 
perspective of practical reason. I argued first that the agents in the original 
position, as autonomous and idealized, must share the same conception of 
freedom and equality, and that this means that they are really not substantially 
distinct in a way that would necessitate a compromise in determining the two 
principles of justice. Then I argued that the reflective equilibrium process which 
we must all engage in, in order to determine whether we actually believe 
ourselves to be similar enough to the idealized agents in the original position to 
endorse the two principles of justice they determine, also had to stem from a first-
person reflection. Thus the claim and its authentication both stem from a first-
person perspective.  
Without a proof for the necessary identity between the results of the 
original position and the results of our own reflection, the most that can be said of 
the two principles of justice is that they cohere. And this is all Rawls wants to say. 
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Rawls refuses Kant’s deduction of morality in favor of Kant’s fact of reason. And 
Rawls interprets the fact of reason as a coherentist justification for the two 
principles of justice.  
Thus Rawls writes: 
Pure practical reason is authenticated finally by assuming primacy over 
speculative reason and by cohering into, and what is more, by completing the 
construction of reason as one unified body of principles: this makes reason self-
authenticating as a whole. (Themes 523)88  
The idea here is that since there can be no theoretical proof of freedom and 
morality, the only justification for morality that can be given is that we recognize 
ourselves as moral beings, that is, we recognize ourselves as the agents who 
participate in the original position. This means, as we saw, that the speculative 
part of his theory, the original position and the mutual regard of rational 
autonomy, cannot be justified except through empirical endorsement by fully 
autonomous actors, the people engaged in ethical reflection— you and me.  
O’Neill comments on this passage:  
The distinction which Rawls draws here between Kant’s 
constructive use of the [categorical imperative] to establish ethical 
principles and the merely coherentist justification of the [categorical 
imperative] itself parallels his own strategy in A Theory of Justice, 
where the principles of justice are constructed using [the original 
position], but [the original position] itself receives only a coherentist 
justification.89 
 
                                            
88 See also O’Neill. “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant”. pp. 356-57.  
89 O’Neill. “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant”. 357.  
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By a coherentist justification Rawls means that in recognizing ourselves in 
the idealized agents of the original position we take their principles as our own 
principles. The primacy of reason which is invoked in the fact of reason doctrine 
means, however, that there can never be a theoretical explanation of why we 
must recognize ourselves in these agents. We just do. And we do so only if we 
actually act on those two principles of justice, make them ours. For, as the first 
person perspective requires, it is only through adopting them as principles of 
action that they can become our principles.  
Thus, much rides on the notion of recognizing ourselves in the idealized 
agents of the original position. This recognition comes down to believing 
ourselves to be capable of employing pure practical reason. And this belief is 
what Rawls means by cohering into a much broader notion of reason. Rawls thus 
offers a minimalist authentication of the possibility of morality itself.  
I mentioned earlier that Rawls thought that the categorical imperative 
offered only modest help in determining contentful principles of justice. We are 
now in a position to make better sense of this claim. Because of his coherentist 
justification of the two principles of justice, Rawls does not maintain that his two 
principles of justice are the only ones possible. That is, he does not maintain that 
he has determined the precise content of the laws our social organization should 
take. He has proposed ‘a theory’ of justice which is open to revision.  
But this is not a significant departure from Kant, since Kant was not 
proposing a significant content to the moral law. He was only interested in 
showing that there is such a thing as the moral law. This, however, is a position 
  
 101 
in which Rawls must follow Kant, since in order for there to be any kind of theory 
of justice, the possibility of a theory of justice must be given. And this is what 
Kant’s deduction and later his doctrine of the fact of reason seeks to show.  
The second claim is deeper, for it contains a thesis about the ultimate 
justification of morality. Here Rawls just assumes that the principle of practical 
reason really exists. In this sense, the revisability of the two principles of justice 
which, as we saw, are supposed to be derivatives or incarnations of Kant’s 
categorical imperative, depends on there being such a thing as the categorical 
imperative or freedom in the first place. By seeking to give a weaker 
interpretation of the categorical imperative in terms of the CI-procedure, Rawls 
has given up on Kant’s claim that the weak autonomy thesis must be turned into 
a strong autonomy thesis. Rawls has, in other words, given up on the idea of 
showing that humans are rational beings and has just assumed that we are.  
But giving up on the strong autonomy thesis means that, as I have argued, 
there is no answer to the question raised in the last chapter, namely, why should 
we think that we appetitive humans are motivated by rational laws and hence, 
why should we think that what you think is ‘rational’ is not just a way of 
subjugating me. The whole question of justice, in other words, rests on showing 
that we are all in possession of a common rationality which can help us to 
overcome our appetitive natures and adhere to derivatives of the categorical 
imperative as Rawls or anyone else proposes them.  
To put the question one last way in terms of Kant’s analytic and synthetic 
distinction: it might be analytically true that humans would follow something like 
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Rawls’ two principle of justice if they were rational, but to show this goes beyond 
the scope of Rawls’ book. I hope, however, to have raised the issue of the 
grounding of reason with sufficient urgency to show that metaphysical neutrality 
is not an option for a theory of ethics.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
HEGELʼS AND WILLIAMSʼ CRITIQUES OF THE KANTIAN 
POSITION 
 
In this chapter I look at what it would take to resolve the problem of 
normativity which I have so far developed with regard to Kant and Rawls. To do 
this, I would like to turn to two influential criticisms of the Kantian position, those 
of Hegel and Bernard Williams. These criticisms are not exactly the same, but 
they do share a fundamental skepticism that the moral can be divorced from the 
non-moral realm. If Hegel and Williams are right and the non-moral and the moral 
cannot be separated, we must inquire into what it would mean to see them as 
one instead of dividing them up the way Kant and Rawls have. Seeing the moral 
and the non-moral as one would mean showing how normativity pervades all 
realms of thinking and acting. It would be, to take up Prauss’ criticism from 
chapter one, to show that there is a way in which thinking is already acting.  
In addressing this point, this chapter will function as a transition point 
between the two previous chapters which sought to examine what a theory of 
practical reason might look like with and without a metaphysical basis. The next 
chapters will deal with the need to refigure what is meant by a ‘metaphysical’ 
justification for moral conduct. In this sense, the chapters coming after this will 
have to contend with the question of what it means to work through and alter the 
question of universality itself with regard to moral conduct.  
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I will present Hegel’s criticism first, both for historical reasons and because 
his criticism of the reciprocity thesis shows that no stable and strong sense of 
universality can be made available in the Kantian argument. Williams’ criticism, 
by contrast, focuses more on the question of whether there can be any sort of 
universal justification for action at all.  
 
The Critique of the Categorical Imperative I:  The Formality Charge 
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ethics is usually characterized as the charge that 
the categorical imperative is empty. At a deeper level, however, this charge 
amounts to skepticism about the authority that action generated by the 
categorical imperative would have. I will thus argue that Hegel’s criticism of Kant 
really claims that the Kantian theory suffers from a disjunction between the meta-
concept of the categorical imperative and its application. If such a disjunction 
exists, then whatever content the categorical imperative does provide is 
irrelevant to the actual conditions to which it is meant to be applied and hence 
without authority to instantiate the moral action. This means, as Hegel puts it, 
that any action the agent does decide on will be necessarily subjective— bound 
only by the authority of the agent’s desires and therefore not autonomous.  
Hegel’s critique of the categorical imperative falls into two parts. The first 
part concerns the contention that the categorical imperative is empty because it 
cannot generate principles for action. This is the first order issue of whether the 
categorical imperative can generate contentful principles. The second part of the 
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critique concerns the authority which the contentful principles generated by the 
categorical imperative (if there are any) have for the justification of the principle 
of practical reason in general. This second-order concern must deal with the 
question of how any content at all can be found in the noumenal realm given 
Kant’s total exclusion of nature there. In other words, do reasons for action stem 
purely from the noumenal realm or do they come from some dialectic of reason 
and nature, as Hegel seems to propose?   
 
I will deal only briefly with the first-order issue since it is well known. Hegel 
makes two main criticisms of Kant’s conception of the maxim. The fundamental 
objection to Kant is stated programmatically: GPR §132:  
The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognize as 
valid should be perceived by it as good, and that it should be held 
responsible for an action— as its aim translated into external 
objectivity— as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, 
according to its cognizance of the value which that action has in 
this objectivity”.90 
 
 The main point here, as before, is that the subjectivity which defines the 
moral standpoint renders it arbitrary against the objective standpoint of reality. As 
Hegel explains a little later, the problem is that the ‘ought’ which the moral point 
of view entails cannot generate usable principles because the ‘ought’ is a general 
injunction to do good and one cannot do good in general. But Hegel also praises 
                                            
90 Hegel. Foundations of the Philosophy of Right. §132 Henceforth cited as GPR followed by 
paragraph number. “Das Recht, nichts anzuerkennen, was Ich nicht als vernünftig einsehe, ist 
das höchste Recht des Subjekts, aber durch seine subjektive Bestimmung zugleich formell, und 
das Recht des Vernünftigen als des Objektiven an das Subjekt bleibt dagegen fest stehen.” 
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Kant’s recognition that one is free only if one does one’s duty. Hegel sees Kant’s 
great insight as having shown that duty and freedom are really one in the sense 
discussed earlier— that freedom requires us to adhere to certain principles. The 
dispute here is thus about the ability of the categorical imperative to generate 
contentful principles.  
Hegel’s first order criticism of the categorical imperative is that it cannot 
yield concrete ethical principles because it merely takes the form of the law of 
non-contradiction. Thus Hegel contends that it is just as consistent to will private 
property as to will no private property.91 This objection targets the consistency in 
conception version of the categorical imperative-test. The objection, however, 
can be dispelled on the grounds that, in the deposit example from the 
Groundwork, what is in question is not so much the willing of private property as 
the notion of trust between people, upon which the practice of the deposit is 
based.92 It might thus be wished that trust continue to exist while I abuse it, but 
this cannot be willed in a strict sense of willing: I can wish that I might have my 
cake and eat it too, but I cannot will both at the same time, for this cannot be 
logically conceived of. Though Hegel’s concrete criticism of this example can be 
turned back by clarifying the maxim, the point that the maxim is itself necessarily 
concrete and as such subject to misunderstanding stands.  
                                            
91 The short-story “The Black Sheep” by Italo Calvino makes this point very well. In the story, the 
peaceful life of a town of thieves, who nightly steal from each other, is disrupted by the arrival of 
an honest man who refuses to steal, though he is stolen from. This, in a Rousseauian manner, 
leads quickly to some attaining more material possessions and others less. The point seems to 
be, as in Hegel, that it was the consistency that mattered, not the principle itself.  
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The second objection, articulated most clearly in the natural law essay, 
concerns the idea that the categorical imperative aims at its own extinction.93 
This objection claims that to will the end of poverty and to make this one’s 
principle of action aims at the eradication of the need for this principle and thus of 
morality more generally. According to Korsgaard and Wood, however, the 
problem lies in the correct formulation of the maxim. The maxim should not be 
‘end poverty’ since this is a state that might, conceivably, be eradicated, but 
rather ‘help those in need’, a more general formulation, or even, ‘do good to 
others’, which is surely not a maxim that can ever become redundant.94  
The problem with Kant’s categorical imperative is thus not that it does not 
permit us to determine which maxims are permissible and which are not, but that 
Kant does not tell us how to formulate maxims, since a given situation might be 
formulated in a variety of ways. As Wood points out, claiming that we should 
consider only those morally salient issues in stating our maxim only restates the 
problem since it is precisely moral salience which is at stake in the maxim.95  
I want to interpret these criticisms in terms of the problem of synthesizing 
inclinations and principles. Hegel’s critique claims that because the application of 
the principle to the inclination is in a sense arbitrary, any duty to act which results 
from this synthesis will itself be arbitrary. Hegel thus argues that without a better 
understanding of how reason and inclination relate no such thing as rational 
                                                                                                                                  
92 See Allen Wood. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. 157-58.  
93 Hegel. “Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts”. (1802).  
94 Allen Wood. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. 160. 
95 Wood. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. 161.  
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action is possible.  What we need, in other words, is a better understanding of 
how the maxim itself comes into being and how maxims form as a bridge 
between the self and nature.  
 
The Critique of the Categorical Imperative II: The Failure of the Reciprocity 
Thesis 
Though it seems possible to generate some kind of principles out of the 
categorical imperative, this does not resolve the question of whether these 
principles are sufficient to actually allow us to accomplish particular acts. The 
question Hegel raises about the underdetermination of the moral principles 
remains threatening to the Kantian project until we can determine whether the 
categorical imperative has the power to justify and motivate action according to 
the principles derived through the categorical imperative-test.  
This question leads us all the way back to the subject matter of the first 
chapter, in which I examined Kant’s attempt at proving the reality of pure 
practical reason. The conclusion reached there, even by Kant, was that the 
attempt at a proof that reason and morality imply each other was a failure. I 
would now like to examine whether there might yet be a way out of this problem 
given a different reading of Kant. To this effect, we should examine Allison’s and 
Korsgaard’s defense of the fact of reason doctrine.   
In chapter 1, I dealt chiefly with the problem Kant had in showing that we 
humans are rational creatures, i.e. the second part of the proof of morality. Here 
we must deal with the first part, the claim that, as rational creatures, we are 
subject to the moral law. This question is central to Hegel’s more fundamental 
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critique of Kantian morality, especially to the emptiness charge. For if it cannot be 
shown that reason can justify itself, that is, provide principles of action which are 
purely rational (the categorical imperative), then it cannot be shown that 
autonomous reflection can give us reasons to act.  
Allison has called Kant’s attempt to show that reason can both justify and 
motivate rational creatures the reciprocity thesis. It claims that morality and 
autonomy entail each other. The general statement of the reciprocity thesis goes 
as follows: (1) As a ‘kind of causality’ the will must be law-governed or 
determinable according to some law (a lawless will is an absurdity); (2) as free, it 
cannot be governed by the laws of nature; (3) it must therefore be governed by 
laws of a different sort, namely, self imposed ones; and (4) the moral law is the 
required self-imposed law.96 The point is that for Kant freedom is not only a 
necessary condition for morality, but also a sufficient condition.  
This line of reasoning has been attacked by many but I will examine it in 
the formulation of Allen Wood who shows that the argument rests on an 
ambiguity in the notion of universality employed by the categorical imperative. 
Wood claims that, though Kant can rightly claim that the principle of practical 
reason must be universal, this universality entails only a universality in 
applicability but not in both applicability and concern. That is, I might, as the 
rational egoist does, think that it would be rational for everyone to act as I do, but 
also wish that not everyone actually does. This means that autonomy might only 
                                            
96 Allison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. 202-204.  
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yield the hypothetical imperative but not the categorical imperative.97 And this 
means that autonomy might be necessary but not sufficient to establish morality.  
Let us examine the problem in a little more detail. The reciprocity thesis is 
meant to stop a regress of reason-giving. Charles Taylor puts the problem well: 
“If freedom is to renounce all heteronomy, any determination of the will by 
particular desires, traditional principles or external authority, then freedom seems 
incompatible with any rational action whatsoever. For there do not seem to be 
any grounds of action left, which are not wholly vacuous, that is which would 
actually rule some actions in and others out, and which are not also 
heteronomous.”98 Having renounced all forms of nature like inclination (internal) 
or contingency (external), it looks like there might not be anything to put an end 
to the regress, that is, nothing could have enough content or authority to justify 
the maxim we should act on and thus motivate action.  
Allen Patten’s treatment of the issue in Allison and Korsgaard is excellent 
and I follow his analysis here.99  
Kant’s argument starts with the weaker sense of universality and 
ends with the stronger sense, which means that there is a gap to be 
bridged. Allison has argued that the gap can be bridged by 
appealing to transcendental freedom, the idea that freedom 
consists in complete ‘independence from everything empirical and 
hence from nature generally’. Transcendental freedom refutes the 
threat of rational egoism by showing that the latter doctrine relies 
on a material determining ground of the will— rational egoism 
presumes an end. Allison’s defense thus amounts to saying that 
                                            
97 Allen Wood. Hegel’s Ethical Theory. p. 135. See also David Gauthier. “The Unity of Reason; A 
Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant”.  
98 Charles Taylor. Hegel. 373. Cited in Allen Patten. Hegel’s Idea of Freedom.  
99 Allen Patten. Hegel’s Idea of Freedom. 91-93.  
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principles that purport to be universal in the first sense but not in 
the second, are not universal at all. But though Allison may be right 
to say that the principle of rational egoism could only be deemed 
reasonable in the first place  because of certain presupposed ends, 
it still might be the case that the same is true of the categorical 
imperative. Why is the categorical imperative deemed to be 
intrinsically rational and rational egoism not?  
 
In “Morality as Freedom”, Korsgaard makes explicit two assumptions that 
might well underlie Allison’s argument, namely that (1) a spontaneously or 
transcendentally free agent— an agent who is independent of all authority— has 
as a highest order reason or ‘incentive’ the preservation and promotion of his 
spontaneity, his independence of all empirical conditions, and (2) that someone 
who has this incentive would reject, upon deliberation, every principle of action 
except the principle of acting on only those maxims that could at the same time 
be willed as universal law. 
Kant’s justification for the second claim is: “The moral law does not 
impose a constraint on the will; it merely says what it has to do in order to be an 
autonomous will at all. It has to choose a law.”100 According to Patten, the 
ambiguity in ‘choose a law’ here mirrors exactly the ambiguity of ‘universality’ in 
Allison’s argument. Thus it might be true that the will must choose a law for itself, 
but this does not mean that the will must choose a law which others must follow 
as well. Patten thus concludes that Kant’s argument for the reciprocity thesis fails 
because, though valid, it relies on a faulty premise.  
 
                                            
100 Christine Korsgaard. “Morality as Freedom”. 166.  
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The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Kant and Rawls 
The inability of Kant’s theory to prove the objectivity of reason means that 
for Kant there is no way of establishing morality. The threat remains that what is 
rational for me might be rational only for me. This leaves Kant without a theory of 
intersubjectivity, for his theory of sociality depends on the objectivity of reason, 
which has not been established.  
Rawls too attempted to provide a theory of intersubjectivity based on the 
rationality of the individual subject. In Kantian Constructivism, Rawls argued that 
the rational (the hypothetical imperative) must be framed by the reasonable. This 
is so because, from the perspective of the agents for whom the results of the 
deliberation in the original position are supposed to be normative, it makes sense 
only to take these results as embedded in certain commitments like respect for 
persons which we (as really existing agents) already have.101 Thus the 
instrumental rationality of the hypothetical imperative is overlaid with a normative 
perspective of respect for persons. Rawls argues, in effect, that the reasonable 
and the rational are one and the same principle. Rawls thus also seeks to move 
from the weak autonomy thesis to the strong one.  
The problem with Rawls’ argument, however, is that the argument must 
assume the principle of pure reason which the argument is itself meant to 
establish. This leaves Rawls’ theory open to the charge that it, like Kant’s 
argument, never moves beyond the hypothetical imperative in the sense that my 
reflection might commit me to certain acts but not others as well. We see this 
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problem resurface in the reflective equilibrium: the reflective equilibrium, I 
concluded earlier, is only ever able to tell us how much agreement there already 
happens to be with those around me. But the conclusions of others are not 
normative for me, because I am only ever committed to my own conclusions. 
There is no objectivity of pure reason which can guarantee that my conclusions 
are the same as yours.  
The problem with Kant and Rawls’ arguments is that they rely on the 
principle of pure practical reason to establish the strong autonomy thesis (which 
states that freedom or morality exists) and then turn around and infer from the 
principle of reason that morality or intersubjectivity exists. The argument, in other 
words, is circular because there is no independent proof of the existence of pure 
practical reason.  
 
This is a powerful critique of the Kantian position and we will spend the 
rest of this dissertation examining its ramification. Before we begin looking for a 
way to meet this objection, however, I would like to bring in one more formulation 
of the problem. I propose now to turn to Bernard Williams’ critique of the Kantian 
position.102 Williams’ formulation has two advantages over Hegel’s formulation. 
The first is that the answer to the Kantian problem of the justification of morality 
which we will be pursuing in Korsgaard’s work is actually in part addressed to 
                                                                                                                                  
101 See also Rawls. “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. 503-504. 
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Williams’ concerns and so does not force us to translate quite so much from the 
language of recent Anglo-American philosophy to that of 19th Century German 
philosophy. The second, perhaps more important, point is that Williams bases his 
objections to Kant on a theory of person and society which can more readily be 
summarized than Hegel’s theory can. By examining Williams’ view of the 
historical situatedness of the person we will thus not have to beg the question 
quite as often as we would in considering a scaled down version of Hegel.  
 
A Reorientation of the Normativity Question: Justification and Motivation 
As a way of returning to Williams’ account, it would be good to see where 
Hegel’s critique has taken us. As I said at the outset, this dissertation is not 
principally concerned with the letter of Hegel’s critique of Kant but rather with the 
ways in which certain questions arising from this critique have persisted in more 
recent scholarly debates between Kantians and Hegelians.  
The question I take as fundamental is what the failure of the reciprocity 
thesis means for future attempts to ground normativity. The criticism of the 
Kantian position according to which my reflections might motivate me to act but 
not others destabilizes what we think of as a philosophical or moral justification 
for action. This suggests a dilemma: we must avoid concluding both that moral 
                                                                                                                                  
102 I refer to the Kantian position since Williams’ critique is aimed just as much, perhaps more, at 
contemporary writers like Rawls than it is at Kant himself. Indeed, Williams refers to the texts of 
post-Kantian writers far more often than to Kant himself.  
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reflection is merely justifying but not motivating (because it is too abstract) and 
that it is motivating but not justifying (because it is not universal).  
For our purposes, the alternative most pressing is the latter because I am 
assuming throughout that action is indeed possible. We are here concerned with 
the question of which actions are moral in the sense that they are universally 
permissible. The Hegelian criticism must yield a new way of thinking through the 
universalizability requirement which preserves both the need for principles to 
motivate us and the idea that they should be in some sense imaginable as 
universally permissible. If there is no transcendental realm in which the laws of 
morality are in some sense given to us through reflection, we must reconsider 
what universal justification can give us. Reflection might only ever be able to give 
us in some sense temporary and revisable principles according to which we can 
act ‘morally’.   
With this in place, we should turn to Williams’ critique of the Kantian 
position. Williams seeks to bring to bear the finite nature of our process of 
reflection on the question of universal justification for action.  
 
Williamsʼ Critique of the Kantian Position 
Williams makes two general criticisms of the Kantian position. The first 
point concerns Williams’ claim that reflection and detachment are not the same 
thing. That is, the ability to detach oneself from one’s commitments is not the 
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same as being able to reflect on them.103 The second point is an elaboration of 
this to the effect that, since one cannot detach oneself from one’s commitments, 
it is wrong for a system of impersonal morality to demand that one do so.   
Let us start with the first point, which I shall call the internalism thesis. It 
has two sub-points. The first concerns the idea that reasons for doing something 
must always be internal to the agent in order to motivate him. The second point is 
that the first claim, at least for Williams, includes to some extent the Humean 
assumption that desires motivate directly. Let me elaborate.  
In his famous paper “Internal and External Reasons” (in Scanlon’s useful 
summary):  
Williams distinguishes between two ways of interpreting a 
statement that a person "has a reason to <φ>" (where <φ> stands in 
for some verb of action). According to the first interpretation, the 
statement implies that the agent has some motive— that there is 
something that matters to him or her— that will be served or 
furthered by <φ>-ing. If the person in fact has no such motive, then 
on this interpretation the claim is false. The second interpretation 
includes no such condition, so on this interpretation it can be true 
that A has a reason to <φ> even though <φ>-ing would not serve or 
further any aim or value that matters to the agent. Williams refers to 
reason claims under the first interpretation as "internal reason 
statements" and refers to those under the second as "external."104 
 
This shows that Williams is not a skeptic about reasons, but that he 
understands reasons differently than writers in the Kantian tradition do. Here I 
                                            
103 See also Allison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. 194-95. Allison argues that Williams’ central 
criticism of Kant amounts to the charge that Kant has conflated the theoretical and the practical 
standpoint in arguing that reflection and detachment are one and the same.  
104 Thomas Scanlon. Appendix. What We Owe Each Other. 363.  
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follow Korsgaard’s distinction between content and motivational skepticism.105 
Korsgaard argues that Williams’ skepticism about the ability of pure practical 
reason to motivate is due not so much to the idea that pure practical reason 
cannot, in principle, motivate, but rather to Williams’ belief that it has not been 
shown to do so. This is due to Williams’ sub-Humean conception of reason.106    
The sub-Humean model supposes that φ-ing has to be related to some 
element in the motivational subset S as causal means to an end. But here 
reasons are construed rather more broadly than on the Kantian view, for 
according to Williams one can have many reasons, as well as reasons not to 
follow these reasons. Reasons may be imaginatively interrogated and in doing so 
one might find that what one thought was a reason really is not one, or one might 
find that one has reasons to do things one did not think one had.  
There is thus no question that in Williams’ sub-Humean model of 
motivation, there is deliberation of some sort. Indeed, deliberation seems to run 
rampant. The set from which one draws reasons to deliberate about includes all 
psychic states which are part of what makes a character, including pleasure, 
“dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties: and 
various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of 
the Agent.”107  
                                            
105 Christine Korsgaard. “Skepticism about Practical Reason”.  
106 The thesis is ‘sub-Humean’ because, as Williams argues, it does not contain all the details of 
Hume’s own account.  
107 Williams. “Internal and External Reasons”. 105.  
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Williams has thus extended the set of motivations for action from mere 
direct desires to a whole host of other interests and commitments. In doing so 
Williams has also diluted the force of his internalism to the extent that customs 
can now be included, giving the agent’s action an intersubjective grounding. The 
point to bear in mind, however, is that for Williams what really counts here is that 
whatever the reasons for my actions are, they are mine and therefore not 
universal or objective. This means simply that you cannot give me reasons for 
acting. They might become reasons for acting only if I adopt them by making 
them my own in deliberation.  
We have already examined this point in a slightly altered form in the failure 
of the reciprocity thesis in Kant. It was the idea that though it might be true that 
your projects are normative for you in just the same way my projects are 
normative for me, this does not require me to take the fact that you have chosen 
your projects the way I choose my projects as a reason not to interfere with your 
projects.108 The argument thus repeats the charge that normativity might not be 
sharable.  
It is important to see that while the internalism thesis appears to 
undermine the Kantian project of arguing that a universal morality is motivating, 
the thesis reinforces the point that something like the weak autonomy thesis is 
true, that we are motivated by our own deliberation. This claim, of course, still 
                                            
108 Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 59-62. In formulating this criticism, Williams is 
also referring to Alan Gibbard’s argument to the same effect. See Alan Gewirth. Reason and 
Morality.  
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leaves open what, exactly, such non-moral or morally neutral deliberation means 
for Williams, and also what it means for post-Kantian writers like Korsgaard. To 
put the question in terms of synthesis, it now appears that some type of 
deliberation is able to synthesize reason and nature such that action can result 
from it. The question now becomes, what is the nature of this deliberation? 
Though Williams is vague on this point, Hegel and Korsgaard both have 
considered views about what constitutes both morally neutral and moral 
deliberation which we will turn to in this chapter and the next.   
 
Before we turn to the process of deliberation, we should, however, take up 
Williams’ second criticism of Kant, the idea that the impersonal moral standpoint 
violates the integrity of our character. This criticism is really an elaboration of the 
argument that we are motivated by our own particular subset of available 
interests and desires and that to force us to adopt reasons that are not ours is 
tantamount to coercion.  
I would like to briefly look at two different arguments Williams gives to 
justify this point. In “Persons, Character and Morality” Williams argues against 
Rawls’ idea that we owe equal allegiance to our current selves and our future 
selves and must thus seek to maximize the benefit to our present and future 
selves equally. Against this Williams argues that the correct perspective from 
which to consider one’s plans and goals, one’s ground project as Williams puts it, 
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is from now since it is only the current perspective that motivates me to go on at 
all, that is, that keeps me from suicide.109  
In “Moral Luck”, Williams draws the argument out a little more by 
suggesting that the deliberation process we engage in to make certain life 
altering decisions is not universal because it depends for its justification on a 
future outcome that is necessarily not yet known. He argues that the justification 
of Gauguin’s decision to leave his family and go to Tahiti can only be ascertained 
at the end of the project. The futurity of the justification (to Gauguin— there may 
never be a justification which his family would accept) introduces the factor of 
moral luck in the sense that it depends on a certain set of contingencies that 
determines whether the project succeeds.  
Williams introduces the notion of agent-regret, a type of regret felt only by 
the agent involved, which centers on the desire for things to have turned out 
differently, but does not necessarily include the desire to have deliberated 
differently. Williams uses the tension between the success or failure of a life 
project with regard to the luck and/or correct deliberation involved in it to argue 
that what ultimately matters to the agent is not the correct deliberation but the 
outcome. For Williams this means that there is a disjunction between the rational 
deliberation in pursuing our ends advocated by the impartial (moral) perspective, 
and the luck or unluck that the success of our particular ground plan requires in 
order for it to be genuinely ours and to count as success for us. In this sense, it 
was Gauguin’s bad luck to be the type of person who had to make the decision to 
                                            
109 Williams. “Persons, Character and Morality”. 12.  
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break with morality in order to pursue his ground project. And since, by the 
internalism thesis, Gauguin’s character is motivated by his particular set of 
interests and concerns, there is something wrong with a moral scheme that 
seeks to divorce us from our fundamental projects. Williams concludes that 
morality must thus be seen as one value among others or be refigured in order to 
include individuality more thoroughly.  
Williams’ critique of morality thus seems to suggest that the realm of 
normativity should not be seen exclusively in terms of either moral duty or 
(morally neutral) permissibility. Normativity goes all the way down, as the 
internalism argument shows. This means that for Williams we should start our 
ethical inquiry with something more akin to Socrates’ question: ‘how should one 
live’.110 This question does not presuppose a stark distinction between the moral 
and the non-moral but rather a continuum of sometimes conflicting normative 
demands, all of which we must seek to meet. Failure to meet these demands will 
leave us with the sort of regret which Williams argues plays a central role in 
accomplishing or failing to accomplish our projects.111  
                                            
110 Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 1. Williams, however, expresses some doubt 
that the impersonal way of formulating even this question, might lead us to a false understanding 
of ethics. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 4.  
111 See also Martha Nussbaum. The Fragility of Goodness. pp. 1-84. Nussbaum argues that the 
emphasis on the impersonal Christian and Kantian standpoints has actually obscured our 
understanding of Greek thought, since Greek thought was in part developed in tragedy and not 
only in abstract ethical theory. Nussbaum thus argues that the tragedians (she uses Antigone and 
Agamemnon as examples) show that in genuine tragedy— having to choose between the survival 
of your army and the survival of your daughter, for instance— there is no decision that will leave 
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In emphasizing the Socratic question over that of duty, Williams is in 
accord with Hegel’s criticism of Kant as well. Neither Hegel nor Williams deny 
that there are such things as more narrowly moral commitments, but both 
emphasize that because the moral can sometimes lead to an impasse, we must 
consider ways in which to re-imagine the moral, making it more inclusive.112 In 
this sense, both Hegel and Williams emphasize the ethical or Sittlichkeit, over the 
moral.113 But depending on how one reads Hegel, he is either much more 
optimistic about the possibility of reconciling our desires with those of others in 
our society or only a little more so than Williams who does not hold out much 
hope for an eventual resolution to the ethical problem. We should also note that 
the position of Williams and Hegel bring us back to an objection to Kant raised in 
the first chapter by Prauss, who suggested that Kant had really made a mistake 
                                                                                                                                  
you clear of blame. The failure to acknowledge this, and not the decision to sacrifice his daughter 
Iphigenia, is what makes Agamemnon’s actions blameworthy. It should be noted, however, that 
Kant does not emphasize blame but rather responsibility. Blame, it appears, only makes sense 
from within a thick conception of society such as is perhaps no longer apparent in Kant.  
112 By calling this a criticism of Kant, I do not mean to suggest that Kant does not himself offer 
ways of getting beyond such impasses. Kant’s philosophy of history is centrally concerned with 
just this issue. However, the apparent division between Kant’s ethics and his philosophy of history 
invites the belief that there is something about ‘morality’ construed in the individual sense, that 
Kant wants to hold up against other more social theories.  
113 Williams notes that the moral is a subset of the ethical which emphasizes certain aspects over 
other and says that we should treat this idea with particular skepticism. Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy. 6. Hegel’s discussion of morality (and in particular the Kantian view) in the 
Foundations of the Philosophy of Right leads to the dilemma of empty personal conviction which 
is at odds with the rest of society.  
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by trying to prove autonomy by linking it to morality directly rather than exploring 
other possibilities of understanding autonomy as normativity.  
A further point to be made here about Williams’ and Hegel’s critique of 
Kant and the Kantian position is that the critique concerns the special status Kant 
gives to normativity as moral rather than the status of normativity in general. Both 
Williams and Hegel believe that normativity is rather more general than the 
traditional Kantian position as well as theories of rational choice or egoism make 
it out to be. The question here is whether there is a way of conceiving of 
normativity in social terms without Kant’s emphasis on the impersonal standpoint. 
To put it in the language used earlier: is there something about deliberation 
which is historically specific and personal, and thus capable of motivating us and 
yet aspires to universality without claiming to be universally legislating?  
Lastly, there is the question of moral luck itself, that is, the question of how 
(or whether) the individual can be reconciled to the prevailing ethical schema. As 
the Gauguin example makes clear, there is a certain recalcitrance of individual 
commitments which Williams diagnoses. This is a question which Korsgaard 
does not really deal with, but one which, I hope, Hegel can shine some light on. 
This question too, is the question of the social which we have been tracking so 
far. In the absence of Kantian rigorism, it now appears that we might lose 
universality altogether, and that being moral may not be an achievement at all, 
but a mere contingency, a happy coincidence of the individual commitments of 
different agents. But taken together with Williams’ argument about the irreducibly 
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subjective character of normativity, this is a picture that Kant, Korsgaard and 
Hegel want to reject vehemently.  
 
Reformulating the Questions after Hegel and Williams 
We have now arrived at a critical point in the development of the argument 
since we have come to a better understanding of the question to be answered by 
the two remaining writers to be considered here: Korsgaard and Hegel. There are 
two main problems that need to be addressed in order to provide at least the 
beginning of a satisfactory resolution to the problems raised so far. The first issue 
is that of internalism and reflection. Here we will need to see whether a 
conception of reflection can be developed which is able to successfully 
synthesize the thoughts and intentions of the agent with the contingencies of the 
world. This reflection will thus have to be normative, a reason for action, for the 
agent who conceives of it. This will be the subject of chapter four. The second 
question we will need to answer is whether, if we can develop a theory of 
normativity in the above way, this normativity will in some way bind not only the 
agent to her actions, but agents to each other as well. This will be the subject of 
chapter five. We will have to see whether the new conception of normativity will 
have intersubjective validity.  
In taking up the question of intersubjectivity, this chapter will also try to 
make some inroads into the status of moral luck. For if reason is indeed 
intersubjectivity, the issue of moral luck takes on a rather less damaging 
character since it then might be (merely!) the lack of appropriate historical 
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development that condemns the subject to living at odds with the prevailing 
social norms, rather than a fundamental incompatibility of commitments. The 
question of moral luck forces us to examine the relative accessibility of 
intersubjectively harmonized standards of action in the modern world. The 
response to moral luck, as Rawls keenly appreciated, is always more justice.  
If it is indeed possible to reformulate the Kantian question with regard to 
the criticisms of Williams and Hegel, using two writers who are not often found 
together in the same work let alone in the same argument, I will take this to have 
shown that there is much greater similarity between 19th Century post-Kantian 
philosophy and late 20th/ early 21st Century post-Kantian philosophy. The proof 
that this is so will, of course, only be evident at the end of the argument itself. 
However, I am, I believe, at least justified in suspecting that Hegel and Korsgaard 
provide a way out of the problems posed for Kant by Hegel and Williams. I thus 
disagree with the frequent lumping together of Hegel with Williams though as the 
earlier part of the chapter sought to show, they level the same sorts of criticisms 
at Kant.114 The difference is that Hegel sees a way out of Kant which is 
sympathetic to Kant while Williams does not.  
 
Prospects for a Reformulation of the Kantian Project 
Let me now say a little about how I propose to give an answer to the 
above question using Hegel and Korsgaard. Building on Korsgaard’s strong 
                                            
114 See Allison. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. ch. 10.  
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Kantian credentials, I will examine her reinterpretation of the Kantian process of 
reflection, which avoids at least the first Hegelian objection, that Kant’s maxims 
cannot motivate any particular action in the world. Korsgaard’s argument will also 
conform to Williams’ internalism requirement by being absolutely subject 
dependent.  
But this still leaves us only with a notion of normativity which is subject 
specific and a second argument will be required in order to show that normativity 
is more than egoistic. To this effect, I will examine Korsgaard’s idea that reason 
is public and that we therefore, at least in principle, can have shared aims and 
projects. While Korsgaard provides only brief arguments for the second point, her 
analysis of action seems to bridge the gap between individual normativity and 
more general normativity. Her theory of action centers on the idea that, in acting, 
we set about doing things according to constitutive standards of action which 
have both technical standards and social standards, corresponding to the 
hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative. The fact that when 
building a house, we seek to conform both to socially and technically shared 
standards, I will argue, gets us half way to public reason. The other half of the 
way is provided by an argument which seeks to show that we cannot be just to 
ourselves and not also at least feel pressure to be just to others.  
In bringing Hegel into the discussion, I will argue that Hegel and 
Korsgaard share the idea that reflection on desires must be conceived of as 
rational and furthermore that both writers also share the idea that reason must be 
conceived of as public or intersubjective. I will further argue that Hegel’s theory of 
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institutions provides an important extension of Korsgaard’s argument about the 
constitutive standards of action, since, in Hegel’s view, institutions unify the 
subjective projects of individuals with the more general and public projects of 
society itself. I will thus try to expand on Korsgaard’s theory of action by 
supplementing it with Hegel’s view of the subjective and objective elements of 
the state.  
Hegel’s view, I will argue, expands Korsgaard’s notion of reflection to 
include historical and social practices which aspire to be universal but do not 
pretend to be so already. In this sense, social practices are the measure of our 
current responsibilities to each other but at the same time are subject to revision 
as new standards which are more inclusive and more just emerge through the 
process of reflection. This thought, I will argue, lies at the heart of both the 
Kantian and the Hegelian enterprise. But the Kantian ethical enterprise goes 
wrong when it insists that metaphysical objectivity is at every turn accessible to 
the individual agent, no matter her historical position. This claim is, of course, 
itself in tension with Kant’s own philosophy of history where Kant develops a 
dialectic of historical progress in which each individual must seek to overcome 
her place in history but where pragmatic historical conditions are also taken into 
account.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
KORSGAARD ON SELF-CONSTITUTION 
 
In this chapter I would like to present Christine Korsgaard’s theories of 
reflection and action. Together, these two theories will show that humans are 
normatively motivated and that our actions cannot occur except under a unified 
process of reflection which, Korsgaard argues, actually constitutes the self. This 
will then lead us to Korsgaard’s theory of action which is meant to show that 
reflection constitutes paths of action which are normative for us. This normativity 
is given an objective content by Korsgaard’s argument that actions have their 
own standards. The discussion of reflection is meant to be neutral about the 
subject of reflection in the sense that this chapter does not seek to answer the 
question of whether the reasons that derive from reflection are private or public, 
subjective or intersubjective. That question will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Nevertheless, when discussing examples of standards of action which arise in 
the discussion of standards of action, I will try to remain neutral about the ethical 
or moral content of these standards. This neutrality is part of Korsgaard’s larger 
project of avoiding a conception of normativity which is explicitly linked to a 
morality.  
In examining Korsgaard’s argument about reflection and action we will 
have to keep in mind the two criticisms Hegel and Williams make of Kant. 
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Korsgaard will have to show that reflection is not empty, i.e. that it leads to 
action, and that action stems from the desires of the subject itself in order to at 
least partially deflect these criticisms. The former will satisfy Hegel’s criticism that 
the categorical imperative is empty and the latter will satisfy Williams’ internalism 
requirement.  
The underlying themes of this chapter are threefold. The bulk of the 
chapter will be devoted to showing how Korsgaard’s theory of the self is 
developed out of the theory of reflection. In this, I take her to be quite close to the 
basic tenets of German idealism according to which the self’s consciousness of 
itself is the origin of both knowledge and action. By restating the account the way 
I do, I am also trying to show that Korsgaard’s theory of reflection is not all that 
different from Hegel’s account of the origins of intersubjectivity as we will see it 
developed in chapters six and seven. Lastly, I want to show in this chapter that 
egoism is not a threat to this self-posited conception of the self because egoism’s 
central thesis, that we are really only desire-driven creatures, is insufficient to 
even develop a sense of self.  
 
The Question of Moral Character 
The question of moral character is, for Kant and for Korsgaard, centrally 
one of the possibility of reflecting on one’s situation through the employment of 
formal reason. This means that morality is a question of becoming independent 
of material or natural concerns. This idea, however, has often been challenged. 
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, for example, Williams raises the question 
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of why, given one’s substantive personal commitments, it is even useful to 
imagine oneself as separate from them. Williams writes: “[In ethics] we are 
concerned with what any given person, however powerful or effective he may be, 
should reasonably do as a rational agent, and this is not the same thing as what 
he would reasonably do if he were a rational agent  and no more.”115 That is, 
Williams doubts that it is even possible to intelligibly represent oneself as devoid 
of commitments in this way and that if we were able to represent ourselves as 
stripped of our commitments, what we would do might be completely different 
from what we would do committed as we are. Yet this is what the Kantian maxim 
seems to demand. Behind this lies Williams more fundamental worry that without 
the commitments we do have, we would not have any commitments at all. 
Distancing ourselves from the commitments we have does not change this.  
Korsgaard argues that the opposite is true, namely that philosophical 
reflection does not leave everything just where it was.116 This, as I have said, is 
the core of the disagreement between Williams and Korsgaard. Let us now turn 
to a first formulation of why Korsgaard thinks this is so. Korsgaard begins from 
the fact that we are self-conscious beings and that the outcome of our reflection 
on the world gives us our identity, that is, our commitments and obligations. Our 
commitments and obligations give us our character. But since our commitments 
and obligations are always changing, our identity does not rest on any single 
                                            
115 Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 63.  
116 Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. 119.  
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substantive set of commitments but merely on the fact that we have some 
commitments.  
So, for Korsgaard, the fact that you are governed by some practical 
identity is not contingent. It is your humanity itself. Korsgaard writes:  
It is because we are human that we must act in the light of practical conceptions 
of our identity, and this means that their importance is partly derived from the 
importance of being human. We must conform to them not merely for the 
reasons that caused us to adopt them in the first place, but because being 
human requires it.117 
Our humanity provides the normative glue which makes the contingencies 
of the world into a practical identity which we feel we must maintain even in the 
face of adversity. Humanity, taken as the ability to reflect on one’s 
circumstances, is thus the reason on which we act.  From this Korsgaard 
concludes: “Since you cannot act without reasons and your humanity is the 
source of your reasons, you must value your humanity if you are to act at all.”118 
This is a transcendental argument:  
Rational action exists, so we know it is possible. How is it possible? And then, by 
the course of reflections in which we have just engaged, I show you that rational 
action is possible only if human beings find their own humanity to be valuable. 
                                            
117 Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. 121.  
118 Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. 123.  
  
 132 
But rational action is possible, and we are the human beings in question. 
Therefore we find ourselves to be valuable. Therefore we are valuable.119 
Korsgaard’s argument is directed against Williams’ claim above that 
detachment does not mean reflection. Recall that for Williams, though it is quite 
possible for us to distance our selves from our circumstances in thought, such a 
distance does not furnish any sort of guidance for action because there is no 
content upon which to base a judgment. But by arguing that our conception of 
humanity underlies our conception of what it means to have a practical identity, 
to have commitments in general, Korsgaard suggests that it is really only 
because we have an intrinsic value that such a thing as practical identity or 
Williams’ ground project is possible at all. This means that reflection is 
constitutive of character or practical identity. This means that we have 
established that my projects are normative for me. We could also put it thus: 
normativity arises from the structure of our self-consciousness rather than from 
our intra-worldly commitments.  
And not only that, the fact that our projects have value to us also means 
that they have value to others since humanity, the ability to choose our projects 
rationally, is something each person has. In this last step which moves us to 
intersubjectivity proper, Korsgaard takes up Williams’ skepticism about the idea 
that what you take to have value for you (your ground project) must also be 
valuable for me. Why must your ground project be valuable for me? Korsgaard 
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argues that since all value has the same origin in our humanity, we must respect 
that source of value and everything that springs from it.  
This last step has come in for criticism. The gist of one criticism, voiced by 
G. A. Cohen, is that practical identity is not sufficiently well connected to 
universality or reason to be normative.120 Cohen argues that while Kant tries to 
show that morality comes from reason, Korsgaard only bases her conception of 
morality on practical identity. Practical identity, however, is contingent in 
important ways which means it is not a stable enough concept to underwrite 
humanity itself. Practical identity, Cohen argues, may not have anything at all to 
do with the moral law, but might just be a collection of impulses. Cohen’s 
objection thus amounts to the worry that without Kant’s metaphysical notion of 
reason, practical identity might be merely heteronomous action all the way down, 
that is, there is no obvious connection between believing something to be 
valuable and it being valuable without the guarantee of the unity which only 
reason can provide.  
It may be that Korsgaard is responding to such criticism by dropping the 
notion of practical identity in the Locke Lectures. The important thing to take 
away from the discussion of value in Sources is that Korsgaard takes seriously 
Williams’ challenge to give an internal explanation for reasons. We have now 
                                            
120 G. A. Cohen. The Sources of Normativity. Lecture 6. “Reason, humanity, and the moral law.” 
For another version of the concern, see Eric Watkins and William Fitzpatrick. “O’Neill and 
Korsgaard on the Construction of Normativity”. They argue that the problem with Korsgaard’s 
approach is that value is not basic but only willed. This seems to make it contingent, in some 
sense. 361  
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seen Korsgaard try to give a truly immanent account of the motivation for action. 
Who we are is developed out of the raw material of the world by reflection, what 
is permitted or enjoined constitutes our future character. The internalism 
requirement is met by the process of self-conscious reflection itself. We act 
because of what our ground projects are but our ground projects are made 
possible by the structure of our self-consciousness. In this sense, our humanity is 
our capacity to reflect.  
Seeing how reflection is the basis of our commitments will now allow us to 
see a way of turning back Hegel’s emptiness charge against the maxim. Because 
of the structure of our self-consciousness, anything that we reflect on must be 
seen as fundamentally a self-relation. So, there can be no empty maxim because 
every maxim that arises for an agent will have the perspective of that individual. 
The maxim is never empty because it originates in the agent’s desires rather 
than in some abstract impersonal voice and hence is reflected in her to produce 
a certain outcome, whatever it is. The maxim is thus a situated and contentful 
thought about a particular situation which is either rejected or accepted. If it is 
accepted, it is, by this very acceptance, normative for the agent.  
 
Practical Reason and Reflection 
Recall that the central criticism that Hegel made of Kant was that the 
categorical imperative could not move us to action because it was too general. 
This is a way of saying that Kant’s conception of reflection was not normative 
because it could not move us to specific action and action is always specific, it is 
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always this action. Williams’ challenge to Kant brought out the other side of this 
dilemma, namely that humans do have ways of picking out how to act, but that 
these ways stem from desire, not reason.  
Korsgaard’s way of addressing these two related issues comes in her 
theory of action. Before we proceed to examine this in more detail, we should 
look briefly at the more general way she frames the issue of the rationality of 
normativity. In Sources she argues that the problem of normativity stems from 
self-consciousness itself. The problem of self-consciousness or reflection is that 
when we perceive or believe something we can also doubt that what we perceive 
or believe is correct. In other words, do I really have a reason to believe the 
perception or act on the impulse? The problem of normativity is then, the problem 
of how to give or find reasons justifying our beliefs or actions.  
And this problem, to put it differently, is really the problem of synthesis, of 
uniting subjective mental states with contingent material or worldly states. This is 
what Hegel thinks Kant cannot do— provide a set of categories or conceptions 
for action. But the way Korsgaard puts the problem, adopting Rawls’ language of 
concept and conception, shows that there really cannot be a problem on the 
most basic level of reflection. Korsgaard writes: “If you recognize the problem 
[the concept] to be yours, and the solution [the conception] to be the best one, 
the solution is binding upon you”.121 That is to say that every agent must reflect, 
mediate the world with her subjectivity and that is what a maxim is. There is 
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(almost) no way of not doing this.122 But this, surely, is not what Hegel and 
Williams meant in their critique of Kant. Their critique was aimed at Kant’s claim 
to provide a ‘universal’ normative standard according to which each individual 
could will or act. So the action to be picked out by reflection is not merely any 
action, but an action which can be acted on by anyone in my situation. Although 
this question might appear to require a theoretical answer (and this is precisely 
Hegel’s point— how could we ever know the depth of any particular situation so 
that we could be sure it was a good thing to do) Korsgaard insists that universal 
action must be understood practically. In Sources, she thus argues that what 
distinguishes constructivism from other philosophical perspectives (like realism) 
is that for constructivism, the answer to an ethical or practical problem in action is 
not knowledge but more practice.123  
Together these two points show us that Korsgaard’s notion of reflection in 
action means that theoretical reason must be subordinated to practical reason. 
This is not to say that there cannot be purely theoretical knowledge, but it does 
mean that such knowledge is always at least potentially in the service of practical 
reason, of action. By arguing in this way, Korsgaard reaffirms what Prauss was 
deeply skeptical of in the first chapter, namely that practical and theoretical 
knowledge are in fact one, and that thinking is already acting in practical terms. 
But this is precisely what I think Korsgaard does want to argue.  
                                            
122 The exception is the case of the wanton, see below.  
123 Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. 36-37.  
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To sum up, what we are looking for in Korsgaard’s account of reflective 
action is an explanation of how rational reflection (and not some weighing of 
desires against each other as in Williams) can pick out a (concrete) course of 
action in the world. The question of just how universal the reflection is (and thus 
the answer to the richer formulation of Hegel’s challenge— the subjectivism 
charge) will have to be deferred until the next chapter.  
 
The arguments we will examine break into two general parts. First, there is 
what Korsgaard calls the metaphysical argument which examines the agent from 
the third person perspective and which is mainly concerned with establishing 
that, in order to be an agent at all, you have to act on some principle. The 
argument breaks down into an argument about the impossibility of willing 
particularly (i. e. being totally determined by desire, which is dealt with in the first 
sub-heading) and the argument that we do, in fact, will according to the 
categorical imperative (which is dealt with in the second sub-heading). The 
second argument, the normative argument, examines what it is like to act from 
the agent’s perspective and shows that in order to act there must be standards of 
action which are generated by the agent herself. These are the constitutive 
standards of action.  
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Acting on Principles 
In the Locke Lectures, Korsgaard begins by arguing that we are 
condemned to action. (LL 1 1)124 There is no way we cannot act, for even not 
acting is acting. For Korsgaard, the problematic of the primacy of the practical 
means, quite literally, the problem of action. And here she also distinguishes 
herself from the beginning of Kant’s Groundwork by focusing on all action rather 
than simply on good action. This is significant, since unlike Kant, Korsgaard 
thinks that all action must on some level be governed by the categorical 
imperative. The hypothetical imperative is not a separate principle. In order to 
claim a broader premise than Kant, who sought to show only that morally good 
action conforms to the categorical imperative, Korsgaard wants only to show that 
all autonomous action, or what she will call action as opposed to an act, is under 
the jurisdiction of the categorical imperative.  
Korsgaard calls the argument which is meant to establish that whatever 
we endorse is normative for us and thus constitutes us the metaphysical 
                                            
124 The Locke Lectures though (as yet) unpublished offer the best way into Korsgaard’s recent 
work. They partially comprise restatements of arguments given in published material, and I will 
refer to these when possible. The Locke Lectures are available on Korsgaard’s web page: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/#Locke%20Lectures  
I will cite the Locke Lectures as LL followed by lecture number and page number.  
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argument.125 This argument is regressive, asking ‘why’ of its premises until an 
indubitable one is found. Korsgaard summarizes her argument thus:  
The necessity of conforming to the principles of practical reason comes down to 
the necessity of being a unified agent. And if it is correct that agency requires 
unity, the necessity of being a unified agent comes down to the necessity of 
being an agent. And if this is correct, the necessity of being an agent comes 
down to acting. And the necessity of acting is our plight. The principles of 
practical reason are normative for us, then, simply because we must act.126 
Let us work forward from the last step and begin with action. What makes 
action our action, that is, what makes the action attributable to us? It must be that 
we add something to what happens rather than being the passive site of the 
action. When we are pushed and knock over a glass, we can say that it was not 
our fault, we did not intend it. But when we pick up a Champagne bottle and pour 
it over someone’s head, it can plausibly be inferred that we did it. Thus action 
isn’t merely being pushed around by desires or physical objects, it is contributing 
to and choosing among, different desires or causes. We are the site of agency 
only when we act autonomously, when we direct our will.127 Having principles 
according to which we act means having agency, for it means being able to 
                                            
125 It is worth noting Korsgaard’s departure from Rawls here who was uninterested in any sort of 
metaphysical investigation into what constitutes the self. Korsgaard’s use of metaphysics here is, 
I think, strongly reminiscent of the transcendental arguments given in German Idealism.   
126 See LL 1 17. It is unclear to me whether this argument is meant to be a transcendental (and 
thus synthetic) argument or whether Korsgaard takes this argument to be analytic, the way Kant 
takes the argument for the rationality of the free will to be.  
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adjudicate between different possibilities as they present themselves in the 
material world.  
So, if action is only action if it is attributable to us, we must examine what 
it means to will an action. This question concerns the nature of our ability to will. 
Korsgaard is looking for the conclusion that willing must occur according to 
universal principles. To be an agent, you must conceive of yourselves as 
causally efficacious, that is, you must be the one doing the willing. You are not 
merely a passive spectator in the battle between desire A and desire B to be 
turned into action by our will. From this it follows that there must be some 
principle which allows you to stand against these two desires and choose 
between them. In choosing which desire to follow, you must regard the decision 
as expressive of yourself.  
So you must identify with one of the two options. But if you will particularly, 
you cannot say, when asked why you chose one rather than the other, that you 
did so because you were inclined to do so, since this would mean that you have 
a principle which enables you to choose. A true particularist would have to 
embrace the decision in its particularity in a way that is not further describable. 
Particularist willing thus eradicates the difference between the person and the 
desire.128 And this means that particularist willing, taken as the idea that a person 
                                                                                                                                  
127 See Korsgaard. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” 14.  
128 Notice that this is not Hume’s position since Hume believes that there is an intermediary step 
between the passions and the external impulse. Reason could not be the slave of the passions if 
the affectation were immediate. See David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Bk. 2 Pt. 3 Sec. 3 
Para. 5/10. 
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could will without reference to universal principles and still be an agent (who, by 
definition, must choose between options), is impossible.129 So, in order to will, we 
need a universal principle of practical willing.130  
 
Acting on the Principle of Pure Practical Reason 
But if we cannot will particularly, how do we will? We are thus looking for 
principles according to which we can act. We must will universally, or, at least, 
provisionally universally, since we cannot know whether all of our premises are 
true.131 And, if these principles are to constitute the agent himself, they must be 
the agent’s own. Thus we must ask what kind of law or principle the autonomous 
agent must give himself.  
Korsgaard favors Kant’s categorical imperative as a principle. She writes: 
The categorical imperative, as represented by the Formula of 
Universal Law, tells us to act only on a maxim that we can will to be 
law. And this, according to Kant, just is the law of a free will. To see 
why, we need only compare the problem faced by the free will with 
the content of the categorical imperative. The problem faced by the 
free will is this: the free will must have a law, but because the will is 
free, it must be its own law. And nothing determines what the law 
must be. All that it has to be is a law. Now consider the content of 
the categorical imperative, as represented by the Formula of 
Universal Law. The categorical imperative merely tells us to choose 
a law. Its only constraint on our choice is that it have the form of a 
                                            
129 Korsgaard. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”. 26-27. See also LL 2 22-25.  
130 Korsgaard adds a caveat to the idea of universal willing. We do not, of course, know that our 
maxims are indeed universal, but we must take them as such. Thus our maxims must be 
considered provisionally universal. Korsgaard. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”. 
25.  
131 Korsgaard. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”. 25.  
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law. And nothing determines what that law must be. All that is has 
to be is a law. Kant concludes that the categorical imperative just is 
the law of a free will.132  
 
The categorical imperative thus answers two questions at once; what 
should I will if I am to remain autonomous, and how shall I will it, that is, what are 
the constraints on my willing? The important thing to note here, as Korsgaard 
points out, is that the categorical imperative is not a rule that applies in 
deliberation. It is deliberation itself and as such it is part of the logic of thought. 
What thus distinguishes it from the realist approach to moral problems is that it is 
not to be applied in a theoretical manner.133 The categorical imperative is 
practical, it is just how we think about things when confronted with a practical 
problem. The maxim does not give us knowledge, it gives only action.  
This point is central to the idea of constructivism in general. The 
constructive procedure in the metaphysical argument means that the principle of 
practical reason is interpreted as both form and content of deliberation. 
Korsgaard argues that practical reason is not an interpretative principle but a 
constitutive principle. That is, our deliberation furnishes us with a plan of action 
which constitutes us because action constitutes us. There is no outside to 
deliberation, no moral truth about the matter, since we just are who we make 
ourselves to be.  
                                            
132 Korsgaard. “Realism and Constructivism in Moral Philosophy”. 114-15. See also The Sources 
of Normativity. 98 and “Kant’s Analysis of Obligation”.  
133 I think the centrality of the constitutive moment of deliberation, though emphasized by Rawls 
as well, gets lost in his discussion of the Original Position where he writes of the two principles of 
justice as if they were being applied.  
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The first part of Korsgaard’s argument is thus meant to provide a 
justification of the principle of practical reason. In order to act, rational beings 
require principles. It is impossible to act without them and they cannot be 
particular either. Thus, we have a principle of practical reason. As yet, the 
principle of practical reason has not been specified. It might still turn out to be 
either the moral law or some other, instrumental principle. Only the possibility 
that people are wanton has been eliminated.  
 
Korsgaard’s argument for the categorical imperative in the form of the 
moral law now proceeds by eliminating instrumental reason as well. Korsgaard 
argues that the hypothetical imperative is subordinate to the categorical 
imperative much in the same way Rawls argued that the rational was subordinate 
to the reasonable. Korsgaard calls these two terms efficacy and autonomy.134  
In order to understand the argument, we must take a closer look at 
Korsgaard’s concept of action. Korsgaard distinguishes between acts and 
actions. She argues that for Kant, a maxim always includes both the act to be 
performed and its end. This is so since the question raised by the categorical 
imperative test is whether there could be a universal policy of pursuing this sort 
of end by these sorts of means. Kant is not concerned with the permissibility of 
act-types or general prescriptions, but with particular acts. For Kant, then, moral 
worth is ascribed both to end and act together. We can thus distinguish between 
the act of helping someone and the end of this act, which is the action of doing 
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something either for pleasure or for duty. Thus, moral worth is ascribed to an act 
done for its own sake, for the sake of duty, and this Korsgaard defines as an 
action. It is done because it is good.135   
Korsgaard distinguishes this view from other contemporary views 
according to which actions are explained by their purpose. She argues that if 
actions are really done for their own sake, then the purpose of the action is not 
always its reason. It may thus appear that every action is done for the same 
reason: it is worthwhile.136 On this view, then, the reason for an action is not 
external to the action but intrinsic to it. As Korsgaard puts it: “the action is an 
essentially intelligible object that embodies a reason, the way a sentence is an 
essentially intelligible object that embodies a thought”.137  
Here, again, we see the constructivist move according to which the end of 
the action cannot be external to its purpose. An action, like a deliberation, is what 
it is by virtue of both its form (its principle, acting from, say, duty or self-love) and 
its content (the act being performed). To anticipate the argument a little, the 
action’s content is measured by its own formal standard, whether or not the 
agent fully succeeds in performing it. In this sense, just as there is no ‘outside’ to 
deliberation, there is also no ‘outside’ to action.  
                                                                                                                                  
134 LL 3 5.  
135 LL 1 9-10.  
136 In this Korsgaard clearly seems to be following Aristotle. See, for instance, McDowell. “The 
Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics”. 3.  
137 LL 1 14.  
  
 145 
To come back to the distinction between the hypothetical and the 
categorical imperatives, we can now conclude that an action bound by the 
hypothetical imperative has its reasons outside itself while the action governed 
by the categorical imperative has its reasons inside itself. This distinction also 
explains why Kant thought that the hypothetical imperative was analytic, that is, 
why he thought that being committed to an end meant being committed to its 
means. If we determine ourselves to cause an end, we are also committed to 
cause the intermediate ends (means) necessary to bring the final end about. But 
proceeding in this way does not tell us anything about the worthiness of the end 
we are pursuing. The hypothetical imperative is merely effecting an end in the 
world, any end.  
The situation is quite different with the categorical imperative. As we saw, 
the categorical imperative restricts our acts in certain ways. It requires our acts 
(from the hypothetical imperative) to be in the service of certain ends. This end is 
what we have just called being worthwhile. An act is an action if it is restricted to 
an end that is worthwhile, that is if it is restricted to an internal standard. And, as 
we saw, this standard must be internal to the action itself, if it is to count as an 
action, that is, if it is to be autonomous.  
And in this way we can see that Korsgaard too ‘subjugates’ the efficacy of 
the hypothetical imperative to the autonomy of the categorical imperative. Rawls 
and Korsgaard both admit that acting on merely the hypothetical imperative is 
possible, but this kind of act also fails in certain respects (to be examined below). 
Indeed, Korsgaard goes further than Rawls did by claiming that the hypothetical 
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imperative is merely a form of the categorical imperative, a law of the will in a 
causal employment. She concludes this from the fact that the principle of 
practical reason arrived at above is simply: act in accordance with a maxim you 
can will as a universal law. This formulation does not make any distinction 
between the two types of imperatives. This means that the “hypothetical 
imperative will govern only acts to reach ends, but not the whole package, the act 
for the sake of the end, if it is worth doing for its own sake”.138   
This brings the metaphysical argument to a close. We have seen that in 
order to attribute an action to a rational agent, the agent requires a principle of 
action which makes the action ‘hers’. This ‘ownership’ of action requires that the 
agent be unified by a universal principle. Finally, we saw that the principle in 
question is the categorical imperative, which specifies nothing more than that the 
law has to have the form of a law and be willed by the agent.  
 
The Normative Argument 
We now turn to the normative argument. Whereas the metaphysical 
argument examined the unity of agency from a formal perspective, the normative 
argument deals with the perspective of the agent who wills. Korsgaard has earlier 
said that action is done for its own sake, because it is worth while. The key to 
                                            
138 LL 3 2-3. Korsgaard rules out the prudential imperative as not an imperative at all since, as 
Kant acknowledges, happiness is not definable. But a principle of maximization requires a theory 
of what happiness is be in place before maximization can take place and so must be substantive 
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understanding how the categorical imperative can motivate us is to understand 
what makes an action worthwhile. In this subsection, we will discuss what makes 
an action worthwhile in general terms, taking as the model action in the world of 
things. This argument, however, prepares the way for a development of a 
conception of standards of actions in the social world as well. This will be the 
subject of the following chapter. The question is thus not merely the already 
important issue of how reflection can determine a path of action in the material 
world, but also of how reflection can determine a path of action in the social 
world.  
Worthiness, Korsgaard argues, is the internal property of the act itself, a 
set of standards which are autonomous that is, independent of desires and 
interests. But where do actions get their independence, their ability to judge us 
back, as it were, to tell us off for not completing them properly? Korsgaard’s 
answer lies in claiming that actions have their own (objective) ends to which we 
must adopt in performing them. Just as we cannot but understand the world 
around us except in terms of the categories of the understanding, so we cannot 
act except under the categories with which actions provide us.  If reason does 
indeed provide us with objective constraints that we must follow, then it can 
motivate us or constrain us to action.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
rather than constructivist. So it is not really a principle of practical reason at all. LL 2 4-7. This is 
also the central argument of Korsgaard’s “The Myth of Egoism”.  
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Self-Constitution, Normativity and Teleology 
As mentioned earlier, the notion of self-constitution is an interpretation of 
the categorical imperative. It is a way of understanding what it means to behave 
autonomously, and how autonomy is related to normativity. We began with action 
and concluded that in order for an action to be the work of an agent, it had to be 
the result of the agent’s deliberations. Deliberation, however, requires principles 
according to which the agent determines herself. This brought us to self-
determination and the problem of constitution.  
Now, self-determination requires the notion of responsibility since 
responsibility is an interpretation of the ‘ownership’ of action. For Kant, what 
makes a person responsible is that the action springs from his autonomy. I quote 
Korsgaard:  
The exercise of the person’s autonomy is what makes the action his, and so what 
makes it an action. And so we get a problem. It is the essential nature of action 
that it has a certain metaphysical property. But in order to have that metaphysical 
property it must have a certain normative property. This explains why the action 
must meet the normative standard: it just isn’t action if it doesn’t.139  
I interpret Korsgaard as saying that in order for there to be ‘ownership’ of 
an action, the action must be both objective (not mine in a certain sense) and 
subjectively mine (in the sense of coming from me). In order to overcome the 
apparent gap between my desires on the one hand and objective reality (nature) 
on the other hand, my action must reflect both its origin in me and its necessary 
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objective characteristic, the fact that it is intelligible as action for others. Such an 
action, in other words, requires a synthesis of nature and reason in which the 
action is both caused by me and conforms to standards other than my subjective 
nature.  
The law which governs the action is called normativity. This normativity is 
autonomous because the law governing the action comes from the agent’s 
reflection itself. Korsgaard finds support for her interpretation of action as 
normatively constrained in an objective way in Aristotle’s theory of teleology in 
the Metaphysics. For Aristotle, what gives an object its form is its ergon, its 
purpose. To use an example, the purpose of a house is to provide shelter. The 
house fulfills its function when its parts, the walls and roof, are arranged so that it 
provides shelter from the elements. Purpose or teleology is what unifies a heap 
of matter into an object.140   
Objects thus have constitutive standards, standards that are internal. Such 
standards are not susceptible to challenge from the outside. It just is the case 
that a house must provide shelter. If it does not, it is not a house. Of course it is 
possible to have a bad house, a house with a leaking roof which nonetheless 
keeps us mostly dry and shields us from the wind. Depending on the degree of 
conformity to the internal standard of providing shelter, we can judge whether it is 
just a bad house or not really a house at all, but a ruin of a house.141  
                                                                                                                                  
139 Korsgaard. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”. 14.  
140 LL 1 18-19.  
141 LL 1 20-24.  
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What appears as an internal standard for an object, appears as a 
constraining rule in the deliberation of a rational beings. In this way, the ‘objective 
property’ of the object informs the subjective goal-setting of the agent who wants 
to act. In order to better explicate this, we must revisit the notion of construction. 
Earlier we saw that constructivism meant a process through which the form and 
content of a thought constitute one another fully. To illustrate the point, 
Korsgaard gives the example of pure procedural justice in jurisprudence. She 
argues that what confers validity on laws is that they have been created by those 
entitled to create them. Thus the legislature creates laws and they are normative 
for us because they have been properly created by the authority entrusted with 
their creation. The agents (legislators) create the laws in the manner in which 
they are formally constrained to create laws (by voting on proposed bills). This 
procedure just is what makes the law valid.142 The process of deliberation is itself 
the synthesis of material circumstances and subjective desires.  
In the same way, the outcome of the CI-procedure which really is rational 
reflection yields a result which must be valid or normative for the agent 
conceiving it. It has been arrived at in the appropriate manner, by autonomous 
reflection. The agent wills her action according to the formal constraint of the law 
she imposes on herself. The reason it does not make sense to question the 
outcome of the CI-procedure is that it has its authority in the process of reflection 
the agent engages in— there can be no other authority. And because this 
process is completely internal to our deliberation, Korsgaard says that it is 
                                            
142 Korsgaard. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”. 8-10.  
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thought itself. As the logic of thought, the CI-procedure produces its own 
authority. There can be no other, if the outcome is to be the agent’s own. This is 
what thinking for yourself is, deliberating according to your own ideas, your own 
standards.  
This constructivist interpretation of autonomy, strong as it is, has now 
shown that there might be such a thing as a constitutive or objectively rational 
standard of action. We have now come to the conclusion of the first part of the 
normative argument: there are rational constraints on the actions of agents and 
these agents endorse these constraints.  
 
Motivation and Good or Bad Action 
So we understand what it is for rational agents to will  autonomously— it is 
to conform to the rational standards given by reason. But there still seem to be 
many instances in which our actions fall short of this autonomy. This is the 
problem of akrasis, or weakness of will. We may intend to do something and fail. 
Does this mean that we do not act then according to the categorical imperative, 
that we are not constrained by the ‘objective’ standards of action? Korsgaard 
denies this. She argues that we cannot but be motivated by the objective or 
constitutive standards of action because that is all we have as a principle of 
action.  
She begins by insisting on the role that reason plays in our autonomous 
deliberation. Remember that it is not in question whether humans have reason at 
all (this has already been seen to be the case from the argument against 
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particularism in which we saw that humans must act under principles), but just 
whether they are always motivated by reason:  
If justice and universalizability are internal standards, then they are not 
extraneous considerations whose normativity may be doubted. This means that 
even the most venal and shoddy agent must try to perform a good action, for the 
simple reason that there is no other way to try to perform an action.143  
But if we cannot help but try to act according to the laws of reason, does this 
mean that we must act well or not at all?  
In order to answer this question we must understand how the principles of 
action are normatively constituted. To do this, we must take a short detour to look 
at Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of moral motivation, which I also 
take to be Korsgaard’s own. What we are looking for in this account is how the 
categorical imperative might both motivate us and also fail to motivate us to act in 
accordance with its constraints. We have seen that, for Kant, there must be some 
principle beyond our desires and inclinations which determines our will. If desires 
were immediately motivating for us, we would not be subjects. We saw this in the 
discussion of particularist willing. Kant believes that only some desires act on us 
at any one time. He calls these incentives (Triebfedern), but they might also be 
called candidate desires, desires which enter into our consideration for action.  
It is these incentives which will form the set of possible actions once one 
has been endorsed through the process of reflection. That is, we can do them, 
but we must find out whether it is worthwhile to do them. Here we must note that 
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reflective endorsement of a desire does not mean that it is actually 
universalizable, only that it appears to be universalizable to the subject. It is a 
central feature of Kant’s theory of moral motivation that the moral law itself can 
be an incentive and so motivating.144 But, by the same token, incentives might be 
other desires like those of self-love. Whatever the incentive that has been 
adopted may be, it constitutes the subject normatively.145  
There are thus three types of actions. The first are actions which conform 
to the categorical imperative. These are actions in the sense discussed above 
since they are efficacious acts (conforming to the internal standards of the 
hypothetical imperative; putting one foot in front of the other in order to walk, say) 
and they are autonomously willed (the maxim is adopted because the end is 
worthwhile). Second, there are merely efficacious acts. These acts meet their 
own criteria but are not autonomously willed. Third there are acts which fail to be 
acts because they do not even satisfy the standards of the hypothetical 
imperative.  
The important point, however, is that we always act in accord with some 
principle, even if it is not the categorical imperative itself but its derivative, 
instrumental reason. We are, in this sense, at least minimally rational or 
reflective. But, Korsgaard wants to insist that all action is done from the same 
principles, the categorical imperative, and that actions which appear not to be in 
                                                                                                                                  
143 Korsgaard. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”. 15.  
144 See Korsgaard. “Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action”. 206-208. See also LL 3 22.  
145 See Korsgaard. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason”.  
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accord with the categorical imperative are still actions which sought to conform to 
the categorical imperatively, but just were badly done. I will explain how an action 
can be badly done in a moment. Let us first look again at why Korsgaard thinks 
that all actions must conform to the categorical imperative.  
Korsgaard’s discussion of bad action further buttresses the distinction we 
saw earlier between acting on the categorical imperative and acting on the moral 
law. Bad action shows that we can be rational without being moral. For 
Korsgaard, bad action is not necessarily action which is done for bad reasons 
such as malevolence, carelessness or self-love. The point of bad action is at 
once to show that, since action must always be autonomous to be an action at all 
it must conform to the categorical imperative, but what makes it bad is that it 
does not conform to the moral law as it would exist in the kingdom of ends. 
Korsgaard gives the following example: she describes modern constitutional 
democracy where, through pure procedural justice, unjust laws still come into 
being. The laws conform to the categorical imperative in the sense that they are 
autonomously adopted (through the right parliamentary method) but fail in the 
sense of being unjust or ununiversalizable.146  Here the deliberation is efficacious 
without being just. Of course, the badness of the law is only something that 
becomes apparent after the fact and is then subject to historical revision.  
The point is that what makes the action ‘bad’ is that it has adopted the 
wrong incentive (content) for action but has willed it in the correct way, by making 
the outcome of its maxim a law for itself. Bad action does not take reason as its 
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incentive, but something else. The unity of the subject that is created by the 
autonomous adoption of the wrong incentive is thus on shaky ground. The agent 
who has autonomously willed the wrong incentive will find that her actions 
according to the wrong incentive will come into conflict with those actions which 
she has willed according to universalizable laws. The bad or defective action is 
an action which is trying to be unified but just can’t quite keep it together. Thus 
Korsgaard says that a builder building a bad house intends to build as good a 
house as the good builder, she just cannot quite manage to do so.147 By the 
same token, the addict is trying to live the same kind of life as the virtuous 
person, but just cannot quite manage to do so.  
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with what might be called the ‘subjective’ side of 
action, that is, with what makes action possible from the perspective of the agent. 
We have seen that in order to act, one must be unified under some principle and 
that this principle must be the categorical imperative. But the question of the 
‘categorical’ part of this imperative is still unclear. It is necessary for the agent to 
reflect in order to act, that is, it is necessary for the agent to have reason to act. 
These reasons are furnished by the very process of reflection itself. But the wider 
question of the intersubjective value of the agent’s reasons for acting remains 
largely unaddressed. We still have not substantively engaged with the objectivity 
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of reflective reasoning. It will be my argument in the next chapter that 
Korsgaard’s notion of the constitutive standards of action together with her 
argument for a public notion of reason can help us here. That is to say that the 
problem of egoism is still unresolved. The universal character of reflection, in 
other words, is still in question.  
For now, let me recap the argument in terms of the two criticisms of the 
Kantian position I mentioned at the outset: Hegel’s claim that the maxim cannot 
pick out a meaningful course of action because it is too abstract and Williams’ 
claim that only desires can motivate. The argument I have presented deals only 
partially with Hegel’s charge since it address only the subjective side of 
reflection: the possibility of formulating any sort of action through reflection. 
Korsgaard’s vindication of Kant with respect to the synthetic abilities of the 
maxim clearly centers on the idea that the maxim is not something to be applied 
to a given situation (an idea which brings with it all sorts of commensurability 
problems) but rather is the activity of thought itself. That is, if we follow 
Korsgaard’s contention that the solution to the problem of action is the 
formulation of a plan of action, we can see that there is no lag between the 
practical problem and a practical solution. Korsgaard thus denies what is, I think, 
implicitly assumed by the Hegelian critique, namely that the assessment of the 
problem of action occurs first in theoretical terms and must then be translated 
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back into practical terms.148 While the latter picture entails all the problems Hegel 
identifies, the former does not, because here theoretical knowledge is 
subordinated to practical activity. If the maxim really is merely reflection on a 
practical problem, as has been suggested by Korsgaard, there can be no 
question that it will yield a concrete course of action.  
Korsgaard’s insistence on the immanent character of reflection answers 
not only Hegel’s charge against the abstractness of the maxim, but also 
conforms to Williams’ internalism requirement. I interpreted this requirement 
foremost as a requirement that the authority which turns desires into ‘reasons’ 
must be the same authority which experiences the desire or incentive in the first 
place. Conforming to the internalism requirement in this sense, however, still 
leaves open the question of what, exactly, ‘having reasons’ is supposed to mean. 
It is clear just from the way Williams and Korsgaard formulate what they take to 
be reflection that they think of the process in different terms. While it is not the 
task of this dissertation to examine what Williams’ means by deliberation in more 
depth, I think that Korsgaard’s references to reflection as originating in the 
problems of self-consciousness and therefore in Kant’s doctrine of the 
spontaneity of the understanding is clear enough. I will examine how Hegel 
appropriates this doctrine in the last chapter and I will argue there that 
Korsgaard’s view of reflection is informed by similar considerations. The point for 
                                            
148 This conception also informs Prauss’ doubt that practical and theoretical reason could really 
be one and the same thing. See chapter one.  
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now is that Korsgaard’s view of reflection is immanent and that she sees reason 
as self-authorizing.  
It has also become clear in this chapter that Korsgaard forcefully rejects 
the idea that desires can motivate directly. I do not think Williams’ claim that 
commitments motivate should be taken as endorsing precisely the sort of direct 
motivation which has here been shown to be impossible. I thus propose to read 
Williams’ insistence on the motivational power of personal commitments as a 
moral claim, or rather, as an ethical claim made against the Kantian claim of 
morality. We should read Williams’ charge as centering on the question of 
whether our commitments to our projects can be shared, rather than saying 
anything about the possibility of reflection itself.  
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CHAPTER V 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN KORSGAARD 
 
In this chapter I would like to take up the problem we saw articulated 
earlier by both Williams and Hegel, namely the question of the scope of 
normativity. The theory of reflection offered by Korsgaard in the previous chapter 
showed that normativity exists, that is, that we do need reasons for action. That 
discussion, however, left open whose reasons count for me. For, as I have noted 
repeatedly, Williams insists that the only types of reasons that are truly normative 
for me are my own reasons. In this chapter I will take up the charge of subjective 
normativity or of egoism, as it is usually formulated in the Anglo-American 
literature. I would like to present this challenge in the form of Hegel’s theory of 
subjective action because Hegel presents both a fresh formulation of the problem 
of egoism (which, however, can be assimilated to Williams’ concerns) and also 
takes the problem to its dialectical limit, which will allow us to see what is needed 
to avoid this challenge. (This will be the subject of the next chapter.)  
The second half of the chapter will be devoted to Korsgaard’s arguments 
against subjective normativity or egoism. These arguments seek to show that 
egoism, conceived of as having private reasons, does not yield a stable 
conception of agency. Only an agent who is able to take into account other 
people’s desires as his own is able to act on the categorical imperative and only 
this will make him a coherent agent. Finally, I will evaluate how effective 
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Korsgaard’s defense of the publicity of reasons is in turning back Williams’ 
Gauguin example in “Moral Luck”.  
 
Hegelʼs Account of Action 
I will now give a brief reconstruction of Hegel’s theory of subjective action, 
culminating in his criticism of conscience. Hegel’s account is similar to Williams’ 
in that it accepts the internalism requirement and insists that the articulation of a 
subjective ground project is of constitutive significance for the agent. The radical 
internality of his ground project is, as in Williams, given a privileged space in 
Hegel’s interpretation, and constitutes pure subjectivity. But by formulating the 
subject’s interest thus, Hegel also points to the limits of such internality. The 
limits of the subjective norms Hegel diagnoses are similar to Williams’ fatalistic 
claim that the happiness of an individual really just depends on whether his 
ground project happens to line up with currently acceptable norms. Both are 
forms of the impasse of subjectivity.  
Michael Quante has distinguished three elements in Hegel’s theory of 
action: (1) the subject’s perspective on the action as being done for the subject 
itself, (2) the normative nature of the action, its relation to the principle according 
to which it is carried out (that is, whether it conforms to this principle) and, (3) the 
demand that the action be recognized by others as being good.149  
                                            
149 Quante. Hegels Begriff der Handlung. 128-30.  
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These three stages in Hegel’s theory correspond roughly to the 
development of the subject from reflective endorsement to social recognition. 
That means that we are moving from the subject’s interaction with the world of 
things (which includes treating other people as ‘things’ as well) to an interaction 
between subjects which is characterized by recognition or misrecognition.  
Hegel begins the Morality section of his Philosophy of Right by claiming 
that in order for the subject truly to be a subject, it must determine itself 
according to its own standards, rather than according to the standards of 
others.150 Hegel calls this the right of the subjective will: “The will which is 
determined as subjective and free for itself, though initially only concept, itself 
has existence in order to become Idea. The moral point of view therefore takes 
the shape of the right of the subjective will.”151 The right of the subjective will 
means a retreat of the subject into its own willing and away from the influences of 
others. This marks both a rejection of the (arbitrary) law that others (perhaps the 
Hobbesian state) wish to impose on it, and a rejection of the subject’s merely 
physical needs and inclinations.  
                                            
150 GPR §106. The “Morality” chapter is the second section of the Philosophy of Right and deals 
with Kant and the critique of moral subjectivism more generally.  
151 “Der als subjektiv bestimmte, für sich freie Wille, zunächst als Begriff, hat, um als Idee zu 
sein, selbst Dasein. Der moralische Standpunkt ist daher in seiner Gestalt das Recht des 
subjektiven Willens.” GPR §107. See also GPR §117 where Hegel explains the right of the will as 
the right only to be held responsible by others for what the will could have known its actions 
would lead to. 
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The right of the subject, however, at least as initially conceived, is empty, 
because there is nothing binding the application of these rights. The subject’s will 
just is its action. But as we examine the rationality of the subject we are also 
looking for ways in which the subject limits itself by its own commitment. The 
right of the subject must therefore be something like a duty of the subject. Hegel 
thus construes the internalism requirement as duty: an act is a duty when it is 
normative for us. Hegel’s point, like Korsgaard’s, is that having a principle is not a 
static relation to the world but rather an active engagement with it. Normativity 
arises when the subject imposes certain limitations on its actions, i.e. acts 
autonomously. These limitations, Hegel contends, are the result of the subject’s 
interaction with the world.  
The requirement of the will to assert itself in nature, to transform nature 
according to its principles, is experienced by the will as an imperative. In acting 
autonomously, the will must will itself. But because the subject is also part 
nature, it must appropriate the fact of law for its own purposes and claim the 
lawfulness of nature as its own. This is what it means for the subject to determine 
itself in accordance with the representation of laws.152 And this representation of 
laws is experienced as normative or as an ‘ought’. I must take the means to my 
                                            
152 Kant. “Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the 
capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with 
principles, or has a will.” “Ein jedes Ding der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur ein vernünftiges 
Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, d.i. nach Prinzipien, zu handeln, 
oder einen Willen.” GMS 412.  
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desired ends, for desire itself is only properly constituted within the bounds of the 
resistance I experience from the world.  
Lastly, the question of the good arises. The good, for Hegel, is a more 
social version of the well-being each agent desires for himself. The good is what 
is desirable for all. It is part of Hegel’s argument that there is no categorical shift 
from desire to the ethical relation since there is no fundamental difference 
between the world and the other subjects in it. What is desirable for all, however, 
is constituted not in an a priori way but is developed out of the interaction 
between subject and world, now conceived of as both the material world and the 
social world. This is where the impasse of subjectivity occurs: the individual’s 
desires might not be reconcilable to the demands of society.  
 
The Subjectivism Charge: Conscience and Gauguinʼs Ground Project 
This, I think, is where we might locate Williams’ Gauguin. The claim that 
Williams makes for Gauguin’s need to act on his ground project appears to be 
something like the following. To quote Hegel: “For the subjective will, the good is 
likewise absolutely essential, and the subjective will has worth and dignity only in 
so far as its insight and intention are in conformity with the good.”153 And now to 
paraphrase: the subjective will’s conception of its own good is so essential to it 
that the subjective will’s value consists entirely in seeking to realize its 
conception of the good. We might call this the Luther moment. (“Hier steh’ ich, 
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ich kann nicht anders”.) The point though is, I think, clear enough. Gauguin’s 
conception of the good, his ground project, is so important to him that he is 
prepared to break with the conventions of civil society and to leave his wife and 
children in order to seek to fulfill his own-most commitments.  
Hegel connects this Luther moment with conscience in a deprecating way 
which fits rather well with Williams’ own skepticism about the ability of society to 
furnish us with appropriate moral guidelines. Hegel argues that conscience is the 
ability to determine the good for oneself in all vehemence and conviction, but that 
this determination is completely subjective. This way of putting it pits Gauguin’s 
subjectivity against the objectivity of social mores in just the way Williams intends 
it; the idea of commitment to one’s ground project is overriding in the same way 
we speak of the normative power of conscience, which plagues us even after we 
have gotten away with breaking some rule. But here it is the breaking of a social 
norm that has become central to the identity of the agent. Conscience is thus 
fundamentally an anti-moral attitude in both Williams and Hegel. And it can (and, 
according to Hegel, will) become immoral because, in taking itself to be moral, it 
goes against the ethical, which is always conceived of as objective.  
A further element that Hegel’s analysis of the subjective will shares with 
Williams’ Gauguin, is the idea that the subjective will can and must be judged by 
those around him. Hegel writes: “The right to recognize nothing that I do not 
perceive as rational is the highest right of the subject, but by virtue of its 
                                                                                                                                  
153 “Für den subjektiven Willen ist das Gute ebenso das schlechthin Wesentliche, und er hat nur 
Wert und Würde, insofern er in seiner Einsicht und Absicht demselben gemäß ist.”GPR §131.  
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subjective determination, it is at the same time formal; on the one hand, the right 
of the rational— as objective— over the subject remains firmly established.”154 
Hegel is thus pitting the right of the subjective will against the rational or objective 
order of things. Though Williams would clearly not agree that there is a rational 
order of things that Gauguin violates, it does seem that he agrees that Gauguin is 
going against the (somehow arbitrary) norms of society. Indeed, Williams 
explicitly denies the idea that Gauguin is amoral.155  
But to say that Hegel is contrasting the rational order of the world with the 
subject’s particular notion of the good is to overstate the point. For what is 
precisely at issue here is whether there is a rational order of the world which the 
subject can seek guidance from or whether all we have to go on is our own 
commitments. This is clearly where Williams and Hegel (and Korsgaard) part 
company— for while Williams seems to think that it really is a matter of luck what 
sort of subjective commitments we come to have, Hegel thinks that the sorts of 
commitments we have are a function of historical development. For Williams luck 
seems to be something truly arbitrary while for Hegel it seems to be something 
historically determined.  
Lastly I want to touch on an issue which is present as a possibility in 
Williams and which is brought out explicitly by Hegel, namely that the right of the 
subjective will really is evil and not good at all. Williams acknowledges this point 
                                            
154 “Das Recht, nichts anzuerkennen, was Ich nicht als vernünftig einsehe, ist das höchste Recht 
des Subjekts, aber durch seine subjektive Bestimmung zugleich formell, und das Recht des 
Vernünftigen als des Objektiven an das Subjekt bleibt dagegen feststehen.” GPR §132. Anm.  
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when he says that Gauguin’s ground project may never be justifiable, even to 
Gauguin himself. Here we should not conceive of evil as intentional evil but 
rather circumstantial evil, brought about by the misguided actions of different 
actors. Hegel writes:  
Where all previously valid determinations have vanished and the 
will is in a state of pure inwardness, the self-consciousness is 
capable of making into its principle either the universal in and for 
itself, or the arbitrariness of its own particularity, giving the latter 
precedence over the universal and realizing it through its actions— 
i.e. it is capable of being evil.156 
 
The problem with acting on one’s subjective commitments means that one 
might be acting contrary to the interests not only of society in general, but also of 
oneself. Personal commitments are here seen as trumping social and personal 
norms.  
Hegel locates the origin of these personal commitments in nature itself, in 
the irreducible specificity of the drives which, as he notes, can be construed as 
either good or bad— and for Hegel good or bad are relative to the level of 
historical social development. This is indeed how Williams conceives of them. It 
is a matter of luck to what extent your personal commitments or drives coincide 
with the general conception of what is acceptable in a given society.157 
                                                                                                                                  
155 Williams. “Moral Luck”. 23.  
156 “Das Selbstbewusstsein in der Eitelkeit aller sonst geltenden Bestimmungen und in der reinen 
Innerlichkeit des Willens ist ebensosehr die Möglichkeit, das an und für sich Allgemeine, als die 
Willkür, die eigene Besonderheit über das Allgemeine zum Prinzip zu machen und sie durch 
Handeln zu realisieren— böse zu sein.” GPR §139. 
157 Nussbaum argues that Williams’ target in his critique of morality is the Victorian morality 
system which was particularly repressive in sexual matters. See Nussbaum. “Bernard Williams”.  
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Compounding the importance of this point, both Williams and Hegel take the 
expression of conscience or one’s ground project as a fundamental expression of 
one’s freedom.158 The more pessimistic dialectical point which Hegel draws from 
the notion of possibility or luck is that the will, which might be at odds with 
society, will come to be at odds with society at some point. This, however, means 
that such a will must be seen as evil.159 I think this pessimistic point is echoed in 
Williams’ desire to roll back the brutal hegemony of an entrenched morality 
system to allow more space for individual freedoms.160  
 
Hegel’s strong formulation of the problem of conscience and Williams’ 
equally strong formulation of the need to fulfill one’s ground project seem to 
suggest that we have come to an impasse in terms of articulating a theory of 
normativity which is binding to all the way it is binding to each. This does not 
preclude a political solution like the one Rawls suggests through the overlapping 
consensus in Political Liberalism, but it does cast serious doubts on the idea that 
commitments must be shared to be normative. But the political solution at least 
allows the possibility of a gradual convergence of different types of personal 
commitments, thus reducing the relative ‘evil’ of each.  
                                            
158 Hegel writes that the origin of evil lies “in the speculative aspect of freedom, in the necessity 
with which it emerges from the natural phase of the will and adopts a character of inwardness in 
relation to it.” “in dem Spekulativen der Freiheit, ihrer Notwendigkeit, aus der Natürlichkeit des 
Willens herauszugehen und gegen sie innerlich zu sein”. GPR §139 Anm.  
159 GPR §139. Anm.  
160 Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Ch. 10.  
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I would like to devote the rest of the chapter to an examination of how 
Korsgaard responds to the challenge articulated above. A key to Korsgaard’s 
response is to see that she moves the standards of action from merely technical 
standards to intersubjective standards. That is, she thinks that the way we 
interact with others has its own set of standards and that these standards come 
from conforming our actions to the categorical imperative. By taking other 
people’s reasons into account, we treat them as ends rather than as means. It is, 
however, a matter to be investigated whether the possibility of taking others to be 
ends in themselves really helps us with the problem of morality as I have 
formulated it.  
 
The Intersubjectivity of Reason in Korsgaard: The Wittgensteinian 
Argument 
In Sources Korsgaard presents an argument, itself a revision of an earlier 
argument, which seeks to refute the charge we just saw in Williams and Hegel, 
and to establish that the normativity of reason obtains not just for the self but for 
all others, at least in principle.161 Though this argument has been criticized as too 
thin to provide the solution to the problem of intersubjectivity itself, it is an 
important step toward the more powerful argument for the intersubjectivity of 
reason given in the Locke Lectures. The argument in Sources also appropriately 
formulates the problem of autonomy and its necessary relational character. As 
such, it shares many of the features of Hegel’s view of intersubjectivity itself.  
                                            
161 See. Korsgaard. “Reasons We Can Share”.  
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Williams’ claim that reasons for action are essentially personal or private 
was formulated in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy as the problem that, 
though the fact that you have a plan gives you reason to pursue your plan, and 
the fact that I have a plan gives me reasons to pursue my plans, this does not 
mean that I am bound to consider your plans a reason to change my behavior. 
Williams even suggests that it might be the case that if I were you, I would want 
to interfere with my goals (because, presumably, my activities limit your goals in 
some way).162   
The problem with this way of formulating the objection, Korsgaard notes, 
is that the objection itself relies on a premise that is widely assumed in Anglo-
American philosophy, but not itself argued for, namely that reasons are 
fundamentally private and must be shown to be public in order to establish 
morality.163 By seeking to refute this argument and to establish the 
intersubjectivity of reason, Korsgaard is also taking issue with Williams’ 
formulation of the internalism constraint according to which only desires motivate 
our actions, a position which itself implies that desires are private. I think we 
should thus take Korsgaard’s argument against private reasons as a further 
argument for the necessity of conceiving of reason-giving according to her model 
of reflection rather than according to the sub-Humean model Williams employs.  
                                            
162 See Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 61.  
163 Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. 132.  
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Korsgaard’s argument is borrowed from Wittgenstein and relies on a 
parallel between language and thought.164 Korsgaard interprets Wittgenstein’s 
private language argument as stating that language is inherently relational 
because it is normative.165 To say that X means Y is to say that one ought to take 
X to be Y. That is, having a language means having a certain type of normative 
relation to oneself, namely that of giving oneself instructions or rules on how a 
certain term should be used. To use a term correctly thus means to use it 
according to a specific rule which one is not free to change.  
Reasons are relational in just the same way. To have a reason is to 
determine oneself in a certain way. The publicity of reason comes in just where it 
does in the private language argument. Though it is perhaps most common only 
to articulate one’s reasons to oneself just the way one only explains one’s use of 
words to others when pressed, reasons and words have an intrinsically sharable 
quality because they must provide a law according to which we bind ourselves.  
The argument also models the intersubjectivity of autonomy in the sense 
that giving oneself a law means treating oneself as someone else, someone who 
is capable of being bound by someone else’s commitments. Korsgaard here cites 
Derek Parfit’s notion of the serial character of person whose relation to himself is 
not so different than the present self’s relation to other current selves.166 That is, 
                                            
164 Though Nagel raises the objection that egoism does not violate publicity, I think that 
Korsgaard’s response is adequate. See Sources of Normativity. 208 and 223-228.  
165 The argument is made in The Sources of Normativity. 136-39.  
166 See section III of Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. It is telling that Williams’ argument in 
“Persons, Character and Morality” relies on Parfit’s notion of identity as well.  
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to commit myself to something I say means also that I can commit myself to 
something someone else does.  
But the Wittgensteinian argument establishes only what we already 
assumed to be the case in Korsgaard’s argument about the possibility of 
reflection: that it is at least in principle possible to give reasons to others. So it 
now remains for us to see why we should seek to take other peoples’ reasons 
into account. This piece of the puzzle comes in the form of the argument for self-
constitution, and internal and external justice in the Locke Lectures. In this 
argument, the notion of personal integrity will play a central role.  
 
The Intersubjectivity of Reason in Korsgaard: Taking Othersʼ Reasons as 
Oneʼs Own  
In Sources Korsgaard used Wittgenstein’s private language argument to 
show that reasons cannot be private because in order to be normative, they have 
to be at least capable of being made public, or of being articulated. The last 
installment of the Locke Lectures seeks to establish the same conclusion but 
gives a more detailed account of interaction than was available in Sources. The 
new argument is meant to pick up on the reflection argument we have already 
examined by showing that justice is really a further demand of the unity of 
agency— and this has already been established in the normative and 
metaphysical arguments. I take this to be an expansion of the previous argument 
for the possibility of interaction in the sense that the new argument states that 
because we should seek to be unified agents, we should seek to act according to 
the categorical imperative.  
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I would like to present the argument in a different manner than Korsgaard 
does in her lectures. While Korsgaard seeks to show that taking others’ reasons 
as motivating reasons is a consequence of the need to be consistent in the way 
one regards one’s own goals and those of others, I would like to frame the 
argument in terms of the internalism requirement. Putting the argument that way 
will help us see how Williams’ critique of the Kantian position is both 
accommodated and refuted by Korsgaard.  
Let us begin with reflection. As we saw earlier, it is the nature of self-
consciousness to reflect on the perceptions and desires which arise both within 
the subject and outside of it. Choosing which action or belief to pursue means 
that the subject must endorse a particular desire or perception over others. This 
endorsement gives the agent unity and constitutes the agent’s identity. 
Reflection, to put it simply, gives us reason to act. We also saw that Williams’ 
critique of the Kantian position implied that deliberation entailed no such 
reflective unification of the subject but rather consisted in the ordering of the 
subset of inclinations and desires in a certain way. Korsgaard’s argument for 
intersubjectivity or the ability for people to take other people’s desires as 
motivating relies on the notion of reflection. I will first lay out Korsgaard’s 
argument for intersubjectivity and then (in the next section) proceed to discuss 
how Williams’ notion of deliberation does not yield intersubjectivity.  
Korsgaard’s argument simply appeals to the fact that the subject 
experiences desires as external. If desires and inclinations must be endorsed by 
the subject in order to become reasons for action, and all desires are in some 
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sense external to reflection, then it does not really matter where the desires 
come from. They might stem from my own intentions and desires, but they might 
also stem from the wants and reflections of others. Korsgaard writes:  
I must interact with the conscious inhabitants of my body, because I must act 
with my body. But I may also interact with other people, and when I do then their 
reasons, as well as my own, become as it were incentives in the deliberative 
process that we undertake together, resources for the construction of our shared 
reasons. So taken in that way, the category of my reasons doesn’t exclude an 
identification between my reasons and the reasons of others.167 
What is important is that all desires must be endorsed by me. There is 
then, no reason why your request that I pick you up from the airport should not 
trump my desire to sleep in. Both candidate desires have to be reflectively 
endorsed. Where the desire comes from makes no difference.  
This argument is meant to refute the claim, put slightly differently than 
before, that egoism is capable of being universalized.168 That is, it is possible for 
me to acknowledge that your projects are normative for you all the while denying 
that they are normative for me. We examined this claim above in terms of the 
idea that reasons were private. But if Korsgaard’s take on the internalism 
requirement is correct, then it is at least possible that reasons are pubic, that is, 
that your interests or reasons should be acknowledged to be reasons for me.  
                                            
167 Korsgaard. LL 6 21.  
168 On this, see Nagel’s contribution to The Sources of Normativity. Lecture 6.  
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Korsgaard gives a useful example. It comes in two varieties, one 
assuming the publicity of reasons, the other assuming their privacy. Let us look 
at the publicity of reasons first. A student and a teacher want to meet.169 This 
creates a practical problem to which meeting would be the solution. If the teacher 
suggests a time which the student cannot make, and the teacher genuinely 
seeks a solution to the problem common to both, the teacher will take the 
student’s inability to make the suggested time as a reason for her to suggest a 
different time. This is because the meeting is a problem common to both, a 
problem which can also only be solved if both make the meeting. In seeking a 
solution, both student and teacher will take each other’s scheduling problems as 
their own problems.  
In deliberating in this way the student and the teacher’s wills will be fused, 
not in some metaphysical way, but by each taking the other’s reasons to be her 
own. Korsgaard writes:  
When we interact with each other what we do is deliberate together, to arrive at a 
shared decision. Since the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action, the 
result is an action that we perform together, governed by a law we freely choose 
together. The free choice of this law is an act that constitutes our unified will and 
makes shared action possible.170 
In taking the student’s request to meet seriously, the teacher 
acknowledges the need for a meeting to be her own. That is what it means for an 
                                            
169 Korsgaard. LL 6 17-19.  
170 Korsgaard. LL 6 15.  
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agent to take another agent’s needs or desires seriously— it means making them 
her own. Consequently, the problem can only be solved if both can make the 
meeting.  
From this argument Korsgaard concludes that we can treat people as 
ends in themselves for that is what we are doing when we take others’ reasons 
as our own. This is not to say that we always do so. This part of the argument 
rearticulates the Wittgensteinian point about the possibility of intersubjectivity.  
 
Deliberation as Action 
The above example leaves us wondering whether it is more than mere 
chance whether we interact with others in the way Korsgaard says is possible. A 
way of addressing, if not answering, this problem presents itself in the theory of 
the constitutive standards of action.  Though Korsgaard does not make this 
explicit, I take it that the argument about the publicity or privacy of reasons is 
analogous to the argument about good and bad actions. In discussing the 
constitutive standards of action, Korsgaard argued that there was really no such 
thing as intending to build a bad house. When one acts, one acts on something 
that is worthwhile and what is worthwhile is building a (good) house. You build a 
bad house only if you don’t know how to do it right, but you cannot intend to build 
a bad house (though you can intend to build a house that will stand just until the 
house is sold, but in that case, your intention is fraud and not building a house).  
The case of deliberation is much the same. Let us look at the 
unsuccessful example of deliberation. The version in which there is not public 
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deliberation is the one we might be more used to imagining when there is a 
differential of powers as commonly exists between teacher and student. This 
scenario takes the same starting point, that of a student seeking a meeting with a 
teacher. But this time, the teacher does not take the student’s reasons as her 
own. She does not really care whether she meets the student or not. The request 
for a meeting still poses a practical problem but the problem just is not the same 
for both student and teacher. The teacher just wants to get on with her work and 
does not care whether she meets the student or not. What then passes for 
interaction or deliberation is nothing of the kind, but is rather two individuals 
reflecting on their own desires in the same space and hoping for the coincidence 
of agreement. Each treats the other’s reasons not as reasons but as obstacles to 
what he or she wants to accomplish. It is important to note that though the 
student might still believe that he is trying to solve the problem together with the 
teacher, the teacher’s private goal renders the student’s goal private as well, 
because the teacher’s obstinacy will mean that the student experiences the 
teacher’s reasons as obstacles as well.  
What is going on here is that the student and the teacher are not pursuing 
the same thing and are thus not cooperating on the same project. This could be 
because the teacher does not think she should be burdened with having to meet 
students and is thus actively trying to avoid meeting the student. This case is 
analogous to the fraud case above, because the teacher is simply pursuing a 
different goal. (Here it does look like the teacher has private reasons or, at least, 
reasons she does not want to share with the student— we will return to this 
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below.) Or the teacher just might be bad at social interaction, in which case the 
teacher does intend to meet the student and acknowledges the force the 
practical problem of meeting has on her, but she just can’t quite make it work. 
The failure of the meeting is unintentional, just the way building a bad house is 
unintentional.  
But there is also a difference between building a house and deliberating 
with someone else. This difference can best be captured in terms of the 
difference between the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative. 
Building a house is an action which must conform to the technical imperative 
which is the hypothetical imperative. Though there might be certain 
intersubjective standards involved in this, it is clear that the technical imperative 
is overriding. But deliberating with someone else is only a technical matter to a 
limited extent: it cannot be done on its own and it has no particular procedure. I 
cannot claim that I was deliberating with you but you just weren’t listening. It just 
isn’t deliberation unless both people are involved and know themselves to be so.  
If the analogy between action and intersubjective deliberation holds up, 
then it looks like there really is no way in which we could not seek to deliberate, 
to take other people’s reasons into account when we reflect. The example of 
private reason is then not really an example of reason being private, but of 
reason being insufficiently attentive to its public function. Because of this, I want 
to interpret Korsgaard’s claim that deliberation is hard work as a claim about the 
relative difficulty of reaching a solution to a practical problem rather than a claim 
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that it is hard to overcome one’s egoism and step into intersubjectivity.171 
Korsgaard’s claim is that if we deliberate reflectively then we also deliberate 
publicly, because the process of reasoning is open to all possible desires. So 
there is no way of ever really having private reasons. This is a strong claim and it 
appears to contradict the case of the teacher who did not want to meet with the 
student in order to have more time for her own research. But it does not.  
In Sources, Korsgaard has argued, convincingly I think, that merely by 
being in a room with you I obligate you somehow.  
If I call out your name, I make you stop in your tracks. (If you love me, I make you 
come running.) Now you cannot proceed as you did before. Oh, you can 
proceed, all right, but not just as you did before. For now if you walk on, you will 
be ignoring me and slighting me. It will probably be difficult for you, and you will 
have to muster a certain active resistance, a sense of rebellion. But why should 
you have to rebel against me? It is because I am a law to you.172 
From this I think we should take it as having been established that on the 
internalist model of reflection Korsgaard offers, intersubjectivity is possible and 
even common. This does not, however, mean that there cannot be cases like 
that of Gauguin in which one puts what appear to be purely subjective desires 
ahead of all the reasons supplied by others— Gauguin’s leaving despite his 
family’s pleas for him to stay and support them.  
 
                                            
171 Korsgaard. LL. 6 19.  
172 Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. 140.   
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The Divided Self 
I would now like to explore why Korsgaard thinks there can be no such 
thing as private reasons in connection with Williams’ notion of the ground project. 
Doing so will provide an additional argument supporting Korsgaard’s claim that 
all reasons must be public and also provide a critique of Williams’ claim that 
ethical commitment is subjective. However, in taking up the problem of the 
seeming-egoist we should note that we are moving into a slightly different 
complex of problems than before, for we are now dealing with someone who 
turns his back on the reasons of others though, as we have just established, he 
is very well able to hear and appreciate them. I want to suggest that we are now 
moving away from the theory of what it means to be a subject capable of taking 
up the reasons of others, and toward a theory of how desires are furnished by 
the world around us for actual endorsement. In doing so, we are also moving 
from the question of possible justice to the question of real or concrete justice. 
This move will also make it necessary to say something about how political 
organization is different from moral capacity. (Recall also that one of the themes I 
have been pressing is the need to abolish a moral/non-moral partition of the 
world.)  
Korsgaard begins discussing the problem of private reason by introducing 
the model of a city, a model shared by Plato and Kant. She argues that a city 
which is just to its citizens cannot very well be unjust to others, or, if it is, it will 
not last very long. Here having private reasons means being unjust outwardly, as 
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in the student-teacher example above.173  In both cases it seems to be possible 
to act on one’s own reasons against those of others, but both sets of actions 
undermine the social network upon which those very actions depend.  
An example taken from utilitarianism illustrates the problem. As a 
utilitarian you might believe that it is good for people to believe certain things and 
you may try to get them to think these things. It might occur to you that you too 
should believe what it is useful to believe. But you can’t believe what you don’t 
think is true. But if you find that it is not useful for you to believe the truth, you 
cannot comply with this and your inward justice or self-respect and 
consequentially your outward justice or respect for others is in disarray. The 
problem stems from the fact that your reasons for having people believe certain 
things will not pass the test of publicity. This is just why the teacher in the second 
example must keep silent her true aim of not meeting with the student. Korsgaard 
argues that the problem with the utilitarian view is that the standard of reflection 
articulated earlier holds you to a more stringent standard of reason-giving than 
the utilitarian model allows; while the utilitarian model seems to endorse self-
deceit, Korsgaard’s reflective model shows that, though we might condone 
deceit, we cannot self-consciously engage in self-deceit.174 This is so because in 
reflection all desires are equal until they are endorsed by reflection and constitute 
the subject.  
                                            
173 Korsgaard has in mind Plato’s Republic and Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”.  
174 Korsgaard. LL 6 5-6. See Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Chapter 6 for a 
similar critique. See also Kant’s discussion of the realist’s position in “Perpetual Peace”.  
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So, what would self-deceit mean? On Korsgaard’s view, self-deceit is an 
oxymoron because it is only through endorsing certain desires over others that 
the self comes into existence.175 Someone who deceived him or herself would be 
a bundle of desires without a self or a self divided. But this, Korsgaard argues, is 
precisely what the egoist is. To illustrate the point, Korsgaard takes the example 
of the Russian nobleman, taken from Parfit, that we have already seen Williams 
use in “Character, Person and Morality”.176 Recall the scenario: the idealistic 
nobleman who will come into an inheritance when his father dies wants to give 
his estate to the peasants. Anticipating, however, that, as he gets older, he will 
become more conservative, he arranges for his estate to be disposed of in 
accordance with the wishes of himself and his wife and instructs his wife to 
remain true to his present self by insisting against his future self that the estate 
be given to the peasants.  
My analysis of this example does not precisely follow Korsgaard’s but I 
think that the point can be gotten at in my way as well, with the added result that 
we will see the parallel to Williams’ Gauguin example. The problem with the 
nobleman is clearly that he does not know what he wants. On the one hand he 
wants to give his future estate to the peasants, on the other hand, he anticipates 
wanting to keep it. So he cannot make up his mind. The solution of asking his 
wife to give the estate to the peasants despite his (future) self’s wishes is only an 
                                            
175 Here we are not talking of psychological or unconscious states, just of states which appear in 
reflection.  
176 See Parfit. “Later Selves and Moral Principles”.  
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apparent solution, for he will also be asking her (in the future) to keep the estate. 
The two requests, though temporally set apart, have the effect of canceling each 
other out.  
The problem here is similar to the problem we saw in chapter four when 
we examined Korsgaard’s particularist willing argument. There the argument was 
that if you are made up only of competing desires, there will be no you which can 
act. Here the case is the same: the nobleman cannot act on either desire 
because he is unable to make a law to which he is willing to bind himself. Asking 
his wife to be a law for him would only work if he could already be a law for 
himself. The problem faced by the nobleman is thus that his self lacks the 
authority to give itself laws. The nobleman cannot do anything because he 
cannot constitute himself through action. In this sense, the divided self is not a 
self at all. The point to be understood here is that, given the reflective 
endorsement argument, we have no choice but to interpret the nobleman’s or 
Gauguin’s predicament in social or intersubjective terms.  
 
Constitutive Standards of Ethical Action 
So to say that the nobleman is not a self is to put the problem a little too 
strongly. Surely the nobleman has desires on which he does act. But it is his 
overarching desire, his desire to do good for both himself and for the peasants, 
that puts him in a moral quandary. So the problem the nobleman faces is not the 
problem of reflection in general, but of unifying his intentions and subjective 
desires with those of other subjects around him. He experiences the needs of the 
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peasants as reasons to give away his estate just as he experiences the demand 
of his future (perhaps ailing) self as reasons to keep it for himself. Korsgaard’s 
argument about the divided self is thus an argument about the difficulty the agent 
experiences in trying to satisfy competing demands, which are reasons for him, 
in a situation in which only one of the demands can be met. The nobleman’s 
problem is thus that his two ground projects threaten to split him in two. He is 
torn to the extent that there threatens to be no self left to adjudicate between 
projects. And this problem, I want to argue, stems from the organizational 
structure of the social world itself.  
This is where the notion of moral luck comes in again. For it is a question 
of luck which moral dilemmas we are faced with, which competing reasons we 
have to judge between. From this perspective, I think we can interpret Williams’ 
point about moral luck as a question about the origins of what we happen to 
value, what is available to us as reasons for action. Apart from the clearly 
biological needs of nutrition and shelter, the great majority of reasons for actions 
are cultural or social.  
 
Given the political nature of the problems faced by the nobleman, Gauguin 
and even the teacher, we should now look deeper into how the social world is 
constructed such that different ground projects could come into conflict with each 
other. What I ultimately want to argue is that the historical nature of the standards 
for action or practices are not wholly cohesive, which means that different 
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practices will conflict with each other. This is where we should locate both the 
possibilities of moral luck and historical progress.  
There is a continuum between what we might term technical acts like 
walking and ethical actions like deliberation. All but the most basic technical 
(biological) actions are historically determined. 177 The more complex the action 
is, the more socially determined it will be. Thus, the practice of building a house 
has changed in the past two hundred years and a house built two hundred years 
ago would now no longer pass a building inspection. This means, to put it in 
terms of reflection, that the desires one must endorse in order to accomplish the 
action of building a (good) house are now different than they were two hundred 
years ago. This has both to do with technical standards and with more general 
practices of modern life, like where the house should be built, how it is decorated, 
etc.  
Though on a continuum with the more technical imperatives of building a 
house, what counts as interaction today has also considerably changed from 
what it was 200 years ago. We talk to different people than we might once have 
and we speak to them with more respect than we might once have. (The need to 
put the example whiggishly is, I think, one of the consequences of Korsgaard’s 
and Hegel’s views. We will come back to this.)  
To understand the political significance of social institutions or practices, 
we must examine the idea of reasons for actions from the other side. For it is not 
                                            
177 Though the Monty Python sketch about the ministry of funny walks does its best to undo even 
the relatively fixed notion of walking.  
  
 185 
only the case that in order to accomplish our desires we must endorse them in 
certain ways, do X for the sake of Y. It is also the case that the practice of Y tells 
us that X is the appropriate way to get Y done. This means that the institutions 
that exist determine which means should be endorsed to accomplish which ends. 
To give an example, the end of maintaining discipline in the classroom gave 
teachers reasons to use the paddle. Today, the same end gives us reasons to try 
to reason with students. (Again a whiggish story.) So, I think on this reading we 
would want to say that the end of satisfying his ground project of artistic self-
expression gave Gauguin reasons to leave his family and move to Tahiti. The 
ground project of living with his family, we might add, also gives Gauguin reason 
for staying. The problem, then, is that Gauguin’s different ends are at odds with 
each other in such a radical way that pursuing one means completely 
relinquishing the other. And this, I have been arguing, is a political problem. It is a 
problem to be solved collectively.  
What still remains unclear in Korsgaard’s account is how we come to have 
certain reasons and how, concretely, we are pushed toward resolving conflicting 
moral claims using them. The standard of wanting to have a whole self is 
insufficient on this count.  
 
Conclusion: The Question of Justice 
In this chapter I have presented Korsgaard’s theory of intersubjectivity as 
the response to the charge that reasons are normative only for the agent who 
experiences them. I have tried to show that Korsgaard has a convincing 
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argument that the reasons of others can and must enter into our deliberative 
process if we are to be unified agents, if, in other words, we are to avoid having 
our actions appear as evil, as Hegel puts it.  
The above point is a point about the nature of reason itself, the fact that 
reasons are available to all in much the same way. My reasons can enter into 
your process of reflection just the same way your reasons do. But this does not 
tell us to what extent justice or intersubjective deliberation actually obtains. 
Interpreted as a political or social problem, the question of moral luck raised by 
Williams, however, asks us precisely this: why is it that, given that reasons can 
be shared, they are not shared.  
 
In concluding this chapter, I would like to take up the question of moral 
luck again and put it together with the idea that the constitutive standards of 
action change. The point I would like to make is that while Korsgaard’s point is 
that reason is in principle public and universalizable, it is also the case that what 
counts as justice changes with time. Williams’ notion of moral luck points to the 
fact that we need a historical and political account of values in order to make the 
possibility of public or intersubjective reason a reality.  
The problem that Williams (and Hegel) puts his finger on is that injustice 
pervades so-called moral society because moral society is unable to 
accommodate individual desires. Moral society is then a set of standards or 
practices which is too narrow to meet the needs of self-expression of all. If we put 
the Gauguin example in historical context, we can see that Gauguin’s problem is 
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both a historical achievement and the reason that norms are not yet satisfactory. 
On the one hand, it is already something of a success for the individualism 
Williams endorses that Gauguin is even able to formulate his ground project in 
the way he does. On the other hand, had the man Gauguin been born 500 years 
earlier, it might not have been possible for him to even think of leaving his family 
to pursue a career as a painter. So the fact that Gauguin has the option is 
something good on Williams’ account. On the other hand, of course, the fact that 
Gauguin has to make the choice to leave his family in order to paint is a bad 
thing. It shows that there is something incompatible in fulfilling one’s ground 
project and living with one’s family, surely another ground project.  
The double nature of the fact of moral luck, the contingently determined 
position we have in our society, suggests that something ought to be done to 
minimize the power of moral luck to determine our happiness. A historical 
account of the development of reason and reason-giving, that is, what reasons 
are available for us to act on, is needed in order to engage more fully with this 
question. I will argue in the next chapter that Hegel delivers such an account.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
HEGEL AND REFLECTION 
 
I concluded the last chapter by arguing that Korsgaard’s theory of 
intersubjectivity was insufficient to deal with Williams’ critique of morality 
because, at bottom, Korsgaard can only show that intersubjectivity is possible but 
not that it is necessary. This, I argued, was because Korsgaard’s conception of 
personal integrity was insufficiently developed. It is just not clear what integrity of 
the self is supposed to mean other than the elimination of conflict. I do, however, 
think that Korsgaard’s notion of the constitutive standards of action provides a 
way of getting deeper into the problem of what constitutes integrity, not only on 
the personal level but on the social or intersubjective level as well.  
I thus argued that the constitutive standards of action provide a theory of 
the intersubjectivity of reason. The fact that actions have standards which are in 
some sense not determined by the actor means that they are socially or 
intersubjectively constituted. This means that desires can be realized or 
reflectively endorsed in certain, socially constituted, ways. The desire to build a 
house is realized differently today than it was realized 200 years ago. Less 
obviously, though more importantly, we might also say that the way a family is 
structured has also changed. And we can (almost) only structure our family in 
ways that are currently available to us. This means that reasons for action are 
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intersubjectively constituted and in turn structure the agents who act on them as 
intersubjectively committed. “There’s nothing you can do that can’t be done”, as 
the famous Beatles’ line has it.178  
But the idea of intersubjectivity is not the only operative notion in the 
theory of reason giving developed by Korsgaard. As we saw, the point is also to 
give us some idea of how to improve our ability both to develop a more adequate 
set of ways of realizing our desires and a more adequate way of adjudicating 
between the different means to pursue our happiness both as individuals and as 
members of society. Such decision making depends on the set of issues which 
we must decide about. Korsgaard’s response to Williams is thus that he insists 
on the unchanging nature of individual commitments and thus allows no room for 
the modulation of preference or desire either historically/politically or 
personally.179  
A central thesis of the dissertation is that any account of ethical decision 
making must include a story about historical development and a story about how 
to evaluate this historical development in terms of individual reflection. Justice is 
the question of how to overcome the sort of impasse faced by Williams’ strong 
individualism and by Hegel’s man of conscience. The question of justice thus 
demands that the idea of reflective endorsement in the individual be expanded to 
include a social theory. Understanding the question of justice is thus a matter of 
                                            
178 The Beatles. “All you need is love”. Magical Mystery Tour. 1966.  
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understanding how we can have truly intersubjective reflection and this, in turn, is 
a question of seeing how the reasons on which we act are socially mediated.  
In this chapter I would like to pursue the problem of the individual’s place 
within this intersubjective realm. That means seeing to what extent the 
perspective of the individual itself can be accounted for within a theory of 
intersubjectivity. I will argue that conceiving of the process of reflection in the 
terms outlined in Korsgaard is the right beginning of such a theory but that it must 
be revised to include a theory of history. History, I will argue, is the perspective 
which seeks to account for those who have been marginalized by the deliberative 
social process and hence who form the impetus for a better theory and practice. 
This is the question of justice.  
After this, I will turn to Robert Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s theoretical 
philosophy, which I believe covers much the same ground as Korsgaard’s theory 
of intersubjectivity. This will, I hope, both expand on and corroborate Korsgaard’s 
interpretation of Kant’s theory of reflection. I will argue, however, that Pippin’s 
reading of Hegel shows that the question of intersubjectivity necessarily leads us 
to a theory of history. This is so because, in Hegel, intersubjectivity is conceived 
of as an achievement rather than a mere possibility. Pippin’s interpretation of 
Hegel is, however, limited by too much emphasis on the transcendental 
                                                                                                                                  
179 It should be noted, again, that Williams is much more open to the possibility of historical or 
political change than he is to personal change. Though, if personal change is so difficult, it is also 
doubtful that historical change can occur.  
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character of the development of thought and thus loses touch with the 
perspective of the subject who does not fit into the dominant conceptual scheme.  
(In the next chapter I will give an alternate reading of Hegel based on the 
master-slave dialectic in order to show how deeply Hegel is concerned with the 
perspective of the injustice of dominant social norms. This reading will introduce 
Terry Pinkard’s categorial theory, which puts the subject back into the struggle of 
history and justice.)  
 
The Problem of Justice 
The question this chapter seeks to answer is that of how a more detailed 
or determinate account of the process of reason-giving can be given. The 
ultimate aim of such an account is to provide a way of answering the pressing 
question of injustice, a question that I have been pursuing in the form of Williams’ 
objection to the morality system embodied both by the Kantian position and by 
utilitarianism. In order to see how far Hegel can get us with such an account, I 
would like to say a little about what we might be looking for in such an account. 
The beginning of an answer is given by Pippin in a paper criticizing Robert 
Brandom’s appropriation of Hegel for being insufficiently attentive to the 
difference between subjugation and fully developed, that is, just, social 
interaction. Brandom’s holism, as it is portrayed by Pippin, bears some 
resemblance to Korsgaard’s theory of intersubjectivity in that it too develops a 
type of social autonomy of communal deliberation.  
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Pippin summarizes Brandom’s inferential holism as claiming that “what 
commitments you undertake are up to you but the content of those commitments, 
just what you are committing yourself to by committing yourself to claim P, is not; 
that is ‘administered’ by others. (‘I commit myself, but then they hold me to it’).”180 
In Korsgaard’s terms, we could render this argument by saying that if I allow you 
to enter into my process of reflection, I must take your reasons as normative 
constraints on me. This account, Pippin argues, is not so much wrong as 
incomplete, since it does not seem to distinguish between the normativity of the 
real historical institutions we are being held to and the normative development 
that comes from contesting those historical institutions. For Pippin, this means 
that Hegel’s project is tied up with the claim of being able to make sense of the 
actual continuities and crises of history during any attempt to create (just) 
institutions. This means that Hegel wants his account to say something about the 
justice of any challenges to power. Brandom’s view cannot do this since it cannot 
say anything beyond that there appears to be controversy in people’s reason-
giving practices. Brandom remains a historical sociologist as opposed to a critical 
theorist of morality.181  
Hegel, Pippin contends, agrees with Brandom in the sense that meaning 
is a matter of use, but disagrees with Brandom about what we can therefore say 
about meaning. For Pippin, Hegel wants to be able to say why certain 
articulations of norms failed, something Brandom does not appear to be 
                                            
180 Pippin. “Brandom’s Hegel”. European Journal of Philosophy. 13:3 (2005) : 381-408. 391.  
181 Pippin. “Brandom’s Hegel”. 392.  
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interested in. I think there is a similar lack of interest in the historical structure of 
the constitutive standards of actions in Korsgaard’s work. For Pippin’s Hegel, the 
way the Greek notion of citizenship failed tells us something about what 
citizenship and authority actually is.  
This distinction between the historical normative approach and the 
inferentialist approach comes down to being able to see history itself as a critical 
and normative process. History, for Pippin’s Hegel, is thus both a slaughter 
bench and a source of meaning. Brandom’s account of interacting individuals, 
Pippin writes, “will not even allow the problem that bothered Hegel his entire 
career to arise: that problem of ‘positivity’, subjection by others, according to 
appropriate, public practices, to a status of ‘undertaken commitments’ not 
recognized as such by the individual.”182  
Pippin concludes:  
The whole ball game in Hegel comes down to the question of 
whether he has in fact discovered a historical, developmental way 
of making the case that this distinction [between subjugation and a 
form of life in which the freedom of one depends on the freedom of 
all] can be made (without any form of moral realism or Kantian 
‘moral law’ universalism), of saying what institutional form of life 
actually achieves these desiderata, and his being able to show that 
it is the unfinished and still unfolding achievement of modernity to 
have begun to do all this.183 
 
I will argue below that on Pippin’s own account, Hegel does not succeed 
in this project because he is unable to give an account of the rationality of 
historical categories. And absent such an account, as Pippin readily 
                                            
182 Pippin. “Brandom’s Hegel”. 395.  
183 Pippin. “Brandom’s Hegel”. 397.  
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acknowledges, Brandom’s inferential holism has much to recommend it.184 But 
the more general point to be taken away from Pippin’s critique of Brandom, 
however, is that a theory of normativity must be able to say something about 
what it is like to be an agent within the normative system. It must be able to 
articulate the subjectivity of the agent involved in deliberating with others. Absent 
such an account, we will not be able to say much about how the system is to be 
improved. This is the point pressed by Williams: how is it that we must continue 
our allegiance to a morality system which continues to subjugate the desires of 
individuals to the desires of ‘all’ (where ‘all’ remains vague)? The question of 
subjectivity is thus also a political question.  
But the question of subjugation raised by Pippin also reveals something 
about the historical process linked to the notion of justice. Subjugation, passivity 
in the face of the power of others, is only the flip side of agency and freedom. So 
by focusing on the question of what it looks like for the agent to be within the 
social system, Pippin also reminds us that the social system is not some 
monolithic mechanism of repression (as Williams sometimes portrays it) but the 
interplay of agency and passivity. History itself is then the story of how the 
disenfranchised try to arrange things in a better way. The question of justice is 
then whether the agency of each of the individuals involved does something to 
further the satisfaction of each of the other individuals involved in the society in a 
                                            
184 And, we might add, to take up the question of overcoming metaphysics once again, absent 
the speculative grounding of normativity, Brandom’s view of ‘score keeping’ does not really differ 
much from Rawls’ coherentism.  
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non-arbitrary way. That is, to what extent does the satisfaction of one person’s 
needs involve others.  
The possibility of what we might call collective agency, undeveloped as it 
is, reminds us that society is made up of the interaction of individuals who have 
spontaneous desires rather than agents who act out pre-given or pre-assigned 
roles. The role of a historical normative theory must thus seek to make sense of 
the ways in which people continue to break out of pre-assigned roles. Agency, as 
both Kant and Hegel insist, must be conceived of as radically free. This is 
because it originates not in the social world against which our struggles 
sometimes appear as futile, but in consciousness itself. The freedom given by 
our capacity to reflect is the origin of the historical determination of norms and 
also its limit. In seeking a theory of justice, we would do well to avoid both horns 
of the dilemma: underdescribing what it is like to be an agent and overdescribing 
the set of norms developed by consciousness by making the norms too 
determinate. For in order to be binding on us, normativity must be both freely 
endorsed and also binding. But the individual is the only one who can determine 
the norm’s force. The question for Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel thus becomes: 
how are concrete social relations possible and rationally justifiable? In order to 
see whether concrete social relations can be rationally evaluated, we must 
examine what, in Pippin’s interpretations at least, Hegel takes to be the rational 
conditions of thought. This will take us further into Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy.  
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Hegelʼs Appropriation of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
In what follows, I present Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of 
reflection. I believe this will help us see several points: the first point is that 
Korsgaard’s theory of reflective endorsement is in many fundamental respects 
quite similar to Hegel’s, since both originate in Kant’s theory of apperception. 
Pippin’s account of Hegel can thus be seen as an expansion on Korsgaard’s 
view of self-consciousness, a part of her theory which she does not spend much 
time on. The second point I would like to make is that there are general 
argumentative similarities between Korsgaard, Rawls and Hegel. All three, I 
think, argue that there is only one principle of action, the categorical imperative 
(for Korsgaard and Rawls) and the idea of the self-development and recognition 
(in Hegel). Presenting the Hegelian theory here will allow us to see that by 
arguing that the hypothetical imperative is fundamentally subordinated to the 
categorical imperative, Korsgaard shows that all actions are normative, and more 
importantly that there can be no stable distinction between the ‘moral’ and the 
‘non-moral’. Pippin’s discussion of the development of self-consciousness in 
Hegel will show that for Hegel too, what might be called instrumental reasoning 
with regard to objects (or epistemology in general) is really subordinate to the 
development and interaction between agents. If there is something like a 
categorical imperative in Hegel, it is the imperative to develop an ever more 
adequate way of interacting between agents.  
Lastly, I will link Hegel’s imperative to justice and will end this chapter with 
a criticism of Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Pippin, I will 
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argue, does not conceive sociality in sufficiently dialectical terms and so reifies 
the notion of justice which he formulated in discussion with Brandom.  
 
Reflection 
Let us now turn to Hegel’s theory of reflection and its origins in Kant. For 
Pippin, the origin of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, and thus the key to 
understanding how Hegel sought to overcome what he perceived as Kant’s 
metaphysical baggage, lies in Kant’s deep insight into the role that 
consciousness plays in developing our conceptual schema. Pippin argues that 
Hegel’s indebtedness to Kant is far greater than Hegel ever admitted and might 
be put as follows:  
Keep the doctrine of pure concepts and the account of apperception that helps 
justify the necessary presupposition of pure concepts, keep the critical problem 
of a proof for the objectivity of these concepts, the question that began critical 
philosophy, but abandon the doctrine of "pure sensible intuition," and the very 
possibility of a clear distinction between concept and intuition, and what is left is 
much of Hegel's enterprise.185  
For Kant, in making a judgment I must be able to recognize myself as the 
one making the judgment, for otherwise it would not be me making the judgment. 
As Pippin puts it, being in a subjective state, even a merely momentary 
subjective state, does not count as having an experience of and so being aware 
                                            
185 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 9.  
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of that state unless I apply a certain determinate concept and judge that I am in 
such a state, something I must do and be able to know that I am doing.186 
Awareness of my judgment is not something I happen to have but the condition 
of the judgment being mine. This means that the judgment is reflective.187  
This reflective judgment means for Kant that the ‘I’ of apperception must 
supply a form for the judgment, and since only certain forms are available to us, 
only certain types of judgments can be made. These are the categories of the 
understanding. But this Kantian claim raised the following problem: How should 
one understand the claim that ‘intuitions must conform to the categories for 
experience to be possible’? Does this claim amount to a demonstration of the 
objective reality of pure concepts (as Kant thought) or does such a claim amount 
to the assertion that we can know a priori that intuitions conform to categories 
because there is no real independent ‘givenness’ in experience, and thus that an 
‘identity’ between concepts and intuitions has been established, that ‘thought’ 
has successfully determined its ‘other’?188  
The use of Kant’s apperception thesis is supposed to avoid the realist 
challenge according to which, even if our best criteria for ‘knowledge of X’ are 
fulfilled, we still have no way of knowing whether such fulfillment does tell us 
                                            
186 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 19.  
187 See also Pippin’s working out of this problem with regard to Kant’s Critique of Judgment. 
“Avoiding German Idealism: Kant, Hegel, and the Reflective Judgment Problem”. In Idealism as 
Modernism. pp 129-156.  
188 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 30.  
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anything about X. Realism is supposed to be undercut by claiming that the only 
possible knowledge we can have stems from our subjectivity.189  
Without examining the details of this view, we can see that Hegel’s 
reinterpretation of the Kantian apperception thesis sets the stage for a more 
ambitious theory of ‘what there is’. By rejecting the notion that there is a 
distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, and therefore rejecting the idea 
that there is something beyond the reach of reason, Hegel is poised to construct 
a theory of reason which develops itself purely out of itself and must therefore 
justify itself purely on its own terms.  
According to Pippin, Hegel is thus committed to a theory about the priority 
of pure concepts in human experience. Hegel argues that the Notion (Begriff) 
determines the possibility and character of human experience and that, since 
there is no contrast between our conceptual framework and the world itself, the 
Notion does not limit us.  
Pippin’s argument about Hegel thus also suggests that Hegel is trying to 
overcome the skepticism which was implicit in Kant’s (and Fichte’s) position.190 
By moving now to the Phenomenology, we can see that the issue that must be 
overcome will be the skeptical challenge according to which there might be a gap 
between self-certainty and truth. In answering the skeptic, Hegel turns the table 
in a radical manner by arguing that skepticism arises in a determinate or 
concrete way only as a result of the truth of the Notion itself. Pippin writes:  
                                            
189 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 39.  
190 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 91.  
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[Hegel] will try to show, determinately, why, given some putative 
Notional determination of objects, doubts about whether objects 
must or even can be so Notionally specified, are the relevant, 
determinate doubts they are, only as a consequence of that 
Notion's own incompleteness. This in turn means, for Hegel 
(summarizing everything at once), that such an "opposition" 
between "subject" and "object" is itself a "determination of the 
Notion," and so such an incompleteness can itself be made out only 
on the assumption of a developing Notion of objectivity.191 
 
According to this programmatic claim, the first three chapters of the 
Phenomenology can be seen as a step by step refutation of different sorts of 
skepticism about the empirical world, concluding that consciousness is indeed 
capable of understanding the world as it is. However, even if the apperception 
thesis can refute skepticism about knowledge of the external world, this still does 
not tell us how the world actually is organized. Much will depend on whether 
Hegel can show us how we do understand the world. In rough terms, Pippin 
thinks that Hegel’s development of notional adequacy vis-à-vis the world is 
underwritten by a dialectical theory according to which state B is the resolution of 
state A’s difficulties until a better candidate comes along.192 Much will depend on 
how the apperception thesis is turned into a thesis about conceptual 
determination and hence into a theory about how the structures of the world 
make possible our interactions with each other. This is the question of 
recognition. The point which I would like to insist on is that the critique of 
metaphysics presented in the first three chapters of the Phenomenology is in the 
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192 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 108.  
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service of a theory about how people can interact with each other and what 
mediates peoples’ interaction with each other.  
 
Self-consciousness and the Apperception Thesis 
For Pippin, Hegel’s path toward a theory of recognition or concrete social 
determination begins in the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology. The chapter 
starts with the idea that, given the apperception thesis, the subject must be 
conscious of the fact that it is differentiating objects when it does so.  
[Kant and Hegel both assume] that the results of any natural or causal relation 
between an object and a sensory episode in me could not count as my 
representing the object unless I take myself to be representing that object, unless 
the object is "for me" the object of my representing activity, and this self-
conscious activity requires an account of its conditions.193 
The apperception thesis, however, at least in its Kantian version, suggests 
that there is a difference between the spontaneous work of the understanding 
and the receptivity of the world outside the subject. And it is this thesis that Hegel 
must now make his own by arguing that the subject does not meet objectivity 
when it gazes outside of itself, but rather its own subjectivity. That is, instead of 
the Kantian account of the limits of knowledge, Hegel develops an account of 
how, as Pippin puts it, “we ought to be satisfied that the ways in which the world 
                                            
193 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 132.  
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and others are taken up and assessed are well grounded or ‘absolute’”.194 In 
Hegel’s Idealism, Pippin characterizes this movement as leaving behind the 
deduction of the categories of the understanding in the first three chapters of the 
Phenomenology and embarking on a full blown anti-realist pragmatism in which 
“Hegel appears to be saying that the problem of objectivity, of what we are willing 
to count as an objective claim in the first place, is the problem of the satisfaction 
of desire, that the ‘truth’ is wholly relativized to pragmatic ends.”195 Hegel is thus 
claiming that knowledge is a function of human interest. What is at stake in the 
rest of the Phenomenology, then, is a historical development of some form of 
‘practice’ which gives us institutions which reflect our like-mindedness. Human 
interest, in other words, is social interest. This claim involves considering what 
Hegel means by ‘mutual recognition’ and how it is related to Hegel’s claims about 
the adequacy of human conceptuality or absolute knowledge.  
The move from the deduction of the forms of our understanding to the 
development of the forms of human ‘life’ in general to the forms, in other words, 
of human reason, requires a transition from the paradigm of self related to world, 
to self related to self or, as Hegel has it, from consciousness to self-
consciousness. The move from consciousness to self-consciousness is also the 
move from the ‘I’ to the ‘we’ and is thus the beginning of intersubjectivity.196 Since 
                                            
194 Pippin. “You Can’t Get There from Here: Transition Problems in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit”. 61.  
195 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 148.  
196 Though Pippin does considerable work to show that this transition is not quite as stark as it 
has appeared to some commentators, it should also be noted that this move is really enormous in 
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Hegel has already repeatedly denied that objects affect us immediately in the 
form of some sort of ‘given’ and claimed that our interaction with the world is 
structured by the concepts we employ to make sense of it, it now appears that in 
attending to the world we are actually attending to our own mode of perceiving 
the world in perceiving it. That is to say, in comporting ourselves in the world, our 
comportment becomes an issue for us (to sound a little Heideggerian).  
Given this ‘epistemological’ sounding claim, we must do some work in 
order to account for the seemingly sudden introduction of the language of desire 
at the beginning of chapter four of the Phenomenology. Pippin makes the 
transition using the concepts of dependence and independence. What might help 
us here is to see that in developing an account of human interaction, Hegel is 
aided by a point already implicit in the apperception thesis: that normativity is 
pervasive rather than something attained at a particular level of social interaction, 
such as morality. Self-consciousness presents us with the paradigm of autonomy 
and hence of normativity. In reflective endorsement we commit ourselves to 
beliefs and to actions in the same way. Independence and dependence on other 
people are thus the paradigm concepts of autonomy itself.  
A living subject might be relatively independent of the natural world by 
being in a ‘negative’ relation to it, that is, by overcoming obstacles and 
consuming parts of the world, but this means it is also dependent on the world 
                                                                                                                                  
terms of the history of philosophy. Hegel here appears to undercut the idea that there is an 
ontological distinction between apperception of a subject and apperception of an object. The 
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because something other than the subject’s own ‘self-consciousness’ is its 
essence. In order to understand what it means to be ‘self-conscious’, we will 
have to render determinate our desires and see to what extent they are indeed 
related to our relation to ourselves.  
Hegel’s claim here is that relations to objects do not satisfy us because 
they do not establish any sort of permanent relation with us. Something like self-
constraint or self-relation only occurs when the subject takes objects to be 
objects of its desire and thus worth pursuing. But for this to be the case, the 
object must be permanent. And, Hegel adds, a desire is only a desire for the 
subject in a self-conscious way when there are two desiring agents whose 
desires clash.197 This means that it is only possible to conceptualize the self as a 
self via another self—only the other self can give sufficient resistance to become 
the object of a steady relation.  
We might also understand the other’s resistance to the subject as 
providing the first subject with a more determinate category for understanding the 
world. In this sense, the appearance of the other is actually the appearance of a 
new category of understanding. Such categorial self-understanding has a 
historical horizon which constitutes sociality itself. It is no accident that the 
moment of history appears along side the moment of subjugation but also 
alongside possible equality or recognition. For it is the struggle for the promised 
                                                                                                                                  
speculative point in the apperception thesis is thus to show that inanimate objects and human 
beings exist on a continuum of categorial development.   
197 Pippin. Hegel’s Idealism. 151-52.  
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equality, which the subject recognizes but then rejects in the other, that is the 
stuff of history. The point is that dependence does not have to mean subjugation 
but can also be understood as equality, as interdependence.  
 
The Master-Slave Dialectic 
Pippin contends that rather than providing a social ontology or 
anthropology in the famed master-slave dialectic, Hegel is proposing a way of 
understanding the relation of self to self in terms of an elaboration of the 
apperception thesis. In the social realm, the apperception thesis turns into the 
autonomy thesis discussed in previous chapters.198 The problem with the 
independence of the subject from the natural world is that it was indeterminate. 
The world yielded too readily to the appetites of the subject and so could not 
furnish any sort of self-understanding. This is the same point made earlier about 
the private language practitioner. No one was there to hold her to the rules that 
she claimed to adhere to. The problem is that of solipsism. To fight solipsism we 
need an object that can and wants to assert its independence against the 
subject. Hegel conceives of this encounter between subjects as a state of war, 
because they share no common ground. Each desires merely its own self-
relation, that is, its independence. Independence gains its value from the specter 
                                            
198 Since Hegel’s argument does not depend on any sort of proof or deduction, but rather on the 
speculative and historical thesis that reason develops out of itself, we cannot make any distinction 
here between the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’ autonomy thesis. Indeed, Hegel’s developmental 
strategy must be seen as a response to the inability of a Kantian deduction of reason.  
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of dependence which has just arisen; there is now someone who might be able 
to hold the agent to her own standards. But since both desire the same thing, 
desire is mediated and turned into knowledge. Pippin writes:  
Knowledge of objects is conditioned by forms of self-
consciousness, and forms of such self-consciousness are to be 
understood as the product of opposed self-consciousnesses 
attempting to resolve such opposition, ultimately in ‘thought’. 
‘Recognition’ is Hegel's name for the achievement of such 
collective subjectivity.199  
 
There is, of course, a paradox in this struggle for collective subjectivity. 
Though it is ultimately supposed to issue in social recognition, the struggle 
initially ends in the radical subjugation of the slave by the master. Knowledge as 
social justice has not been achieved. Hegel finds the true self-understanding, 
resulting from the struggle to the death, in the notion of work. For in working, the 
slave recognizes that there is no independence to human activity and that human 
activity is always bound by contingency and death. But this, in turn, means that 
any sense that can be made of one’s life arises wholly as a result of and within 
the self-defined experience of the collective activity of labor. It is by laboring, 
transforming the world in the service of the Master— a labor that requires a 
determinate understanding of nature, and of knowledge itself— that truly 
independent and so self-determining self-consciousness arises.200 Dialectically, 
this means that the master’s independence from the material world is not true 
freedom at all. True freedom, Hegel argues, exists only in the adequate 
mediation of self-posited freedom, which includes accepting social parameters. 
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True freedom, in other words, is when we have concrete categories through 
which to interpret the world and ourselves.  
The prospect of determinate categories of concrete social relations raised 
here by Pippin is, as we shall see, controversial. This interpretation of Hegel 
goes back to Pippin’s earlier claim that the answer to the struggle between the 
two individuals resulting in the master and slave positions is ultimately provided 
by thought itself, and more specifically in Hegel’s Logic. Let me put the worry 
about this point thus: If the struggle for recognition can indeed be carried out in 
thought, then it appears that only thought will determine the adequacy of each 
successive step toward recognition. But, as we have repeatedly noted, the 
perspective of the combatants, be they Gauguin and his family or the master and 
the slave, is also determined by contingency, the structures of desire that the 
individual just happens to have. So, the potential problem with developing a 
theory of recognition out of thought alone is that it will not be able to take into 
consideration the perspective of the agents involved in history itself and will thus 
only be able to form an abstract notion of justice rather than the more concrete 
one called for by injustice.  
 
Self-Positing Thought and Contingency 
H. S. Harris, commenting on this chapter in Pippin, has added an 
interesting interpretation. Harris argues that Pippin has shown the necessary 
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dual nature of freedom by contrasting the life of the master and the life of the 
slave as he does. Chapter four of the Phenomenology is so central to Hegel’s 
general argument because it attempts to resolve a tension in the argument that 
has existed within the Kantian version of the apperception thesis, namely that 
there is a decisive difference between self-consciousness and self-reflection. 
While the former is the awareness of oneself as judging, the latter is what issues 
from the judgment itself, a judgment about objects.  
The master-slave dialectic illustrates both the difference between these 
two and the fact that both are necessary in order to understand Hegel’s notion of 
freedom. On Harris’ analysis, the problem with desire is that I don’t even know 
what I desire until I have desired it in struggling for it. This means that Hegel (and 
Pippin) are right to conceptualize the attainment of self-consciousness in the 
struggle to the death. Self-consciousness is blind desire, it wants only its own 
self-assertion, it thus posits pure freedom. Reflective freedom, coming 
afterwards, chooses a relation among objects. This further fleshes out the 
requirement that the apperception thesis yield concrete categories through which 
to live our lives.  
Harris’ point is that we must understand both types of freedom if we are to 
understand what Hegel means by self-determination:  
'Self-consciousness' is a spiritual relation. At the minimum (in that 
very boundary situation that reveals its logical primacy) self-
conscious freedom involves a double consciousness: the one that 
is 'self-consciously' aware of freedom, and the one that is 
'consciously' (or 'reflectively') aware of it. Both consciousnesses are 
'free'— but one of them has asserted freedom, while the other has 
freely accepted the 'lordship' of death. Kant and Fichte have one 
half of the truth about the self-positing of Reason, Hobbes has the 
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other. Neither side can successfully explicate the actual rationality 
of experience. The choice— to live or to die— is radically free . 
Neither choice (by itself) is 'rational’. The existence of 'Reason' 
requires that both choices should be made together. A singular self 
cannot 'posit itself freely'.201 
 
The experience of choice and the paradigmatic result of the master-slave 
dialectic might thus be formulated as “In choosing freely I must accept as mine 
what results from my choice.” Harris’ point shows that even in formulating his 
anti-realist pragmatics, Hegel has not given up on the idea of contingency or a 
certain type of ‘receptivity’ and ‘spontaneity’. The active and passive have simply 
moved to the social level. Harris fleshes out this thought out by giving the 
example of the soldier going off to war. While the soldier’s mother is quite 
reasonably expected to hope that her son doesn’t die, he is not supposed to wish 
that. Or rather, though it is reasonable for the son not to wish to die, it is his 
willingness to die which makes him truly rational. The social dimension of this 
division can be seen in the fact that different reactions to the event of going to 
war are now distributed among different people. The only thing that can make 
sense of wanting to go to war and being prepared to die is that part of the 
soldier’s self resides outside of him, in his mother, say.  
Pippin’s own gloss on the importance of the separation of the 
apperception thesis into Kantian self-consciousness and more mediated self-
reflection is to argue that Kant left the subject ‘homeless’, undirected and 
alienated.202 The task of the Phenomenology and indeed of the rest of Hegel’s 
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system is to understand how the subject can retain its pure freedom within the 
contingency of the material world, that is, remain radically free in thought even 
though his body is shackled.  
The idea that there could be two moments involved in the development of 
freedom might, however, cast some doubt on the project of developing a 
determinate scheme for conceptual development, since it presupposes that part 
of the work of freedom is accepting contingency. If the contingent is really 
radically contingent, as it must be, then we are always dealing with different ways 
in which history must be made free. A theory of freedom which insists only on the 
first sort of freedom, self-positing, is in danger of missing this important point.  
At this point, Pippin’s argument in Hegel’s Idealism turns to the Logic, and 
we cannot follow it here. Let us note, however, that by turning to the Logic, Pippin 
implies that the Logic works out the conceptual schema of the individual self-
consciousness. This implication seems to be at odds with Pippin’s interpretation 
of Hegel’s claim that the Logic develops a determinate structure of thought 
uncoupled from individual subjectivity.  
 
Linking Hegelʼs Speculative and Practical Philosophy 
Given the objection to the idea of developing a social theory through 
thought alone, the question for Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel is whether he can 
indeed link his compelling speculative thesis about apperception to a robust 
thesis about autonomy and justice. The success of this task will depend on 
whether Pippin’s Hegel can give a strong account of the necessity of those social 
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institutions which are ultimately supposed to mediate our intersubjective 
relations. Such a theory will not only have to argue for the necessity of those 
institutions but will also have to show how these institutions provide the 
normative foundation for our actual social life. Pippin will thus have to provide us 
with a set of criteria enabling us to accept some particular instantiations of the 
state and reject others. The general question, then, is whether Pippin’s Hegel 
can translate the apperception thesis into a theory of autonomy or freedom which 
can both help us be satisfied with the life we do live and also demand change 
where our current form of life is inadequate. Kant, in Hegel’s critique at least, 
could not help us with this problem because the principle of pure practical reason 
Kant developed was inadequate to mediate between subject and world. We thus 
have to look for a very deep notion of reason and justification in Hegel.  
Pippin claims that the proof is in the pudding, that is, that Hegel’s social 
theory must justify itself by providing a lucid analysis of modern structures of 
authority. Pippin himself provides no philosophical link between the speculative 
part of Hegel’s philosophy and the analysis of social structures.203  
Pippin interprets Hegel’s social theory using the metaphor of a self-
grounding. I call this a metaphor because Pippin never explains this grounding in 
his writings on Hegel’s practical philosophy. This suggests to me that Pippin 
actually finds very little in Hegel’s practical philosophy which displays sufficient 
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internal rationality to ground itself.204 And this, in turn, suggests that Pippin sees 
serious problems for Hegel’s practical philosophy if it is to provide more than just 
another model of sociality, like A Theory of Justice. The language of self-
becoming does help Pippin distinguish Hegel’s view from a number of other 
views. Hegel’s practical philosophy, therefore, is not a form of communicative 
action, as Axel Honneth contends.205   
The repeated insistence on ‘becoming’ or ‘self-actualization’ has led 
Richard Rorty to complain that Pippin’s account serves only to celebrate 
autonomy rather than to explain it. Rorty claims that to say humans have become 
free in modern society, absent some sort of causal explanation, is like saying of 
an author ‘this is the book you were born to write’. Such Aristotelian potency-act 
distinctions, Rorty writes, now merely strike us as celebratory and at worst as 
                                            
204 Pippin gestures to the family as a possible way of developing a self-grounded social structure. 
“In the simplest terms, everyone has parents, can reproduce the conditions of their existence only 
cooperatively, and are invariably subject to, or the subjects of, decisions about the common good 
or the exercise of some sort of political power. We are not simply one agent among many, or all 
alike in being agents who can act on reasons. We are, but even in being able to recognize and 
act on such considerations, we require others, such that the socially formative and educational 
institutions which make possible such recognition and its realization are effective.” Pippin. “Hegel 
on the Rationality of Ethical Life”. 123.  
205 This is so because communicative action already assumes the existence of rights whichare 
not fully realized, however,  until the rational state is. “Hegel and Institutional Rationality”. 10-11. 
Nor is it Aristotelian or Kantian. The account is not Aristotelian because it does not presuppose 
any substantive notion of the good, though Hegel’s account is, in some sense teleological. “Hegel 
on the Rationality and Priority of Ethical Life”. 121-22. Hegel’s is not a Kantian account in the 
sense that it breaks with Kant’s individuated ontology of the subject.  
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merely verbal.206 Given the seriousness and philosophical rigor with which Pippin 
has pursued Hegel’s thought, Rorty’s characterization seems rather reductionist 
of Pippin’s project, but it does strike at something. I would like to propose that we 
understand Pippin’s reluctance to concretely articulate the rational principles 
behind Hegel’s notion of ethical life as having to do with Pippin’s final judgment 
on Hegel’s speculative project itself.  
 
The Transcendental Thesis and Hegelʼs Failure 
Pippin cannot flesh out what the theory of institutions concretely means 
because of what Terry Pinkard has called Pippin’s transcendental thesis: the 
idea, taken from Kant, that we need to construct categories without which we 
could have no conceptual schema at all.207 According to Pippin, these categories 
must be the product of determinate negation which means that they have to be of 
the same sort as the categories of ordinary logic. Dialectical logic, however, 
cannot accomplish this task, as Pippin points out. Indeed, the problem of Hegel’s 
dialectic is that “The ‘urge’ that Hegel speaks of for the Notion to comprehend 
itself in these [dialectical] moments is […] an urge Hegel cannot demonstrate 
even if he presupposes it throughout.” 208  
                                            
206 Richard Rorty. “Comments on Robert Pippin’s ‘Naturalness and Mindedness: Hegel’s 
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This lack of dialectical rigor means that the categories of reason which 
Hegel does develop are not truly self-grounding at all. Taken together with 
Pippin’s own reservation about the possibility of translating logical analysis into 
the language of social philosophy, this means that no satisfactory account of the 
self-grounding nature of the categories of social life can be given, and that Pippin 
must remain vague about their rationality. There is no way for Pippin to give an 
account of what it truly means for freedom to be expressed in the thesis that “In 
choosing freely I must accept as mine what results from my choice.” There is no 
way to explain the unity of the apperception thesis (the self-positing of freedom) 
with its reflection in social and historical categories according to the 
transcendental thesis.  
Hegel’s failure to live up to the transcendental thesis thus means that 
Hegel fails to give a rational account of ethical life, whatever else he might do 
that is helpful in our understanding of sociality. These latter insights Pippin has 
charted with great clarity. For Pippin, however, Hegel is ultimately unable to give 
a speculative grounding to his social philosophy in much the same way that Kant 
is unable to: Hegel is unsuccessful in showing that the categories the subject 
develops are in fact the categories which reflect the totality of actual relations in 
the world. And, lacking the certainty that our categories are right, we do fall back 
into some sort of skepticism.  
Certainly, Pippin has formulated Hegel’s project in the most demanding 
terms. Hegel is held to his avowed intention to furnish us with a complete theory 
of what there is. The requirement of determinate negation in Pippin’s Hegel 
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suggests that the theory of what there is be given for all time and thus be 
exhaustive. But the ambitiousness of Hegel’s project seems ultimately to betray 
the very thing Hegel (and Pippin) have their eyes set on, namely, a theory of 
justice. And it is to Pippin’s credit that he does not try to spin a theory of justice 
out of a metaphysical theory of the conceptual schema. To do this would not only 
be to betray the ideal of freedom, but actually to violate it.209  
 
Conclusion 
Lastly, let me formulate the problem with Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel in 
a way that will allow us to see its link to Korsgaard as well. In Pippin’s 
interpretation, Hegel is fundamentally interested in showing the objective 
structures of conceptuality. This means giving an account of sociality as it exists 
in its current and complete form. The problem is not only that such an account, 
as Pippin recognizes, is not possible, but, as Pippin does not recognize, such an 
account would be too complete to be true.210 By this I mean that if a complete 
account of intersubjectivity could be given, this would mean the exclusion of the 
perspective of those whose views are in conflict with the dominant account as 
well as the perspective of the speculative theorist herself.  
To take up the theme of the master-slave perspective, we could say that 
on both Korsgaard’s too general view about the possibility of intersubjectivity and 
on Pippin’s too determinate view, the perspective of the slave cannot come into 
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view. This means that neither view contains the necessary relation to the 
contingent world which would force it to develop an account of the concretely 
unjust relations which exist within the potentially just social world.  
What I have thus been trying to show in this chapter is that the project of 
developing a way of understanding the social world through the process of 
reflection itself is doomed to fail if it does not also include a dialectical relation to 
that which it is, at all times, trying to assess: the material. The problem with 
Pippin’s view of Hegel is thus what is also fundamentally the problem with Kant’s 
view, namely that neither Kant nor Pippin’s Hegel seem to believe that nature or 
contingency affects our freedom. In seeking to rescue our freedom from 
determinism, both represent nature as fundamentally cut off from our unfree 
historical existence.  
This is why, I want to argue, Pippin’s interpretation of sociality actually 
lacks a theory of history. History is tied to injustice just the way Pippin says, 
namely by being the story of how inadequate institutions are challenged by 
individuals and cultures who are not represented by them. But the story of these 
challenges, because they are themselves contingent, cannot be represented in 
logical thought. They require a more fluid story which takes the perspective of the 
subject within history without being able to also give it a transcendental structure.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
HEGEL, INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND HISTORY 
 
In this chapter I take up the problem of justice by developing an 
interpretation of what one might call Hegel’s moral psychology. By taking another 
look at the master-slave dialectic I would like to show why Hegel thinks that the 
problem of intersubjectivity or recognition is intimately connected to the problem 
of giving a historical account of justice.  I will argue that Hegel conceptualizes the 
path toward justice as incremental improvement both in the rationality of the 
actual choices that individuals make and in the range of choices available to 
them. What drives the dialectic is the constant dissatisfaction with the current set 
of options each individual and the culture as a whole experiences. History, in 
Hegel, is thus conceptualized just as much by the moving away from injustice as 
the progress toward justice.  
In the second half of the chapter I will turn to the work of Terry Pinkard in 
order to take up some of the questions left over from the previous chapter. I will 
pay particular attention to how Pinkard proposes to overcome the need to read 
Hegel as a transcendental philosopher. Pinkard’s category theory approach, I will 
argue, preserves the immanent characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy by insisting 
that Hegel always views the development of justice and recognition from the 
perspective of its incompleteness. The perspective of the incompleteness of 
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justice, I will argue, is the perspective of the subject trapped within a system of 
ethics which it can only partially condone and respect. This perspective makes it 
incumbent on us, as participants in history, to be open to and act to further 
revisions of the current ethical status quo.  
 
The Master-Slave Dialectic: Radical Freedom and Slavery 
I would now like to say a little more about the master-slave dialectic in 
Hegel in order to provide a way of avoiding the problem Pippin’s interpretation of 
self-consciousness faced. The main point I would like to make here is that, in the 
master-slave dialectic, Hegel develops a stronger notion than Pippin’s account 
admits of how consciousness and the material world collide and of the damage 
that this collision inflicts on individuals. The master-slave dialectic, though 
concerned with the possibility and also the need for just interaction or 
recognition, is also the place where Hegel begins to articulate the possibility of 
interaction as a historical achievement and so as the result of deliberate action 
by individuals. It is also where Hegel introduces a notion of agency which is quite 
close to Korsgaard’s. The aim of this section is thus to put the notion of injustice 
and justice in relation to a historical narrative of individual and social agency.  
Let me first say something about Hegel’s notion of equality and difference 
and then proceed on to a discussion of how the concept of labor (Arbeit) unifies 
the subject and sets it on its historical path toward justice.  
Hegel begins the master-slave section by announcing the intended result 
of this dialectic: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact 
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that, it exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged”211 By “in 
and for itself” I take Hegel to mean something akin to Korsgaard’s notion of 
having integrity, not being a divided self. Recognition is a matter of being a 
unified or integrated self among other unified or integrated selves. I think that 
Hegel would accept much of Korsgaard’s account of the necessity of thinking of 
agents in this way— as at least possibly unified with others and yet 
autonomous— so I do not think we need to go over the argument again.  
What is of concern for us is rather why Hegel thinks that an account of 
recognition must be historical. Hegel’s answer is that we need a historical 
account because it is only in the concrete interactions between agents and social 
norms that agents and social norms are even constituted at all and hence can 
even begin to build a just society. In order to understand this point, we must 
understand why Hegel thinks that justice appears on the historical scene first as 
injustice.  
Here I want to come back to a point made earlier by Harris.  Harris noted 
that the process of thought in general really has two sides. The first side is the 
radical posited nature of freedom. Harris called this self-consciousness. The 
other side is reflection, which is the endorsement of one desire over another. 
Hegel wants to elucidate the interaction between these two moments of thought 
by placing the emphasis not on the positive aspect of recognition, i.e. the idea 
                                            
211 Hegel. Phenomenology. 111. “Das Selbstbewußtsein ist an und für sich, in dem, und dadurch, 
daß es für ein anderes an und für sich ist; d. h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes.” Phänomenologie 
des Geistes. 109.  
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that recognition is in principle possible because the structure of each self-
conscious self is the same, but on the negative, on the inequality of the two self-
consciousnesses. I think that we should view these two sides of the self as being 
that of the radically free self and the other as that of the unfree because 
embodied self. Hegel, in other words, wants to see what happens to the self of 
self-consciousness when it runs up against contingency, and this is precisely 
what it does when it is thrown back onto its other.  
Coming upon its other triggers a reorientation of the self toward the 
world— a world which has hitherto not existed because nothing in the non-
human material world resisted the self on a conceptual level quite in the way the 
other does. Certainly, securing food and shelter provided certain ‘technical’ 
challenges, but these were either overcome or left behind. All activity was still in 
the fundamental service of the agent’s radical freedom, its self-consciousness or 
self-positedness. It is only with the appearance of the other (or the doubling of 
the self) that an obstacle appears which threatens the subject’s pure self-
consciousness. The subject thus takes a stand, insisting that its self-posited self-
consciousness is more important than its contingent mediation of the objects of 
the world by desire. The subject risks its life. This is because the mere existence 
of the other’s radical freedom is a threat to it.  
It is important to see that the other becomes a threat to the self by being 
quite literally there, by appearing in (for the first time) social space. Social space 
is fundamentally a limitation of the self’s ability to pursue its desires. Social space 
thus threatens and enables the self’s radical freedom. Implicit in this analysis is 
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the worry that the self might break apart, that the self’s radical freedom might be 
replaced by the other self’s radical freedom and yet that the first self’s process of 
reflection would continue to exist. This, I think, is what Hegel has in mind when 
he speaks of masters and slaves.  
What makes the slave a slave is that its ability to pursue its ‘own’ reasons 
no longer exists. The slave’s ability to have desires, its radical freedom, has been 
replaced by desires coming from the outside, from the master. The worry is, in 
other words, a worry about the possibility of some sort of radical externalism. The 
internalist position, as we saw, says that you can only act on desires which you 
yourself have. The Kantian interpretation of this was to say that you must 
reflectively endorse your desires in order to turn them into reasons which are 
normative for you. This is how you act or at least intend to act. The existential 
threat the other poses is not on the level of reflective endorsement, but rather at 
the more fundamental level of having desires in the first place. For it is radical 
freedom or self-consciousness which authorizes us to have desires which we 
must then (secondarily, on this way of putting things) endorse in order to make 
them into actions. So, the threat that the self faces in being confronted by the 
other is that its ability to authorize its own desires will be taken away from it and 
only the process of reflective endorsement will remain. The threat is thus quite 
literally that the self’s desires will not be its own, but that, through reflective 
endorsement, these desires will nonetheless be normative for the self. I suppose 
that we might call this the slave-zombie view: capable of endorsing desires, but 
not capable of producing them. This, indeed, sounds like a fate worse than 
  
 222 
death.212 However, the slave-zombie view is an absurdity and it is the work of the 
rest of the master-slave section (indeed, the rest of Hegel’s social philosophy) to 
show why this is so.  
 
The Master-Slave Dialectic: Agency and History 
Hegel writes that through the battle to the death, the unity of self-
consciousness with itself, as exemplified by its two parts, is that: “Through this 
there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not 
purely for itself but for another, i.e. is a merely immediate consciousness, of 
consciousness in the form of thinghood.”213 The thinghood to which the first 
(slave) self has been reduced is now merely a mechanism, no longer operating 
under its own freedom. It has become the zombie-slave. The master, however, 
“is the consciousness that exists for itself, but no longer merely the Notion of 
such a consciousness, i.e. through a consciousness whose nature it is to be 
                                            
212 We might also note that the pre-conflict self is not really a full self at all yet because its 
desires are not mediated by an other. It is merely the possessor of a private language, bound by 
nothing more than material nature. Such a self has no autonomy because it has no other who will 
hold it to its concepts or language. The master-slave dialectic is really about becoming a self 
capable of autonomy.  
 
213 Hegel. Phenomenology. 115. “Durch sie ein reines Selbstbewußtseyn, und ein Bewußtseyn 
gesetzt, welches nicht rein für sich, sondern für ein anderes, das heißt, als seyendes Bewußtseyn 
in der Gestalt der Dingheit ist.” Phänomenologie des Geistes. 110.  
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bound up with an existence that is independent, or thinghood in general”.214 So 
the master is now a being who exists in radical freedom, having desires but not 
actually acting on them because an other acts for him. Thus the slave has 
released the master from having to interact with the world.  
This leads to an odd sounding situation in which the master has desires 
and the slave reflectively endorses these desires. The slave is an instrument, a 
means, to the master’s ends. One might say the master and the slave together 
make up an autonomous self. But Hegel’s aim is to show the shifting balance 
between domination and enslavement. The master’s power is to have his 
desires— any desires— realized by the slave. This is the power of absolute 
freedom. The slave’s bondage is precisely that he has to make the master’s 
desire real. But in being so bound, the slave is already experiencing his own 
autonomy: acting on a freedom that both is and is not his. By obeying the master, 
the slave is free in the sense that he chooses to follow the master’s orders rather 
than die. This is the first step in the movement away from the immediate radical 
conception of freedom toward the mediated, intersubjective conception of 
freedom Hegel ultimately wants. It is, to be sure, a rather casuistic point, one that 
philosophy can only make once things have improved and there is more freedom 
all around.  
                                            
214 Hegel. Phenomenology. 115. “ist das für sich seyende Bewußtseyn, aber nicht mehr nur der 
Begriff desselben, sondern für sich seyendes Bewußtseyn, welches durch ein anderes 
Bewußtseyn mit sich vermittelt [ist].” Phänomenologie des Geistes. 110.  
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Let us turn to the master. The master, Hegel says, dominates the slave 
because he was prepared to sacrifice himself completely in order to preserve his 
radical freedom or his self-consciousness, as I have been calling it. He was 
prepared to sacrifice the very possibility of reflectively endorsing desires, of 
interacting with the world in concrete terms, in order to maintain his radical 
freedom. When he finally has the slave under his power, it appears that he has 
gained absolute power over the world, because he now has someone under his 
power who will mediate the world for him. All the master has to do is desire— the 
slave will do his bidding. Hegel writes that the master enjoys his desires “purely”, 
because he does not have to work to enjoy his desires and the material world 
thus does not limit him. His desires alone are reasons for the slave to act on the 
master’s behalf. “What the slave does is really the action of the master.”215 The 
master is pure will but no action.  
The master’s will is pure domination and absolute control. But because 
nothing resists it, it cannot ‘dominate’ anything either. Power, for Hegel, exists in 
its exercise. Radical or posited freedom is worth nothing without being reflected 
in action. (This explains why, once the slave realizes that all the power of labor 
rests really in him, he can just pick up and walk off. The purity of the domination 
of the slave by the master is that it exists only in the slave’s mind.)  
 
                                            
215 Hegel. Phenomenology. 116. “Was der Knecht tut, ist eigentlich Thun des Herr.” 
Phänomenologie des Geistes. 113.  
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Let us now turn to the slave. I earlier characterized the slave’s will as not 
his own and thus as purely a means to the master’s ends. But I also suggested 
that this slave-zombie view is an impossibility. It is now time to see why Hegel 
thinks that it is impossible for the slave to be merely (purely) an instrument of the 
master. This point will also move us from the idea of the preeminence of self-
posited freedom to the idea that freedom lies in reflected action.  
The transformative event in the slave’s life, what makes him a slave, is, 
according to Hegel, the “pure universal movement, the absolute melting-away of 
everything stable, […] the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, 
absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which consequently is implicit in this 
consciousness.”216 This absolute dissolution of the subject’s pure or radical 
freedom, I would like to argue, is what makes the subject intersubjective because 
it reveals radical freedom to be for-itself, subjective rather than just 
consciousness in general. Radical freedom, I take Hegel to be saying, has a 
purpose, and this purpose is to become an an und für sich rather than merely a 
für sich. This moment of pure being for self, Hegel continues, “is also explicit for 
the bondsman, for in the master it exists for him as his object. Furthermore, his 
consciousness is not this dissolution of everything stable merely in principle, in 
                                            
216 Hegel. Phenomenology. 117. “Diese reine allgemeine Bewegung, das absolute flüssigwerden 
alles Bestehens” which is “das einfache Wesen des Selbstbewußtseyns, die alsolute Negativität, 
das reine Fürsichseyn, das hiemit an diesem Bewußtseyn ist.” Phänomenologie des Geistes. 
114.  
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his service he actually brings this about.”217 Let me gloss this rather difficult 
passage thus: what is to be overcome through work is the arbitrariness of one’s 
radically free desires. The way to give radical freedom content is to shape radical 
freedom through reflective endorsement, engagement with the world of things 
which, at this point (and in fact, forever) is mediated by the master.  
Let me put the point differently. The movement from the quasi 
epistemological attitude of the subject to an intersubjective attitude is 
accomplished through the process of reflective endorsement, i.e. where thought 
meets world and thus where thought has to satisfy itself in the world of material 
things rather than in the mind. 
This transition, complex as it is, is solved by the development of instrumental 
reason. The self is merely trying to satisfy its desires. But when the self meets 
another self— a self which threatens to extinguish the possibility of even having 
desires at all— it must decide between death and giving up its ability to posit and 
fulfill its own desires. If the subject chooses the life of servitude, its reasons for 
action will come from outside it. This means that its radical freedom will be 
replaced with the radical freedom of another. The slave will retain its ability to 
reflect on these desires and carry them out. This means that the slave will be 
acting on the desires of others just as if they were his own. Radical freedom has 
                                            
217 Hegel. Phenomenology. 117. “ist ferner nicht nur diese allgemeine Auflösung überhaupt, 
sondern im Dienen vollbringt es sie wirklich; es hebt darin in allen einzelnen Momenten seine 
Anhänglichkeit an natürliches Daseyn auf, und arbeitet dasselbe hinweg.” Phänomenologie des 
Geistes. 114.  
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now given way to a different conception of freedom, one which includes the other 
as well and which treats the other as the source of constraints on the slave’s 
action. (The whole dialectic of recognition is, taken in this sense, a movement 
from radical constraint by the other to only relative constraint by the other.)  
So, to get back to the point made in the quotation above, the slave’s 
animal nature is no longer the only source of desires for the slave. In working for 
the master, the slave must now take into consideration both the desires of the 
master and the technical or material constraints of the world itself. He must bring 
together not his desires but someone else’s objectives with nature in accordance 
with instrumental reason. What still remains to be seen is how the slave recovers 
his own subjectivity. This will occur when the slave recognizes that domination by 
the master is only contingent and that the slave has been exercising his freedom 
in reflection all along.  
In order to understand the move from instrumental reason to 
intersubjective reason we must understand the paradox present in the slave’s 
situation. On the one side, he takes orders from another such that he fulfills only 
the desires of another and on the other hand, the slave must choose in which 
way to fulfill these desires. Thus, the slave’s radical (subjective) freedom has 
been replaced with the other’s imperative or what, to the slave at least, appears 
as an objective imperative: the master’s words, ‘do this or I will kill you’. But what 
has not been replaced is the moment of agency itself. Indeed, agency now takes 
center stage as the locus of the slave’s ‘subjectivity’ in that it is only through 
reflecting the master’s desires in action that the slave fulfills the master’s desires.  
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We can now see that the emancipation of the slave occurs when the slave 
realizes that his ‘self’ resides not in his radical freedom but in turning desires (the 
master’s or otherwise) into actions: the slave must recognize that the master is 
not the only constraint, but merely one constraint among many.218 So what I have 
been arguing is that domination by the master has already made the slave 
intersubjective, by revealing that action, not thought alone, constitutes the self. 
The story of the struggle of recognition is thus the struggle of subjects to replace 
others’ reasons for action with their own. Autonomy, however, is born in action, 
because action alone is capable of being autonomous in a non-tautologous or 
public sense. Thought, by contrast, always threatens to be merely private.  
 
In examining the slave’s rebirth as a proto-autonomous agent, we must 
pay particular attention to what the process of coming to understand his 
autonomy looks like to him. Here, again, we should notice that there is a 
difference in perspective between seeing the possibility of recognition or 
intersubjectivity from the perspective of the philosopher, from the outside, and 
that of the suffering agent seeing or not seeing the distant promise of recognition 
from the inside, from within history.  
So let us now turn to the slave’s perspective: the perspective of the actor 
at the beginning of history. This perspective is that of being forced to labor for 
another. The slave’s desires are not his own but the way he carries them out, 
                                            
218 This is clearly analogous to Korsgaard’s argument above (ch. 5) that others’ desires are 
fundamentally of the same kind as our own.  
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endorses them reflectively, is his. What I would like to suggest is that Hegel’s 
theory of agency, in the form of labor, allows us to reconceptualize the interaction 
between the radical freedom given by self-consciousness and the relative 
freedom given by reflectively endorsed action. The complete liquification of the 
self, brought about by defeat in battle, transforms radical freedom from purely 
subjective into intersubjective freedom because, in defeat, the slave is forced to 
accept other people’s desires as motivating for him.  
But what is it about labor that makes this transition possible? Hegel writes: 
“Work […] is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work 
forms and shapes the thing.”219  Labor is power exerted on to the world in order 
to transform it. By creating objects, Hegel says, the slave not only comes to 
appreciate his ability to create but also realizes his negative power of destruction. 
The fact that the slave has been transformed by existential fear only heightens 
this point. The existential fear of death quite literally broadens the slave’s 
consciousness to include the desires of the master. The continued fear of death, 
which we might broaden (in later stages) to include the fear of social death, 
keeps the subject attuned to the desires of others. The fear of the master means 
that the slave’s reasons for doing what he does stem from an other and hence 
that what he produces is for an other. The externality of the product of the slave’s 
work also makes the slave’s creations real or intersubjective. That is, not only 
has thinking itself become intersubjective, but so has action.  
                                            
219 Hegel. Phenomenology. 118. “Die Arbeit […] ist gehemmte Begierde, aufgehaltenes 
Verschwinden, oder sie bildet.” Phänomenologie des Geistes. 115. 
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We might tie this to Korsgaard’s theory of the constitutive standards of 
action in the sense that whereas before the confrontation with the other, the 
slave’s actions, say getting food, merely had to conform to some technical 
standards (like providing enough calories for him to survive), the food he has to 
provide for the master must now meet some public or intersubjective standards. 
Hegel writes: “the formative activity has […] significance [in] that in it the pure 
being-for-itself of the servile consciousness acquires an existence”.220 Only in 
having to conform to intersubjective standards is an act ever really an action. And 
in this way we see that the slave regains some notion of self through his actions. 
Action itself reflects back onto thought, making it intersubjective too.  
Now, if the slave realizes that his labor, alienated though it is, contains 
irreducible elements of his own thinking and execution, the slave will realize that 
his labor is, in a constitutive sense, what makes him free. The slave is free not 
only in the sense that he can choose death but also in the sense that he must 
interpret the master’s desires, making his own imprint on the final product. 
Alienation, in other worlds, can only be experienced by a subject.  
To sum up the movement from self-consciousness to intersubjectivity, we 
can now say that the slave has lost his radical freedom but has gained the 
capacity to see others’ ends as reasons for him to act. This change is itself the 
transition from consciousness to self-consciousness or intersubjectivity. The 
enslavement to the will of the other has now emerged as a constraint on the 
                                            
220 Hegel. Phenomenology. 118. “im Bilden wird das Fürsichseyn als sein eigenes für es, und es 
kömmt zum Bewußtseyn, daß es selbst an und für sich ist.” Phänomenologie des Geistes. 115.  
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slave’s action in the form of the requirement to conform to intersubjective 
standards of action. The slave only develops a self when he realizes that taking 
into consideration the desires of others allows a richer life than the desire-based 
existence of the master. So, we can say, the seeds for a theory of recognition 
and with it for a theory of justice, have been sown.  
Attaining intersubjectivity means that the slave’s immediate desires are 
replaced by an ever expanding set of reasons. This then means that instead of 
endorsing only his own desires, the slave ends up endorsing desires which come 
from outside his immediate purview, and this means that his reasons are now 
intersubjective instead of subjective. What I am trying to argue is that the 
dialectic of the master and slave replaces radical freedom with a concrete 
process of reason giving, or reflective endorsement, and that this shows that 
reason giving can only be construed as the ability to endorse this or that norm 
here and now. For Hegel, then, normativity is necessarily a process of the 
reflective endorsement of those reasons presently available to the agent. There 
is no norm that holds for now and all times but only what counts at the moment. 
This, too, is Williams’ point.  
However, lest we fear that Hegel is falling into a relativism, we must also 
note the second element in this process, namely self-consciousness. For, as we 
have seen, self-consciousness construed as radical freedom has been replaced 
by self-consciousness construed as the freedom of all. Self-consciousness is 
now no longer merely the immediate consciousness of one’s own desires but 
rather the consciousness of the desires of all. Reflective endorsement no longer 
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selects its action merely from its immediate set of desires but from the universal 
pool of the desires of all furnished by self-consciousness.  
Conceiving of self-consciousness in this way allows us to see the 
importance of Hegel’s notion of Geist. The development of Geist is precisely the 
coming into actuality of the possibility of taking the desires of others to be one’s 
own reasons. The dialectic of recognition thus takes place between the 
fundamental capacity of self-consciousness (in each individual) to take others’ 
desires as reasons for action and the limited capability of reflective endorsement 
to turn the consideration of others into a concrete reality.  
And this, too, is where history enters into the picture. History, for Hegel, is 
the process in which agents act on the possibility of recognition, on the possibility 
of taking other people’s desires as reasons. But history is also the continued 
failure of this ideal and so keeps reminding us of the fact that we have not yet 
reached the point of full intersubjectivity. So, to bring things back to the master-
slave dialectic, we can say that the master-slave dialectic is the origin of history 
in the sense that the dialectic is also the origin of normativity proper. For in acting 
on the command of the master, the slave submits himself to a will which is not his 
own, but then realizes that he is bound not by the master’s physical power but by 
other people’s desires cum reasons. But other people’s desires also include his 
own desires, so the slave has now arrived at some notion of mediated or socially 
constrained agency. The master, it is important to note, is left behind because he 
does not experience or enter into the normativity of the world around him; he 
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does not bind himself to any goals because all of his desires are satisfied by the 
slave. The master thus remains outside history.  
I would thus like to interpret the ostensible inequality which marks the 
origin of normativity as necessary for this development itself. It is only in 
inequality, in suffering or limitation, that normativity appears as such at all. 
Normativity enters the picture because not everything is in its place, because the 
world does not yield to our mere thoughts (as it does, we may imagine, for the 
master).  
 
By way of concluding this section, I would like to say that Hegel’s 
presentation of the master-slave dialectic, as I have interpreted it, shows that 
normativity is only ever experienced from the perspective of the loser of the 
conflict. The winner, like the master, never enters normativity because he is 
never at odds with existing conditions. Because he does not experience 
suffering, and thus has nothing to hope for, he remains outside history. The loser, 
by contrast, exists in conflict and continues to insist that his desires be 
recognized by others. The difference between these two perspectives is quite 
nicely captured in Hegel’s elucidation of the Doppelsatz, according to which 
Hegel’s dictum that the real is the rational really means the real must become the 
rational.221 For we can now see that to think that the real is the rational is the 
                                            
221 GPR. Vorrede. Hegel writes: “Das Vernünftige ist das Wirkliche; und das Wirkliche ist das 
Vernünftige”. On the elucidation given by Hegel to Heine see Hardimon. Hegel’s Practical 
Philosophy.  
  
 234 
perspective of the master who exists outside of history. The slave’s perspective, 
by contrast, is the imperative that the real must become rational. The normative 
is here characterized negatively, as the failure of the present order of things. The 
failure of the present order means that some injustice exists and that we must 
strive for justice.  
 
Pinkardʼs Categorial Reading and the Perspective of the Slave 
The above interpretation of the slave’s perspective shed’s some light on 
the problem of the transcendental interpretation of Hegel’s thought by Pippin. 
Pippin’s interpretation was characterized by a strong insistence that the 
categories of thought could be reconstructed or constructed from within self-
consciousness itself. This means on the one hand that all ways of understanding 
the world are, in principle, available already and, on the other hand, that changes 
in the world will not affect our conceptual schemes. Pippin rightly rejected this set 
of claims as both impossible to prove and implausible. The problem with this 
strong interpretation of Hegel’s theory is that it appears to be entirely written from 
the perspective of the master, that is, from the perspective of one who has 
already worked out all of the problems, metaphysical and physical, which might 
face him. That is, to one who has already worked out the conceptual scheme of 
the ages, the real already is the rational and the rational already is the real.  
But this is not, I have been arguing, the right way to understand Hegel’s 
work. So, given the failure of Pippin’s forceful and ambitious interpretation of 
Hegel, it seems worthwhile to consider whether it might not be possible to 
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provide a more modest version of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, a version 
which could be told from the perspective of the slave, the agent within history. 
Such a theory could avoid the claim of Pippin’s transcendental thesis to the effect 
that Hegel must give an account of the totality of the conceptual scheme per se. 
Hegel’s speculative philosophy might rather be understood as working out a 
determinate view of the human and temporally bound conceptual schemata. This 
would open up the possibility of a historical revision of Hegel’s view, but retain 
Hegel’s apperception thesis about the development of concepts. Such a view 
would interpret conceptual development as historical and thus open-ended.  
Terry Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel does just that. It allows us to see 
the conditions for the possibility of the theory of recognition as I have developed 
it in the above discussion of the master-slave dialectic. I propose now to take up 
this other  perspective on the problem of self-consciousness in Hegel. In 
concluding this discussion, I will say a little more about the possibility of justice 
made possible by Pinkard’s interpretation.  
Pinkard’s work on Hegel has shadowed Pippin’s work over the past 30 
years and both writers share many of the same aims in interpreting Hegel.222 But 
Pinkard’s reading differs from Pippin’s reading in that Pinkard thinks that Hegel 
                                            
222 Both wish to show that Hegel is a non- or post-metaphysical writer, both agree that he owes a 
great debt to Kant and both think of Hegel as a radical social critic. Pinkard. “How Kantian Was 
Hegel?”.  
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can be usefully read as a category theorist.223 I will explore this alternative in 
what follows. The aims of this alternative will be to see whether there can be a 
non-metaphysical reading of Hegel which can say something more about the 
self-grounding of reason in Hegel than either Pippin or Brandom could. For 
Pinkard, the dialectic may not give us the transcendental conditions of 
knowledge, but it can tell us if thought is consistent and coherent.224  
 
Let us turn first to Pinkard’s criticism of Pippin’s approach in Hegel’s 
Idealism.225 This will give us a better understanding of what the categorial 
reading can do in grounding Hegel’s notion of reason. Pinkard agrees with Pippin 
that the place of the apperception thesis is most evident is in the 
Phenomenology, since the Phenomenology is supposed to show that all the so-
called metaphysically transcendental objects of knowledge may in fact be 
regarded as posits of thought. But, Pinkard contends, even if the Phenomenology 
were successful in its own terms, it would not show that thought must have such 
and such a categorial structure; it would only show that it would be possible to 
construct such a pure categorial structure of thought. But Pippin has denied that 
                                            
223 For an earlier and influential view of what such a reading might look like, see Klaus Hartmann. 
“Hegel; A Non-Metaphysical View”.  
224 Pinkard. “How Kantian Was Hegel?” Review of Metaphysics. 43 (1990) : 831-38. 837 
225 I will take Pinkard’s critique of Pippin’s transcendental view to be relevant to all approaches 
which do not pay sufficient attention to the perspective of the agent within the historical fray. This 
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Hegel succeeds in proving that the categories of thought he develops are 
developed through determinate negation. Hegel’s categories are thus not 
thoroughly rational.  
The categorial reading, however, allows Hegel a way out of these 
damaging charges: on the categorial view, Hegel is a speculative philosopher, 
and not a transcendental philosopher. Speculation is an alternative to deduction, 
in the logical sense. While in a deduction nothing new is added (the conclusion is 
already contained in the premise and needs only be worked out), in speculation, 
something new is posited.226 According to Pinkard: 
Hegel's goal is not to show the transcendental conditions without 
which there can be no thought at all, or the conditions under which 
any conceptual framework is possible. It is rather to explain the 
rational possibility of certain categories. The assumption is that 
contradictory sets of categories are impossible (after all, the real is 
the rational), and one explains how a category is possible if one 
explains how both it and its apparent contradictory category are 
each compatible with the other.227 
 
While Pinkard agrees with Pippin that the transcendental thesis according 
to which the world’s conceptual scheme can be worked out for all time fails, the 
speculative philosopher still stands a chance of providing some sort of a 
grounding of reason, though not one as determinate as Pippin thought it must be. 
We can thus take Hegel’s dialectical philosophy to rest on the more modest 
thesis that there are resolutions to our problems of categorial possibility and that 
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there will be new problems and new resolutions that we cannot foresee. This 
allows Hegel to be open to new conceptual developments in history.228 Such an 
approach also transforms the apperception thesis into a thesis about our 
conceptual possibility rather than about conceptual possibility in general, and 
thus adds a genetic approach to conceptualization to the theory.  
 
From Metaphysics to Ontology 
As with Pippin, the real crux of the argument Pinkard advances is to be 
found not so much in the description of the social categories which Hegel is 
taken to be describing as in the speculative justification for such description. In 
examining Pinkard’s proposed reshaping of the apperception thesis, we must pay 
particular attention to how the transcendental approach is replaced by the 
categorial approach. In other words, what would it mean if conceptualization 
were rational, at least as it pertains to our situated and contingent human selves?  
It should be noted that I will be examining the categorial interpretation as 
an alternative to the transcendental interpretation offered by Pippin rather than in 
its own right as a defense of Hegel. What I am primarily interested in is what sort 
of resources the categorial view can provide us with in our attempt to ground 
rationality immanently. I cannot, here, examine the difficult issue of what, exactly, 
for Pinkard, consistency and negation mean. That is, we will have to defer the 
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question of whether Pinkard’s views about Hegel’s speculative philosophy are 
correct and attend only to what promises such a view holds for several of the 
issues which have been raised throughout this dissertation; for instance, the 
importance of history and the significance of agency in such a contingent context.  
Like Pippin, Pinkard believes that the key to understanding Hegel’s 
speculative philosophy comes from an analysis of the Logic. Here the Logic of 
Essence is of particular importance.229 In the Logic of Essence, Hegel diagnoses 
the two conflicting metaphysical claims of his predecessors (the rationalist and 
the Kantian) in the following way. The realist view posits an essence behind 
appearance which is itself beyond appearance and thus deprives itself of a way 
of knowing the ground of appearance. Objective realism thus results in 
skepticism. The other formulation of essence, to avoid positing a substance 
behind appearance by saying that it is the mind itself which imposes the basic 
categorial determinations of our understanding, however, lands us in Kantian 
subjective idealism. Here we lose the world.  
The answer to this dilemma is to be found in Hegel’s doctrine of the 
concept which Pinkard interprets as the study of inferences, both formal and 
material. Appearance is determinate in the way it is simply because it is the way 
we must think it, the way in which the world necessarily manifests itself to us. A 
concept is thus a position in a scheme of inferences and has no metaphysical 
                                            
229 Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel’s Logic is at least congruent with Pippin’s in the detailed 
discussion of particular passages. What the two differ on is to what standards Hegel’s claims 
about his goals and achievements should be held.  
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substantiality; outside of such a scheme of inference, a concept has no existence 
whatsoever.230  
What is arrived at in Hegel’s doctrine of the concept is Absolute Idealism 
which is (in Pinkard’s summary): “the doctrine (1) that there is no metaphysical 
intermediary that either stands between our concepts and the world; or (2) that 
we do not need to posit a metaphysical entity that stands ‘behind’ (or ‘beyond’) 
appearance to explain its determinateness.”231  
The determinateness of appearance can be perfectly well explained in 
terms of systematic complexes of concepts, and concepts themselves can be 
explained by the inferential roles they play vis-à-vis each other. Since the world 
manifests itself to us in systems of concepts, any general skepticism about the 
relation of knowledge and the world is misplaced. Pinkard says that the Doctrine 
of the Concept, the last section of the Logic, replaces metaphysics with ontology 
or, as we have been saying, speculation. We still can postulate entities for the 
purpose of theory construction (like genes, or leptons) but we need not think that 
we need to postulate metaphysical entities to do the kind of philosophical 
explanatory work that we earlier thought necessary.232  
Conceptual thought is thus not only capable of giving an account of the 
world but also of giving an account of itself. It is self-subsuming and self-
explanatory in the sense that the determinateness of concepts is explained by 
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the kind of inferential moves made with the set of concepts itself. The theory is 
absolute in the sense that there is nothing outside it and in the sense that there is 
no alternative to displace it. There is no meta-concept. The categories of 
Absolute Idealism express the way the world is. We should note here that the 
claim that Hegel’s theory subsumes itself under itself is a key claim for Pinkard, 
for it states that there can be no outside to theory building. This claim is meant to 
oppose Hegel’s tendency, as noted by Pippin, to make claims about the 
completeness of his system; for the claim to completeness seems to entail an 
outside which is not subsumable into the system. This is the metaphysical 
remnant which Pinkard seeks to avoid. More so than Pippin, Pinkard is thus not 
shy of using Hegel to overcome Hegel.   
 
Before we move on to a discussion of Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
social theory, it is worth noting that, while Pinkard follows the movement of 
Hegel’s system from Logic (skipping the philosophy of nature) to Realphilosophie 
or Philosophy of Spirit, Pippin’s book proceeds in the opposite direction. The 
point is significant because it makes a difference to our understanding of the two 
theses in Pippin’s book which way we proceed. What is at stake here is whether 
Pippin’s transcendental thesis— that the categories of reason require a 
determinate logic— is also a requirement of the human understanding. At one 
level, of course, Pippin is right to demand this, as Hegel’s anti-realism entails that 
the categories of reason can only ever be for us. Pinkard’s view, however, makes 
room for the possibility that we have not yet worked out what the necessary 
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categories of reason are (as they truly are) and shows that we must content 
ourselves with trying to work out the coherence of our categories of reason as 
they appear to us from our particular place in history.  
 
Spiritʼs Purposiveness 
Jettisoning the transcendental thesis renews the question of what a self-
grounding rational form of life might look like. Part of the value of the categorial 
reading of Hegel was to suggest that our theory of the world contains within it a 
theory of our theory of the world, i.e. a way of understanding our own 
theorization. This means we must have some notion of our own place in history. 
Pinkard argues that this notion of our place in history can be conceived of in 
terms of purposiveness. Purposiveness, however, is not teleology since the latter 
implies a driving force which stands outside of the process while the former does 
not. Pinkard contends that it is part of the Logic’s solution to the problem of 
ground that we take ourselves as trying to give an ever more complete account 
of the relation between different parts of our conceptual world. What Hegel 
seems to be after, Pinkard contends, is that a set of inferential connections can 
‘point to’ its rational successor.233  
Hegel calls this constellation of inferential relations which each seek to 
become more rational, Spirit. Spirit is also Hegel’s name for the process of 
developing concrete social and political freedom. Spirit is absolute for Hegel 
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because it is not mediated by anything outside of itself and must provide its own 
necessity. This relation, however, is more than a mere coherentism because the 
dialectical movement relies on its own internal dynamism brought forth by 
historical contradiction in the form of suffering. The goal of Hegelian ethical 
theory is thus to seek a workable conception of the principles of personal life and 
cooperative social life without having to invoke any metaphysical conception of 
the person or society. This is not done by some ‘overlapping consensus’ as in 
Rawls. Rawls is merely agnostic about metaphysics while Hegel rejects it. So 
Rawls can only offer us a theory of what we moderns would rationally choose 
from an appropriate menu, but he cannot explain how it is that such and such 
things are on the menu and why we are the people for whom such things seem 
like options.234  
 
Dialectic, Negativity and Necessity  
The answer to the question about the availability of historical alternatives 
is both historical and philosophical. To answer it, we will also need to know more 
about how to distinguish Hegel’s notion of reason from Rawls’ notion of rational 
deliberation. This will help us see how Hegel does indeed reject metaphysics of 
both the Kantian and realist varieties. This point is all the more pressing, since, 
as noted, certain of both Pippin’s and Pinkard’s interpretations of Hegel do not 
seem very different from Rawls’ notion of social cohesion. Part of the argument 
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Pinkard seems to want to make, however, is that the one central difference 
between them, the question of history, is not merely one difference among many, 
but the reason why Hegel’s account of Sittlichkeit has a rational speculative 
grounding while Rawls’ account of justice does not.  
Pinkard argues that Hegel’s central philosophical concern is for the self-
authentication of our inferences. Given that there is no external authority, this 
means that all authority must be immanent to the authorizing process. Such 
internality of authority means that all theoretical accounts of reason must be 
examined in terms of their ability to generate and justify inferences or reflection. 
For Pinkard, justification means that individuals have to determine whether their 
position in ‘social space’ licenses their intended actions.235 The validity of the 
inference can be determined by whether the inference and the account support 
one another. If the inference is not valid, what Hegel calls negativity arises.  
In order for this negativity to carry any weight, Pinkard adds a second 
thesis to that of internal consistency: the ground rules of the social space, the 
rules for licensing inferences, appear to the people in the social space not just as 
‘given’ or optional but as necessary. The ground rules appear as certain and also 
as structuring what counts as truth. Part of a theory of knowledge, therefore, 
must be to determine if there is any set of authoritative reasons that can generate 
their own necessity in a way that does not undermine itself. Understanding this 
necessity means becoming self-conscious about norms and becoming self-
conscious about the apparent paradoxes, incoherencies and conflict within our 
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norms.236 The dialectic is constituted by the appearance of these internal 
inconsistencies.  
I have tried to give an illustration of such an account in the discussion of 
the master-slave dialectic above. There I argued that the achievement of 
recognition or intersubjectivity lay in the slave’s realization that the constraint 
placed on him by the master was just one constraint among many, and that such 
a constraint was, in fact, really a constraint that he placed upon himself. To 
recognize that one is autonomous despite the prevailing coercive norms is to 
have reason or be authorized by oneself to seek to change the current situation. 
Inconsistencies in the structure of reality are normative for the subject who exists 
within it.  
The question of the structure of (current) reality brings us back to the 
fundamental question of the determinate schema of reason. Recall that Pippin 
argued that the dialectic, in Hegel’s account of it at least, does not give a 
satisfactory account of the determinacy of reason because it does not furnish us 
with satisfactory categories according to which we can measure and evaluate our 
concepts and actions. The only process strong enough to provide an 
authoritative reconstruction of thought, determinate negation, is not borne out by 
Hegel’s writings. We have been looking for an alternative account to such 
determinate negation in Pinkard’s account and this is the point at which we must 
evaluate Pinkard’s final theory.  
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From Metaphysical Truth to Social Truth  
The answer to how the dialectic is supposed to work, Pinkard contends, is 
to be found in Hegel’s (modified) apperception thesis itself, and not in the 
transcendental thesis, as Pippin argues. Let me recall that the recreation of 
Pinkard’s account of the self-authorization of reason is only a sketch and not an 
actual defense. It is nonetheless useful to provide some sort of detail so that we 
may better see the consequences of this view, should it prove to be correct. 
Pinkard thinks that normativity is provided by the apperception thesis 
itself. For Pinkard, as for Pippin, the apperception thesis states that there is no 
given which we must assimilate or receive in order to know the truth. Rather, 
what the apperception thesis means is that subjectivity must proceed from the 
unity of concept and object rather than from their separation. And this means, 
Pinkard argues, approvingly citing Brandom, that the distinction between the 
normative and the factual is itself normative.237  
Pinkard takes this argument to mean that, for Hegel, nature itself, as mere 
fact, is dead and can only be animated by a subject constructing itself. He argues 
that, since nature is finite and finite things have their authority outside of 
themselves, nature cannot tell us anything about who we actually are. The 
consequence of the apperception thesis, however, is that subjects, as self-
authorizing entities, are infinite. As self-authorizing, subjects construct their own 
meaning and this meaning is what Hegel calls reality. Thus reality, for Hegel, is 
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no longer a question of fit between conceptions of subject and the world. In 
reorienting the question of truth, Hegel also rejects coherentism, realism and 
other forms of truth seeking where truth is conceived as the relation between the 
world and the mind. For Hegel, the only relation that can produce truth is that 
between subjects.  
In terms of the social practices which we engage in to construct truth, this 
means:  
We are always already ‘inside’ as well as ‘outside’ of ourselves in 
that, as self-interpreting animals, we are ‘absolute negativity’; we 
are only ever concerned about whether we correspond to our 
conception of ourselves, and whether the activities which make up 
our lives in our institutions, are true, or even if the self which we are 
supposed to be faithful to (according to the modern ideal of 
authenticity) is really our true self. 238 
 
The historical authenticity and the refutation of the charge of historical 
relativism is developed in Hegel’s theory of the negativity of history. For, as 
Pinkard notes, normativity is normative only if it at once seeks to generalize, give 
people reasons for acting, and also, sometimes, fails to give them reasons. The 
dialectic of reason giving can best be seen in historical development organized 
around the dissolution of norms. The most famous example of this is Hegel’s 
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discussion of Antigone, whose actions are the result of the deep commitment to 
her society but also reveal the limitation of the practices of the historical Greek 
city state. The fact that Antigone can both uphold the norms of her time and 
break them shows that contemporary normativity is only the condition for our 
actions rather than the reason for our action.239 To put this slightly differently, we 
might say that present norms are strong reasons for us to act in a certain way but 
not a determining reason for us to do so. We also have our own set of desires, at 
odds with the current norms, which also make a claim on us. As the example of 
Antigone shows, sometime to act on our own desires, on our conscience, as it 
were, is to help establish a more adequate form for social norms.  (This, of 
course, is the dialectical version of Williams’ insistence on the irreducibility of 
subjective desires.)  
Hegel reworks Kant’s principles of ethics in a more substantive way.240 
There is rational deliberation about action, just as in Kant, but the principles 
according to which actions are evaluated are the substantive commitments of 
one’s society. The dissolution of a form of life, Hegel argues, is a necessary part 
of historical progress to the most rational and complete understanding of human 
society, the self-understanding of Spirit.   
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Revisability: Our History, Our Concepts 
Pinkard thus seems to agree with my claim that the genetic account of the 
development of human subjectivity given by the categorial interpretation does not 
supplement Rawlsian coherentism with a historical perspective, but that history is 
itself the product of a struggle for conceptual coherence. This means that human 
rationality has two sides; the strong demand for the rational coherence of the 
conceptual scheme on the one hand, and the demand for the conceptual 
revisability of such a scheme on the other hand. What makes Rawlsian 
coherentism possible, what, in other words, makes it possible for a reflexive 
equilibrium to come about is the very historical situatedness of the agents 
debating and their ability to redefine themselves in the act of deliberation. This 
scenario can, again, quite usefully be illustrated by Harris’ view that freedom is at 
once a radical positing of freedom and also a free acceptance of the contingent 
determinations that such positing gives rise to.  
Our norms are normative for us because they are historically given as 
both contingent and necessary. They are necessary as the norms that we must 
accept as subjects living at a certain place and time, but become contingent to 
the extent to which we are able to posit our way out of them by working toward a 
new social arrangement which is more coherent and thus conceived of as 
necessary.  
Revisability is thus central to Pinkard’s categorial interpretation. As we 
saw, a central difference between the transcendental thesis and the categorial 
interpretation is that on the categorial reading Hegel need not be understood as 
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having developed a determinate conceptual structure for this and for all time. By 
arguing that his philosophy provides the final word on the condition for the 
possibility of knowledge, the formulation of what such a condition might be 
threatened to remain outside the system itself and become reified into a 
metaphysical relic, destabilizing the whole system. Pinkard’s emphasis on 
revisability, by contrast, ensures that the very act of theory building, of 
developing new conceptions of knowledge, always stays within and is 
subsumable under the positing of the new theory.241  
This leads us to a further point of divergence between the transcendental 
thesis and the categorial reading. The fact that the categorial reading subsumes 
its own theoretical positing into itself means that Hegel’s philosophy is absolute in 
the sense that there is nothing outside it. But this does not mean that the theory 
is complete. The claim to completeness that Pippin emphasizes actually 
obstructs what is most valuable about Hegel’s theory: the centrality of dialectical 
revision of norms brought on by the concrete recognition of suffering. There is 
room in the categorial reading for advances in natural science as well as in 
logic.242 More importantly, there is room for a more fully developed theory of 
justice.  
The notion that Hegel’s system aims at the absolute rather than at the 
complete thus sits rather well with the concern for justice of which Pippin writes. 
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For it is only through total commitment to the rational examination of all of our 
concepts that we can hope to advance to a more just society, a society in which 
all conceptual discrepancies are subject to revision and hence improvement. 
Indeed, one could go so far as to say that the ‘absoluteness’ of Hegel’s theory is 
a demand to examine and reevaluate all concepts and social structures. In this 
context, Hegel’s critique of Kant according to which the categorical imperative is 
a conceptual reification receives new meaning.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to show a way of conceiving of normativity as 
an activity within a necessarily embodied world. The point has been to show that 
the possibility of freedom, an idea shared by all writers in this study, is not 
sufficiently specified by the claim that intersubjectivity is possible. What makes 
intersubjectivity or recognition possible is that it appears as a demand on us from 
within history itself.  
This demand, I have been arguing, comes to us in the form of injustice. 
Injustice is the perspective of the agent caught up in a system of norms with 
which she does not wholly agree or, to put it less cognitively, which subjugates 
her even without her fully being aware of it. The problem of ideology is a difficult 
one and far be it from me to take it up here. Suffice it to say that Hegel presents it 
as a historical imperative and hence also as an achievement to become 
conscious of one’s experience of injustice and, having become conscious of it, to 
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act on it. I have tried to give an account of the ur-form of this dialectic in my 
reading of the master-slave dialectic.  
The second element of the problematic of justice and philosophical 
perspective that I have sought to emphasize is the need to understand reflection 
itself as subject to revision. I have tried to show this in my reading of Pinkard’s 
work. Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel as essentially a theorist of the possible 
categories of social interaction means that, for Pinkard, Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy always remains open to revision. Revisability, I have then argued, 
means the possibility of accounting for the perspective of the slave who demands 
that current norms be changed to accommodate his desires.  
I would like to end this chapter by returning to the thought that I have 
raised throughout this study, namely the overcoming of any distinction between 
nature and subject or between the moral and the non-moral. The account of the 
development of normativity in the master-slave dialectic and the account of 
speculative reason itself, I would like to now say, mean that normativity goes all 
the way down. Normativity pervades us from the most basic labor of self-
preservation to the most difficult moral choice. This is so because the dual 
processes of self-consciousness as self-posited radical freedom and reflective 
endorsement of such posited desires are with us no matter what we do. In this 
sense, there is no distinction between the moral and the non-moral. Whether we 
take the hardness of a nut as a reason to bash it open with a rock or a suffering 
person’s cries to be a reason to help him or her, we have within us the 
constraints of our commitments, that is, our other desires. But all constraints are 
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normative for us. The strength of these commitments, of course, is mediated by 
the norms which constitute us.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation began as an investigation into the possibility of a 
philosophical deduction of the categories of morality in Kant’s Groundwork. The 
ultimate aim of this deduction for Kant was to find a way of carving out a space 
for human freedom or agency in the midst of the seemingly overpowering forces 
of nature. I concluded in the first chapter that it was impossible to deduce the 
notion of pure practical reason from the idea of freedom. This failure, as one 
might characterize it, is the failure of reflection to orient our actions with regard to 
a supreme notion of morality. The problem, to put it another way, is that in order 
to create a space for freedom Kant’s notion of moral reflection opens up a chasm 
between the intentions of the free will and the determined material world. Morality 
lies on the one side, nature on the other. This study’s subsequent chapters have 
thus been united by the quest to find, while remaining within the process of 
reflection, a way of developing a notion of agency that is both material and moral 
in the sense that it synthesize the activity and passivity of the human.  
This investigation proceeded in three stages corresponding roughly to the 
three thinkers examined, Rawls, Korsgaard and Hegel. The first strategy of 
overcoming the gap between nature and the free will is Rawls’ attempt to reject 
the problem entirely by just assuming that agents simply are rational. This 
generated the problem that either Rawls’ was assuming more even than 
rationality (in which case he was assuming what is fundamentally at stake: the 
principle of pure practical reason) or that the more modest notion of reason he 
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was assuming was not powerful enough to give rise to the intersubjectivity on 
which his theory of justice relies. This latter objection takes the form of the thesis 
that reason is egoistic in the sense that though my thoughts might be normative 
for me because they are mine, and the same goes for you, this does not make 
your thoughts and goals normative for me.  
Korsgaard’s work takes up many of the important questions left 
unanswered by both Kant and Rawls and develops an immanent account of 
normativity by arguing that the categorical imperative is normative for us because 
it has the structure of thinking itself. Thinking or reflection, in Korsgaard, is able 
to synthesize intentions and the world because it is the condition for the 
formulation of any action whatsoever. In other words, I must turn my desires into 
a plan of action and this plan is normative for me because I am its author. This is 
the basic structure of autonomy. The categorical imperative, on this reading, is 
not some further test to be applied to a plan of action, it is the plan of action itself.  
In order to show the last step, Korsgaard also has to address the egoism 
argument advanced against Rawls. Korsgaard argues that the categorical 
imperative is not merely a technical constraint on action but an ethical constraint 
as well. She argues that reason is by its very nature public, because the process 
of reflective endorsement does not distinguish between internal desires and 
external reasons in developing a plan of action. Thus your needs and my own 
needs are on the same level with regard to becoming candidates for my reflective 
endorsement. Korsgaard, I argued, is thus able to show that intersubjectivity is 
possible in just the way Rawls thought it was. We are able to deliberate together 
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and the results of this communal deliberation, this inter-action, are normative for 
us because we can take each others reasons as reasons.  
A consequence of Korsgaard’s view, I also argued, is that the division 
between the moral and the non-moral or the natural is eroded to a great extent. 
Because reflection concerns all actions equally and because other people’s 
reasons enter into our reflection in just the same way (though they do not 
necessarily have the same value) that considerations about the empirical world 
do, normativity is principally the same all the way down. This aspect of 
Korsgaard’s thought can be seen in her theory of the constitutive standards of 
action, which I interpreted as an account of the institutionally mediated way we 
take other people’s reasons as reasons for us. The way in which we take other 
people’s reasons to be our reasons, the way intersubjectivity evolves, is, I 
argued, historical.  
Throughout the discussion of Korsgaard’s work, I have also been pressing 
Williams’ objection to the current morality system to the effect that it is a matter of 
moral luck whether the way we take up other peoples’ reasons fits with what is 
expected of us from society. I take this objection to be the perspective of 
injustice, of the oppression of one social group by an other. Because Korsgaard’s 
notion of justice contains only a formal demand that we be consistent in our 
dealings with others, I argued that the power dynamics present in inter-action 
cannot be accounted for by her. Korsgaard’s account of justice, I argued, was 
incomplete because it cannot account for the perspective of the marginalized 
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member of the society. If reflection treats everything equally, then differentials of 
power become invisible. Reflection must have a perspective.  
By turning to Hegel’s work, I try to present an even more immanent 
account of reflection, one that would allow us to take the perspective of the 
dissatisfied member of the society into consideration. Such a theory would be 
immanent in the sense that it would recognize the demand of the unreconciled 
individual as normative for its reflection. Such a theory would thus tether the 
whole process of reflection to the existence of injustice within its plan of action 
and would continue to adjust itself accordingly.  
In order to develop this idea further, I offer an interpretation of the master-
slave dialectic in Hegel’s Phenomenology in which I argue that Hegel thinks a 
theory of justice can only be proffered if it is also tied to the perspective of the 
slave, since it is only in the slave that the hope of justice appears. The 
perspective of the master, the perspective of the one who is satisfied with the 
current social arrangement, is irrelevant to the question of justice because the 
master’s conceptual scheme has already reached an adequate interpretation of 
the world. History, I thus argue, is the continued insistence of the slaves to be 
accommodated within the dominant practices of society. Such a historical 
perspective is absent in both the work of Rawls and Kant and in the work of 
Hegel interpreters like Pippin.  
I conclude the study by emphasizing the need to conceive of reflection as 
always occurring form the standpoint of those within the process of history. For it 
is only in emphasizing this standpoint that we can also make sense of the need 
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to improve and revise the existing social system. This, I finally argue, is where 
normativity and autonomy reside.  
 
It is now time to summarize several of the conclusions reached throughout 
the dissertation. As was indicated in chapter three and fleshed out in the last two 
chapters, a central concern of this dissertation has been the question of the place 
of suffering and nature in moral theory. In Kant, this concerns comes in the form 
of the notion of agency or freedom which tries to move us out of our passivity vis-
à-vis nature. To move us away from nature or rather to carve out a space of 
freedom within nature, however, Kant has to make an argument that is invalid 
(the deduction of the principle of pure practical reason). But the consequence of 
Korsgaard’s reformulation of Kant’s original project in terms of a more immanent 
understanding of reflection is that there remains, ultimately, no difference 
between the human and the non-human, since everything is reflected on in just 
the same way. I do, however, think that Korsgaard’s approach is consistent with 
much of Kant who does seem to think that at some level we are just passive in 
the face of the pressures other people put on us and that other people are 
therefore just an extension of physical nature. (In the life and death struggle, it 
makes no difference whether you get run over by a bus or crushed by a falling 
tree.)  
The problem for this view comes in the way it assimilates all action to 
ethical action. This can be seen in Rawls and Korsgaard’s fine refutation of 
egoism to the effect that egoism is not an alternative to practical reason since it 
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too must rely on practical reason to formulate action. Egoism is thus shown to be 
secondary, a type of behavior and thus not an opposing view. However, in 
rejecting egoism, Rawls and Korsgaard seem also to be rejecting nature itself in 
the sense that they view all action as fundamentally able to transcend the 
contingencies of nature through reflection. But in doing so, they seem to me to be 
missing what was so intractable about nature in the first place— that it makes us 
do thing that we don’t seem to ought to want to do. This is the objection I take 
Hegel (and Williams) to be raising— the pressures of nature must always be 
considered in any kind of ethical theory because ethics is something to be 
achieved (must be fought for against our natures, both inner and outer) rather 
than a fact about us.  
 Let us look at this problem a little more closely. The first issue to be 
considered is the status of Rawls’ theory of justice. In chapter two I concluded 
that Rawls’ was unable to generate true communal deliberation because he took 
for granted the notion of intersubjectivity that he argued for in his work. I would 
now like to amend my judgment on Rawls in light of Korsgaard’s argument for the 
publicity of reason. I think that Korsgaard’s argument for the publicity of reason 
decisively refutes the egoism charge against her own work and also against 
Rawls. That is, Rawls’ strategy of assuming that my reasons can enter into your 
considerations without trouble (at least in principle) is borne out by Korsgaard’s 
arguments. Supplemented in this way, I think that Rawls’ assumption about the 
possibility of the reflective equilibrium is sound: it is in principle possible to 
deliberate together.  
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To stay with Rawls’ notion of the reflective equilibrium for the time being, 
we could now say that the possibility of deliberation is not its actuality and that, in 
order to turn deliberation into an actuality, we must also consider the actual 
perspectives of those deliberating. This is what the Hegelian critique of the 
Kantian enterprise insists on, as I have been interpreting it. Justice is visible not 
in theory itself, but rather in the concrete struggle which takes place, sometimes 
just under the nose of theory. If theory is to take account of justice, it must be 
able to contain both considerations about the possibility of justice in general and 
also pay close attention to concrete political and historical activity. Though, as 
O’Neill correctly points out, no theory can do without abstraction. A theory which 
idealizes away the insistence of injustice in order to present a more coherent 
view of ‘justice’ does more harm than good.243  
To put this point together with the question of suffering, we can see that 
Rawls’ rejection of metaphysics, that is, with the question about agency in the 
face of nature itself, really means that there is no way for his theory to properly 
interface with the material world.  As suggested earlier, Rawls’ and also 
Korsgaard’s theories do not register the pressures of the material world (both 
physical and social) that occur in each agent's attempt to be her rational self. In 
other words, the struggle to become rational only really makes sense as a 
                                            
243 Onora O’Neill. “Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism”. I am generally in agreement 
with O’Neill that Rawls is not guilty of much idealization, but there is a sense in which abstraction 
becomes idealization when it is not done at the right level.  
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response to suffering (that is, nature). And this is precisely what Rawls has cut 
out of his theory.  
 
 This question feeds into the more general question that has been in the 
background of this study all along, namely the question of the overcoming of 
metaphysics and its replacement with something like speculative philosophy, or a 
philosophy of immanence. While it is clear that all writers I have been considering 
explicitly reject the label of metaphysician, there has been considerable question 
about unresolved metaphysical commitments even in these anti- or non-
metaphysical thinkers. The clearest metaphysical heritage was seen in Kant’s 
division of the world into nature and freedom and in his attempt to deduce the 
existence of freedom from the adherence of our will to a noumenal realm that 
transcends the physical world.  
But the larger question hovering in the background has been to what 
extent the replacement of this view of the world is itself, if not metaphysical, at 
least insufficiently immanent. I thus suggested that both Korsgaard’s view and 
(the revised) Rawlsian view are insufficiently attentive to the world of injustice 
and the concrete suffering that goes on here and now because they let their 
respective theories rest at the level of the mere possibility of justice which is still 
removed from a theory which seeks to account for the perspective of the loser in 
the ongoing struggle for justice. The possibility of justice, in other words, treats all 
actors equally— those who think society adequately provides for them as well as 
those who do not think this is the case. Without taking account of this relation of 
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inequality among those addressed by the theory, the theory misses its target, 
namely those who would do something to improve their own situation and the 
situation of others.  
A speculative theory, as I have already suggested, would seek to tell the 
story of the conflicting demands that society places on its members by 
understanding the relation of individual and society as a dialectic between the 
possibility of freedom and justice and the barriers to the realization of said 
freedom and justice. A speculative theory gains its anchoring from the possibility 
of recognition which it shares with the views of Rawls and Korsgaard, but seeks 
to augment or give a more detailed description of the concrete norms which are 
needed in order to satisfy the desires of the different members of society. The 
concrete norms generated by the dialectic of individual and society are 
historically contingent because they are the products of particular actions of 
particular agents. As such, their universality consists only in the fact that they 
have been endorsed by certain members of society as an expression of their 
freedom. But this means that they are also contingent manifestations of the 
possibility of freedom that has not yet been realized. A speculative theory would 
aim not only to retell the concrete decisions made by individuals but would also 
illuminate the dialectical process of reason giving-itself by showing that justice is 
always both a contingent social arrangement subject to revision and a genuine 
expression of the society’s ability to be free.  
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